FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-019
Tuesday
29 January 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-019 CONTENTS *29 January 1991*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

- Commentator Adovacates Nuclear Test Ban *[Moscow International]* 1
- Karpov Receives U.S. Arms Control Official *[TASS]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- Churkin Defends Soviet Policy in Persian Gulf *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 2
- Western Response to Baltic Events Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 23 Jan]* 2
- Gorbachev Dialogue With Baltics, West Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 3
- Security Council Consultations on Gulf Cited *[TASS]* 3
- 'World This Week' Views Policy on Japan, Gulf *[Moscow Radio]* 4
- CEPA Session Opens, Delays Baltics Discussion *[TASS]* 8

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

- Bessmertnykh Continues Visit to Washington 10
  - Continues Meetings With Baker *[TASS]* 10
  - Treaty Reductions Discussed *[TASS]* 10
  - Meets With President Bush *[TASS]* 10
  - Summit Postponement Announced *[IZVESTIYA 30 Jan]* 11
  - Delay Seen as 'Joint Decision' *[TASS]* 11
  - News Conference Held *[TASS]* 12
  - Talks Called 'Repair Work' *[PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 12
  - Diplomat Deplores Summit Postponement *[Hamburg DPA]* 13

Northeast Asia

- Gorbachev, Mongolian Leader Hold Talks 28 Jan *[TASS]* 14
- Official Sees Progress Toward Korean Unity *[Moscow International]* 14
- ROK's Foreign Policy Objectives Discussed *[Moscow International]* 15

Near East & South Asia

- PLO Delegation Holds News Conference on Gulf *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 15
- Reactions Assess, Evaluate Persian Gulf War 15
  - Reports on Iraq's Demise Doubted *[Moscow International]* 15
  - U.S. Motives Questioned, Cited *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 16
  - Deviation From UN Mandate Noted *[Moscow International]* 17
  - Limited War Said 'Unlikely' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 19 Jan]* 17
  - Postwar Mideast Security Urged *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 19
- Soviet Presence in War Zone Explained *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 20
- Kuwait Grants $1 Billion Credit to Soviet Bank *[TASS]* 20
- Afghan Interim Government Activities Examined *[TASS]* 21

East Europe

Military Official Speaks on Pullout From Poland *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 24 Jan]* 21
Legislator Views Withdrawals From East Europe *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 24 Jan]* 23
Western Reactions to Troop Withdrawals Noted *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 24
Hungary-Poland-Czechoslovakia Meeting Viewed *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 25

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuba's Vice Foreign Minister Interviewed *[Moscow International]* 26
Consultations With Cuba Viewed Favorably *[TASS]* 26
Nicaragua's Chamorro Postpones Visit to Moscow *[IZVESTIYA 29 Jan]* 27
U.S. Crew's Murder in El Salvador Eyed *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 27
Latin American Group Seeks Peace in Gulf *[TASS]* 27

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Alksnis Predicts Civil War Over Baltics *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 29
Cabinet Meeting Discusses Oil, Gas Industries *[PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 30
Program Examines Oil, Power Questions *[Moscow Radio]* 30
Cabinet Resolution on Nuclear Plants Issued *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 31
Validity of Army Patrolling Questioned *[IZVESTIYA 29 Jan]* 32
MVD Official Interviewed on Joint Patrols *[Moscow TV]* 33
MVD Deputy Minister on Crime Statistics *[Moscow Radio]* 34
New Foreign Ministry Appointments Reported *[TASS]* 35
Representative Expects Over 1 Million Emigrants *[Vienna KURIER 26 Jan]* 35
Soviet Leaders Sign N.V. Talyzin's Obituary *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 35
New Premier's Career, Character Examined *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 3]* 36
Pavlov's Chances for Success Examined *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 3]* 37
Lenin Mausoleum Temporarily Closed *[TASS]* 38
Split in Donbass Miners' Movement Reported *[TASS]* 38
Fundamentals of Employment Legislation Adopted *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 38
Registration of Parties Continues *[TASS]* 39

Economic

Baltics, Not Black Market, Hit by Money Change *[TASS]* 39
State Bank Issues Statement on Money Exchange *[TASS]* 40
Finance Ministry Extends Deadline for Retirees *[TASS]* 40
Agroprom Bank Decides Decree Does Not Apply *[Moscow Radio]* 40
Officials Interviewed on Currency Decree 41
    Pavlov Explains Features *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Jan]* 41
    Deputy Finance Minister Comments *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 41
    Gosbank Chairman on Exchange *[Moscow Radio]* 43
    Gerashchenko on Rationale *[TASS]* 43
    Gosbank Deputy Chairman on Reasons *[PRAVDA 24 Jan]* 44
    Savings Bank Chief on Difficulties *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 25 Jan]* 45
    Official on Exchange Abuses *[Moscow TV]* 45
Commentaries View Currency Decree Implications 46
    Article Questions Rationale *[IZVESTIYA 24 Jan]* 46
    Reminiscent of 'Stagnation Period' *[TASS]* 48

Agricultural

Farms Urged To Sell More Grain to State *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 29 Jan]* 48
Goskomstat Aide Interviewed on Food Situation *[PRAVDA 18 Jan]* 49

Military

Paper's Coup Rumor Cited, Criticized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Jan]* 51
General Says 'Deep Changes' Planned for Army *[TASS]* 51
Concept of RSFSR Army Criticized *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 51
Claim Draftees To Swear Oath to CPSU Denied *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Jan]* 53

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

'Aircraft Bomb' Explodes in Lithuania 28 Jan *[TASS]* 54
Soviet Troops Shoot 'Draft-Dodger' in Lithuania *[TASS]* 54
    Landsbergis Describes Incident *[Radio Vilnius]* 54
    MVD Seeks Witnesses *[Radio Vilnius]* 54
Landsbergis Addresses Supreme Council 28 Jan *[Radio Vilnius]* 55
Statement on USSR 'Aggression' Issued *[Radio Vilnius]* 56
Driver in Vilnius Shooting Incident Arrested *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan]* 56
Lithuanian Media Protest Military Occupation *[Vilnius International]* 57
Swedish Radio Begins Lithuanian Programming *[Radio Vilnius]* 57
Accord Reached on Vilnius Deaths Investigation *[IZVESTIYA 24 Jan]* 57
    Procurator on Investigation *[Radio Vilnius]* 58
Lithuanian Independence Poll To Be Held 9 Feb *[Moscow Radio]* 58
Lithuanian Editor Urges Presidential Rule *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 24 Jan]* 58
Lithuanian Threat to Soviet Democracy Viewed *[Moscow International]* 60
MVD Reports Tension in Baltics 'Abating' *[Moscow International]* 61
Citizens Forum Issues Appeal on 'Coup' Attempt *[Radio Vilnius]* 62
Lithuanian Administrative Reforms Discussed *[Radio Vilnius]* 62
Gorbachev, Latvia's Rubiks Stress Civic Accord *[Riga Radio]* 62
Latvian Leaders Meet Militia Workers 28 Jan *[Riga Radio]* 62
    Militia Calls for Vaznis Resignation *[TASS]* 63
Soviet Legislators Organize Inter-Latvian Talks *[TASS]* 63
    Nishanov, Militia View Developments *[Moscow Radio]* 63
    Nishanov Comments on Riga Talks *[Riga Radio]* 64
TASS Correspondents Attacked in Riga 26 Jan *[TASS]* 64
    Joint Patrol Decision Hailed *[TASS]* 64
Latvian Council Chairman Reviews Current Issues *[Riga Radio]* 65
Self-Defense Detachments Set up in Latvia *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan]* 66
Latvian TV Organizes 'Dialogue' Among Parties *[Moscow Radio]* 66
Latvian KGB, People's Front Reject Violence *[Riga Radio]* 66
Latvian-USSR Trade Union Solidarity Sought *[TRUD 19 Jan]* 67
Baltic Party Leaders Meet in Tallinn 28 Jan *[Moscow TV]* 67
Independent Estonian Communist Party Formed *[PRAVDA 28 Jan]* 67
Tallinn Commandant Plans No Conscript 'Roundup' *[Tallinn Radio]* 67
Narva Enterprises Call Strike 28 Jan *[Tallinn Radio]* 67
Estonia Offers Reward for 'Terrorists' Capture *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 68
'600 Seconds' Reportage on Estonia Criticized *[IZVESTIYA 25 Jan]* 68

RSFSR

Yeltsin Condemns Gorbachev 'Ultimatum' *[Moscow Radio]* 68
Moscow Soviet Asks Yeltsin To Outlaw Joint Patrols *[Radio Rossii]* 69
    Presidium Rejects Joint Patrol Order *[Radio Rossii]* 69
Stankevich Criticizes Joint Patrols, Money Decree *[TASS]* 70
Moscow's Prokofyev on Lithuania, Army Role *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Jan]* 70
RSFSR Deputies Questioned on Baltics *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 24 Jan]* 72
Latvian Envoy to RSFSR Presents Credentials *[TASS]* 73
New Moscow Militia Chief Appointed *[IZVESTIYA 24 Jan]* 73
North Ossetia Sets Up Committee on Referendum *[Moscow Radio]* 73
Leningraders Mark 'Nazi Siege' Anniversary *[TASS]* 73
Chita To Sell Land at R1.5 Million Per Hectare *[IZVESTIYA 24 Jan]* 73

Russian City Reverts to Traditional Name *[TASS]* 74
New Legal Newspaper Published in Moscow *[Moscow Radio]* 74
New Leningrad Sunday Paper Appears *[Moscow Radio]* 74

Western Republics

CPM Secretary on Moldovan Party Conference *[TASS]* 74
Ukrainian Government, Miners Hold Talks *[Moscow Radio]* 74
    Premier Meets Miners *[PRAVDA 28 Jan]* 74

Caucasus

Situation in South Ossetia 'Stabilized' *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Georgian Railroad Blockaded in Protest *[TASS]* 75
Azerbaijan Central Committee Discusses Crisis *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Commodity Exchange To Be Established in Baku *[TASS]* 76

Commentator Adovacates Nuclear Test Ban

LD2701123991 Moscow World Service in English 0000 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Text] As reports indicate, the first air raids carried out by U.S. pilots on Iraq were aimed at its nuclear installations. Now, as they claim, Iraq may not have nuclear weapons of its own for a long time. Then the world learned that the Israeli leadership was threatening to use this lethal weapon against Iraq; that was taken as a hint suggesting that Israel has nuclear weapons of its own. Quite a few indications appeared in the press earlier proving that this is so. In the light of this information the concern expressed by President Bush over the proliferation of nuclear technology is understandable.

It is not clear then why the Washington administration opposes measures that would prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons. What I have in mind is the administration's negative attitude toward a universal ban on nuclear testing. If an international agreement totally banning nuclear weapons became a reality none of the governments engaged in the development of nuclear weapons could succeed in that effort. In order to develop a nuclear bomb its testing is required. The present day technical facilities available in the United States, the Soviet Union, and some other countries, rule out any possibility for holding such tests in secrecy. The logical question arises: Why does the U.S. Administration continue opposing a total ban on all nuclear tests? The Soviet Union for its part has expressed its readiness on many occasions to sign an agreement that would ban nuclear tests universally. What's more, for many months it had refrained unilaterally from holding such tests. Moscow expected Washington to follow suit. Then the moratorium on nuclear tests could be made permanent. Today, as it seems, any references to tension and the Cold War made earlier by U.S. officials to justify their nuclear test policy are no longer relevant to the situation. The Cold War has receded in the past. Yet, the Americans go ahead with their nuclear tests. The Pentagon cannot say that more nuclear weapons should be added to U.S. nuclear arsenals. After all, they already contain over 20,000 charges. Any addition to them will hardly change anything. Obviously the U.S. Administration rejects the idea of a total ban on nuclear test just because it has no desire to enter into conflict with the right-wing circles unwilling to give up the stereotypes of the old political thinking. But the price of concessions to the extreme right elements in the nuclear weapons field may prove to be extremely high. Legitimate apprehensions have arisen today concerning the spread of nuclear technology in view of the events in the Gulf. But, tomorrow such apprehensions may appear, say, in South America, or South Asia.

Karpov Receives U.S. Arms Control Official

LD2601131891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1821 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan (TASS)—Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, today received D. Mahley, deputy assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who is leading a U.S. delegation visiting one of the chemical weapons storage facilties in the USSR within the framework of implementation of the memorandum of understanding between the governments of the USSR and the United States with respect to the bilateral experiment on monitoring and exchanging information in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons.

During their conversation they had an exchange of views on key issues relating to Soviet-U.S. and multilateral talks on prohibiting chemical weapons.

Churkin Defends Soviet Policy in Persian Gulf

PM2801163191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Charodeyev from USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center: "Near East: Soviet Union's Role"]

[Text] At a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists IZVESTIYA put a question to Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate:

[IZVESTIYA] Claims can sometimes be heard to the effect that the Soviet Union's present policy on Persian Gulf crisis will result in Moscow's being unable to and failing to play an appreciable role in the future in resolving the problems of a Near East settlement. What can you say about this?

[Churkin] I think that these claims are utterly groundless. Since the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis the Soviet Union has carried out vigorous political and diplomatic work, guided by both the interests of international peace and security and the extensive and—what we are convinced are—the correctly understood interests of the Arab world, which has found itself split as a result of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. We proceeded and are proceeding on the premise that the sooner Kuwait's sovereignty and peace in the Persian Gulf are restored, the sooner the vigorous efforts to secure a Near East settlement—efforts which Iraq's actions have considerably impeded—can continue. In recent months the Soviet Union has maintained vigorous contacts both with all the parties to the Persian Gulf conflict and with all future parties to the Near East settlement process. Our communications channels have remained open with all leading world powers, with the Nonaligned Movement, with all states in the Arab world, with the PLO, and—to a greater extent than ever before—with Israel. We think that an objective view of the Near East political map shows that a Near East settlement is inconceivable without the Soviet Union and an objective view of Soviet foreign policy and of its potential will show that a Near East settlement was, is, and will remain one of the main avenues of the USSR's international activity.

Western Response to Baltic Events Viewed

91UF0377A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Jan 91

[Unattributed roundup: "Alarm About Perestroyka; Western Politicians on Events in the Baltic Area"]

[Text] At present, the United States, together with its NATO allies is considering the issue of sanctions or other measures against the Soviet Union in conjunction with events in the Baltic area; however, no decision has yet been made. This is what Marlin Fitzwater, press secretary of the U.S. President, stated on Monday at a White House briefing.

The situation in the Baltic area was discussed, along with other issues, at a conference of the ministers of finance and the leaders of the central banks of the United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Italy, which ended in New York on Monday. At a news conference after the talks ended, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady, responding to a question from a TASS correspondent in this reference, repeated the words of President Bush to the effect that "everything in this field is on hold until all of us gain a clearer understanding of what is happening in the Baltic states. I think that at issue is an assessment which should not be made after the events of one or two days," the secretary said.

As you know, the secretary went on to say, a meeting between the U.S. President and the USSR president will be held in the not too distant future. I believe that we should just be patient. We should follow the development of events and should not be in a hurry to respond as soon as we encounter something new for the first time. N. Brady stressed that balanced assessments and judgments should be made, indicating that among his partners in the New York talks as well "nobody was in a hurry to make a statement on the situation in the Soviet Union."

On Monday evening in Strasbourg Franciscus Andriessen, deputy chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, communicated the decision of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) to postpone the beginning of talks on scientific-technical cooperation between the European Communities and the Soviet Union.

Speaking to the deputies of the European legislature, a consultative organ of the European Communities, he stated that the decision to postpone the beginning of talks to a later date was made because of the events in Latvia. In the words of Andriessen, the Commission of the European Communities expects "constructive conclusions to be drawn from the existing situation."

On Monday evening, a communique from the office of an official representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was disseminated in Rome, in which it was noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been following the events in the Baltic republics "with growing alarm." Despite the objective complexity of the issue of the Baltic area, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirms that the method of dialogue and negotiations is the main path to achieving long-term solutions which would take into account the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Baltic republics, said the communique. This is why the use of threats or force amounts to a dangerous turn of events which is incompatible with the results of a recent meeting of the heads of state and governments of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris.

Japan does not intend to give up providing aid to the Soviet Union, despite appeals to do so in conjunction with the events in the Baltic area, which have been made in the West. As the KYODO TSUSHIN agency reports, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of the country Misoji Sakamoto made a statement to this effect yesterday.

Gorbachev Dialogue With Baltics, West Viewed

LD2701034291

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1458 GMT on 26 January broadcasts a five-minute report during the "International Panorama" program by Stanislav Kondrashev on the situation in the Baltic states.

Kondrashev draws a parallel between the storming of the Riga Ministry of the Interior building and the Persian Gulf conflict that could cause thousands of Iraqi casualties which he claims the United States is avoiding counting because it points to their cruelty.

He then says: "If we take the discord between Moscow and the Baltic republics, however, the statement by President Gorbachev on Tuesday took the heat out of it. He stated that his internal and foreign policy had not undergone changes, his main task is to prevent the escalation of the confrontation and to achieve a normalization of the situation, that he denies the conjecture—and there were a great many of them—regarding a swing to the right and the danger of a dictatorship. The fairly constructive meeting between Gorbachev and Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, helped to calm things somewhat.

"But one cannot say that the assurances of the Soviet president convinced everyone in the West. The protests against the fact that Moscow is suppressing the will of the Baltic peoples to self-determination are continuing, as well as the protests against the concentration of Soviet Armed Forces there. Ideologically, the see in that an infringement on freedom and democracy.

"From a political point of the view, the West is, just as before, faced with an important practical dilemma which it would like to resolve by means of a compromise that would be to the liking of both Moscow and the Baltic capitals. The essence of the dilemma is the following: In the West they still continue to value the fruits obtained from perestroyka, from Gorbachev, and want to pursue a strategic course which has given a completely different nature to relations between the West and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the very development of perestroyka does, in their eyes, signify Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia seceding from the USSR, and then the disintegration of the so-called Soviet empire.

"Here their interests, the interests of the West, are at variance with those of Moscow. The pointed question is the following: Where is the dividing line beyond which the benefits for the West from supporting the national leaderships of the Baltic republics end and losses from losing relations with Moscow start. For the moment these relations are more important for the West—how much pressure can one bring to bear on Moscow without sacrificing them? Political pressure on Moscow is, moreover, growing, taking into account the public reaction in the West. It is in its turn nurtured by the constant missions by representatives from Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. In Washington, for example, they formerly avoided receiving them on a high level. Now they are receiving them. A few days ago emissaries from the Baltic capitals were guests of Bush who demanded that economic aid to the Soviet Union should be stopped and it should be chanelled into the republics. An accord was not reached, but pressure in that direction will continue.

"The Center has to try to see that its dialogue with the Baltics does not lag behind its intensifying dialogue with the West. In the West at the same time, a scale of economic repressive measures, so to speak, is being worked out to direct at Moscow. They are threatening to put an end to the rivers and streams of aid. The relevant warnings are being given by Washington to Tokyo. A warning like this was recently given by the finance ministers of the seven, and as far as the aid package recently adopted by the EEC is concerned, there, too, they are in no hurry now."

Security Council Consultations on Gulf Cited

LD2901092691 Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] New York January 29 TASS—The U.N. Security Council on Monday continued consultations on the war in the Gulf.

On Wednesday, the council will hear reports from the allied nations waging a war against Iraq, Security Council Chairman Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire told reporters.

Also on Monday, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz circulated a letter to the U.N. Secretariat at the organisation's headquarters.

Iraq put the blame on the United Nations and its secretary-general "for terrible crimes committeed against the Iraqi people fighting for freedom".

The letter shows that the Iraqi leadership does not intend to recognise Security Council resolutions, Nzengeya told reporters.

A Security Council meeting insisted on by several countries would be a waste of time until Iraq answers the demand to withdraw its troops from Kuwait, he said.

Iranian ambassador at the United Nations Kamal Kharrazi assured the U.N. secretary-general on Monday that Iran would impound Iraqi military aircraft which landed on its territory until the end of the Gulf war.

Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov, talking to reporters, reiterated the Soviet position towards Iraq, saying it should comply with Security Council resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait.

He said he was bewildered by the Iraqi dumping of oil into the Gulf, which led to an ecological catastrophe in the region.

"We previously undertook efforts to influence Saddam Husayn, now we have doubled them," Vorontsov said.

'World This Week' Views Policy on Japan, Gulf

LD2701225691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 27 Jan 91

["The World This Week" program with moderator Boris Andrianov and guests Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial collegium of ZA RUBEZHOM, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Golyakov, political observer for NOVOYE VREMYA]

[Text] [Andrianov] Hello, esteemed comrade listeners. We are beginning our program "The World This Week." I am your moderator, Boris Andrianov. With me I have Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial collegium of the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Golyakov, political observer for the journal NOVOYE VREMYA.

At the head of the list of international events of the week just ending, I would place the three-day visit to our country by Japanese Foreign Minister Targo Nakayama, his talks with USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, and the Japanese visitor's conversation with USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The arrival of Taro Nakayama and his meetings in Moscow opened this year's diplomatic calendar for the USSR and Japan.

[Golyakov] In my view, this is of great importance, for the fact is, Soviet-Japanese dialogue unfolded under particular circumstances at the start of this year. Why is that? Because a powerful impetus and a clear point of reference for the dialogue have been provided by the accord for a visit this year to the Land of the Rising Sun by the president of the Soviet Union. An indisputably important role in preparing that event in our bilateral relations, which is intended to bring a new quality to those relations, was assigned to Taro Nakayama's visit. It can be said that his visit itself confirms the dynamism of the Soviet-Japanese dialogue, which has traditionally been one of the main components in the world order. Such an important circumstance should not be forgotten.

[Volskiy] It is wholly natural that in the course of his visit and Nakayama's meetings in Moscow, attention was focused on another visit—tht which the USSR president is due to make to Japan. Indeed, the Japanese visitor handed our head of state a message form Prime Minister Kaifu describing the Soviet head of state's visit scheduled for April as, what he calls, an historic event in relations between the two countries. That assessment reflects the view of Japanese public opinion, which sees the planned visit as a truly outstanding event, if for no other reason than never has such a high-ranking representatives of the Soviet state visited Japan. I think that the hopes being placed on the visit by representatives of the most varied circles in Japan are understandable.

[Andrianov] Let me note in this connection that statements made by Japanese state figures on the subject of relations with the Soviet Union have been dominated in recent days by a positive approach. This is expressed, in particular, in the unconditional support for the economic reforms being carried out in our country. An understanding attitude is apparent regarding the new thinking that lies at the foundation of the Soviet Union's present foreign policy. There is a sense of sympathy for the difficulties facing perestroyka at the present stage. Under these circumstances, Japan has voiced readiness to provide our country with a certain amount of financial aid to make up for shortages of medicines, food, and so on.

[Golyakov] That is all true; but at the same time, it needs to be said that there are some discouraging statements being made by those in charge of Japanese state policy. What I mean is a distinct desire to restrain the development of good-neighborly contacts between the two countries. This is evidenced by attempts to draw artificial links between ideas of good intentions toward our country and far from good territorial claims. These, of course, are derived from non-recognition of the outcome of World War II, and are therefore unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

[Volskiy] Let us get back to the facts, Sergey Mikhaylovich. Just a few weeks back, after completing the formation of his new cabinet, Prime Minister Kaifu appeared before journalists. The Japanese head of government's statement, on the one hand, voiced unambiguous readiness to facilitate the development of friendly relations beween Japan and the Soviet Union; on the other, it emphasized that an intention to continue to pursue the line linking economic and politicial issues is not very compatible with such readiness. This refers to the slowing economic ties between the two countries in an effort to force the soviet side—with its interest in such ties—to meet Japanese territorial claims. Here I will quote Kaifu: We cannot, he said, unscrupulously separate politics from economics by setting aside the issue of the return to Japan of the four northern islands and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

[Andrianov] There is something else I want to note. Toshiki Kaifu made it unambiguously clear that it is on precisely that line that he is pegging his hopes for success at the talks with the president of the Soviet Union during his forthcoming visit. The Japanese head of government openly hinted at the possibility of unilateral Soviet concessions when he said that he is awaiting from the USSR president certain courageous steps in the direction of the Japanese territorial demands. Kaifu said: We will hold out for President Gorbachev to make courageous decisions on the territorial issue.

[Golyakov] Indeed, that is more than frank speech. Even so, I think it would be worth the Japanese statesman's while to realize how illusory hopes are for the success of a policy of forced pressure on the Soviet Union and for the possibility of inclining our country to make unilateral concessions on Japanese territorial claims. The falseness of such hopes is sufficiently evident even if one only turns to the answers given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to questions from the Japanese newspaper ASAHI SHIMBUN. The Soviet head of state said that not everything should be tied to the territorial problem. It is time to move toward one another, to resolve all the problems and move toward a peace treaty. The president said: I am not prepared to sign a peace treaty with prior conditions laid down by one side. The treaty should result from mutual interests and possibilities being taken into account.

[Volskiy] When President Gorbachev received the Japanese foreign minister, there was a preliminary exchange of views precisely on the question of the territorial issue. You realize that this is by far the most difficult issue when it comes to devising a peace treaty. Our president suggested that all aspects of the problem should be taken into account—the historical and contemporary context, the Japanese and the Soviet aspects. How all this could be reconciled should be the subject of talks, of a search. There is no shortage of goodwill on our side, Mikhail Sergeyevich remarked. But the search can only be successful if it is pegged to a balance of interests.

[Andrianov] Knowing Japan's position on the territorial problem and considering the historical and the emotional and psychological implications of the issue, there is, of course, no question of Japan taking it off the agenda at present. But should the territorial problem outweigh all the remaining factors which favor the development of bilateral relations? Throughout the whole postwar history of Soviet-Japanese relations, harping on this problem has produced nothing but confrontation and mistrust, things which neither side needs. The most realistic and politically acceptable way for both countries out of the situation that has come about would be represented by a desire not to highlight the territorial problem, but to give priority to those spheres where the interests of the Soviet Union and Japan are closer, so as to build mutual trust. Once that trust is present, then it is possible to engage in serious talk on those questions where there is, as yet, no point of contact between the two sides' positions.

[Golyakov] There is no argument about that. Bilateral relations have to be developed without being made dependent on anything else, without any kind of prior conditions, without any ifs, ands, or buts. They must be, quite simply, developed. The way they develop will itself show the fairness or unfairness, the possibility or impossibility, the viability or hopelessness of one decision or another which constitutes or may constitute an obstacle to the development of bilateral relations.

[Volskiy] Of course, the main events unfolding in the past week and, even now, have been not in the Far East but are in the Near East. The war in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps the internal situation in the Soviet Union, are the only things today gripping the attention of the world. For the second week running, hardly any other subjects have been featured in the world press and in radio and television broadcasts. Many Western observers view these subjects—the situation in the Persian Gulf and the situation in our country—as interrelated. Can one agree with this? Well, I believe that, to some extent, one can, in the sense that for our country the war in the Persian Gulf is not a purely external affair. I say this not only because the combat area is situated close enough to our borders that, for instance, toxic rain or some kind of lethal clouds resulting from the use of chemical, bacteriological, or—God forbid—nuclear weapons could move north from the Gulf to reach our territory. But not only for that reason. No less important, I would say, is the psychological effect of the war on the inflamed situation in our country. The virus of violence is inclined to multiply rapidly, and in our country—especially in the Transcaucasus and in Central Asia which are close to the Gulf, but also even in the Baltic region, far as it may be from the Gulf—it can find favorable soil in which to implant itself. This is why, when we watch all these explosions and raids taking place on our television screens, we should not allow ourselves to grow accustomed to such a spectacle. As a state that is a permanent member of the Security Council, our efforts should be toward bringing the war to an end as soon as possible on a just, juridical basis. This is also important from the economic viewpoint, since the disorganization of the world economy threatened by the Gulf war is of no benefit to us.

[Andrianov] That is all very well, but as yet there can be no question of the war being halted. The military action continues; indeed, it is becoming more drawn out. After the early euphoria provoked by the intensive raids by the multinational forces; air forces, it has become clear that Iraq's military potential is still far from being sapped. There has been much talk in recent days of the missile war, but there has never been an occasion yet when either air forces or missiles have determined the outcome of military actions. A navy will not determine it either. The main thing in such operations are the land troops. The infantry remain those who take the field, though to them I would now add the tanks. On both these counts, if one is talking numbers, Iraq has a definite advantage over the multinational forces on the Kuwait front, even though where technology is concerned the air battles and missile raids have demonstrated the allies' advantage.

[Volskiy] It is a considerable advantage at that. But it is not yet clear whether that will also be the case in land operations. Iraq, for instance, has some new Soviet tanks whose combat performance is not bad at all. No less important is the professionalism and fighting spirit of the soldiers and officers handling them, however. As far as this is concerned, it seems to me that it is too early yet to draw definite conclusions. It is perhaps more worthwhile to make some justified suppositions. For instance, there is talk of how unacceptable large losses would be for Americans.

[Golyakov] Well, that is associated with what has come to be known as the Vietnam syndrome, the recollections of the unsuccessful war of the 1960's.

[Volskiy] But the Iraqis have their syndrome, too. One often hears talk of their readiness, especially on the part of the Muslim Shiites, for self-sacrifice, for acts of fanaticism. On the other hand, it is also well-known that the armies of Muslim countries have often displayed an inclination on the part of soldiers and of officers to weaken more rapidly at moments of tension, to relax, and even to give themselves up to prayer, as distinct from other armies where servicemen are trained to cope with a lengthy psychological overload. If the Americans have their Vietnam syndrome, the Iraqis have their syndrome, which I would call the Iranian syndrome. The war with Iran lasted eight years and claimed many lives, yet ended without any definite results. That, of course, cannot fail to leave its psychological impact on the personnel, though I think that the Iraqis' fighting spirit will be different, depending on what it is they are required to defend in the land battles face to face with the adversary, whether they are defending illegally seized Kuwait or the territory of their own country, in which case, of course, patriotic feelings will be much more ardent.

[Andrianov] This has probably brought us to the political aspect of the question—the goals of the war. There can be no doubt that there can be only one legitimate goal for the multinational forces' operation—the liberation of Kuwait, which is how it is defined in the UN Security Council's decisions. If things go beyond the framework of those decisions, then a more difficult and dangerous situation than now may arise. I am thinking here of attempts to eliminate Iraq as a state and even to drag NATO countries into a conflict with it. There are such plans in certain circles. I think that not only do such plans exist, but attempts are being made to put them into effect.

[Volskiy] Well, Boris Vasilyevich, perhaps this is a question not always of planned attempts, but, rather, of unplanned, spontaneous attempts provoked by minute-to-minute strategic calculations. For instance, there is the use of NATO bases in eastern Anatolia, in Turkey, for bombing raids on Iraq. That is undoubtedly a great help to the multinational forces, but, as everyone knows, Turkey is a member of NATO and the use of its territory is fraught with the risk of implicating that military alliance willy-nilly in the Persian Gulf war. There is another side to the affair. Turkey does not yet officially lay claim to any Iraqi territory, though there are circles putting forward claims, particularly in the area of Mosul, which is rich in uranium and oil. Then there are several others among Iraq's neighbors who have territorial claims against it. In the event of Turkey becoming implicated in the conflict—all the more so if Iraq is defeated—it is far from excluded that an attempt could be made to dismember it, with one part for Iran, one for Turkey, and one for Syria. In the end there is the longstanding but acute problem of the Kurds, who make up a significant part of the population of Iraq. I have great respect for, and even like, Kurds. I have visited Iraqi Kurdistan several times, and they are a wonderful, courageous, and noble people. I know what persecution they have been subjected to by Saddam Husayn's regime, and I do not believe one can fail to feel for their national aspirations. But such aspirations hardly correspond to the wholesale carving up of the map of the Near East and the dismemberment of Iraq. That would be fraught with the risk of dreadful destabilization of the situation in the whole region, which would inevitably affect our country, too. For all these reasons, the war has to be halted as soon as possible, provided, of course, that Iraq will agree in the end to comply with the Security Council resolutions and heed the will of the international community.

[Andrianov] As yet there are no indications whatsoever that Saddam Husayn will agree to comply with the resolutions. U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney said a few days ago that Husayn is a man who is prepared to go to the very end and to use all means.

[Golyakov] Yes. In fact, Husayn's public utterances provide constant confirmation of that. Moreover, by all accounts, he still has quite a few resources: aircraft stowed away in underground hangars built by the French; tanks, which we have already mentioned; and finally, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

[Volskiy] There is talk—God forbid—that he also has some kind of primitive nuclear device. One way or another, the main combat actions still lie ahead, in the land theater, and the impression is growing that Saddam Husayn will try to drag them out as much as possible, regardless of whatever losses. He is prepared to let his troops bear them. In his eyes, human life is cheap, but he considers, not without justification, that the Americans do value lives, their own, at least, if not Arab ones or Iraqi ones. Valuing as they do the lives of their compatriots, the American commanders are absolutely not prepared to take big losses. That is Saddam Husayn's view. That is his calculation. The war promises to be a long one, and that, in turn, cannot fail to have its effect throughout the world, including, as we have already said, on the situation in our country.

[Andrianov] Let me note that the events in the Persian Gulf have literally given Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the new head of our foreign policy department, no warming up period. From his very first days in his new job, he has had to plunge into work requiring the mobilization of all his professional abilities and diplomatic skills, which is what our president was counting on when he appointed Bessmertnykh to this post.

[Golyakov] Luckily, this time our minister did not need any warming up period. For the first time in many years, the helm at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been taken by 100 percent diplomat, a professional of the highest caliber. Beginning at the bottom of the diplomatic service, this graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Candidate of juridical sciences passed through literally all the winding corridors and floors of the multistory builidng on Smolensk Square. He worked for a long time at the Soviet Embassy in the United States. The perestroyka years found him in the job of deputy and then first deputy minister of foreign affairs. Six months ago he was appointed to the most responsible job of Soviet ambassador to the United States. Now here he is as minister.

[Volskiy] Out of the frying pan and into the fire, as the saying goes!

[Golyakov] Yes! The day after his appointment, at 0200 on the morning of 17 January, a telephone call from Washington rang out at Smolensk Square. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said that the Armed Forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition were going to begin the operation to liberate Kuwait in an hour's time. This call signified that our new minister was going to have to take his first steps in a very difficult and extraordinary situation.

[Volskiy] It would not be so bad if the crisis in the Persian Gulf were the only problem. But the chief problem, it seems to me, is that our foreign policy department has found itself caught between two crises—one in the Persian Gulf, where the Soviet Union, acting in the face of pressure from domestic conservatives and Red colonels, is still holding to a common policy based on the new political thinking and general human values alongside all civilized countries and the United Nations, and another crisis in the Baltics, which has demonstrated that we are again trying to tackle new problems created by real life with the old strongarm methods, which one would have thought had already been rejected by perestroyka.

[Golyakov] I do not know about you, dear colleagues, but it seems to me that this domestic political crisis of ours is going to have much more serious consequences both for Soviet foreign policy and for the country and the world as a whole than the crisis that has just erupted in the sands of Arabia. Mind you, this circumstance was noted by Bessmertynykh himself. After he was confirmed by the Supreme Soviet, he said, and I quote: I would draw a connection between the development of the situation inside the country and progress in foreign policy. If the events in the Soviet Union assume a form which contradicts international standards and international law, foreign policy cannot be successful. I think that this warning should be heeded, above all, by those who have again resolved to bank on force to tackle our domestic political problems. Irrefutable arguments in the form of tanks have immediately undermined the world community's credit of trust toward our country, earned with such difficulty in the perstroyka years, by our president himself, among others.

[Andrianov] Yes, Moscow is being shown a sort of warning card in the most diverse parts of the world today. Here are just some of these warnings: The American Senate has asked President Bush to consider halting aid to the Soviet Union. It called on the White House chief to withdraw the most favored nation trade status recently granted to Moscow. Later, the House of Representatives unanimously voted for a similar resolution condemning the use of force in the Baltic republics.

[Volskiy] A few days ago, THE WASHINGTON POST said that the U.S. Administration is at this moment examining a package of sanctions against the Soviet Union, but, the paper says, a decision has not yet been made on a concrete course of action. Unlike the United States, however, the European Community and the Euruopean legislature have displayed much greater decisiveness. They have already passed a decision putting a temporary freeze on aid for the Soviet Union worth $1 billion. The Common Market leadership declared unambiguously at the same time that aid to the Soviet Union from democratic states is not unconditional; it is linked with the process of reforms and the democratization of the state and society in our country.

[Golyakov] The events in the Baltic have also aroused a very sharp reaction in our closest neighbors. At a meeting of the heads of their foreign policy departments in Budapest, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary confirmed their intention to speed up their departure from the Warsaw Pact. The Canadian authorities declared that they are halting all previously announced aid to the Soviet Union until all repressive actions in Lithuania, Lativa, and Estonia are stopped. In short, the international community's reaction to the use of military force in the Baltic republics is fairly unequivocal. What matters is not just the halting of the flow of food parcels, which, in fact, are not at all superfluous for us at the moment, so much as the damage to our relations with the rest of the world. If things continue like this, we could find people simply turning their backs on us. In the present circumstances no country, whatever resources it may have at its disposal, can develop in a state of self-sufficiency, isolated from the world economy, as well as science, technology, and culture.

[Andrianov] One can only second that, I think. But let us also ask ourselves the following question. Surely a sovereign state has the right and the obligation to use force at home in response to anticonstitutional, violent actions?

[Golyakov] This is not a new question. It cropped up in connection with the well-known events on Tiananmen Square in China in May and June of the year before last.

Indeed, it is also now being asked by some of our deputies in connection with the events in Vilnius and Riga. Of course, every state has the right to deal with its internal affairs using the methods it considers necessary, but when military force is involved, I think that it is legitimate to ask whether the aim justifies the means. If it does, then of course we can try to achieve genuine socialism with tanks, and we can maintain our fraternal alliance and the friendship of peoples by force or by the threat of using it, particularly since we have already built one variety of this socialism and this sort of community using tanks and the selfsame Gulag. That is why I think that we must tell ourselves and others once and for all that you can not bring happiness to any society with violence. People's freedom, sovereignty, and right to social justice and protection and to a life in conditions worthy of them are the highest values of socialism.

[Andrianov] In actual fact, all these conditions are no more and no less than the basic elements of the new political thinking, that selfsame mode of thought and action which was hailed with such enthusiasm by the international community and which raised our country's prestige, the prestige of our perestroyka, to such a height abroad. But this thinking was tested on the squares of the Baltic cities, and, alas and alack, disaster happened!

[Golyakov] Yes, well nigh the most important achievement of all the years of restructuring—trust in our words and actions—has been put to question. Nine senators are already calling on President Bush to consider dropping the Soviet-American summit set for February. Admittedly, no decision on postponing it has been made in Washington, but, to be honest, I can no longer personally count myself among those who are convinced that the meeting will take place at the time planned.

[Volskiy] Here is something else I want to point out, colleagues. Objectively speaking, the bloody tragedies in Vilnius and Riga and all the present-day developments in the Soviet Union, all of this as a whole is helped to bring back onto the political arena of Western states extreme conservative opposition to current Western governments which have banked on perestroyka in our country and on Gorbachev. This is not just happening in the Western countries. We can also see something similar in a number of East European countries where fresh grapes of wrath are already ripening against yesterday's communists, if one can put it like that. It turns out that having departed from liberal reforms and democratic change, Moscow is laying the foundations with its own hands for the next confrontation, and with neighbouring states at that.

[Golyakov] Yes, many Western observers are pointing to this circumstance. Admittedly, some people sometimes regard such statements as interference in our internal affairs and attempts to teach us how to live and how to behave. But I think it is high time to understand that criticism of our lack of civilization and culture, our uncouthness, if you like, are not necessarily caused by any ill intentions. People abroad try to approach us with the yardsticks they also apply to themselves, that is, from the point of view of the general human values which we have proclaimed and strive to maintain toward other states, and have regrettably failed to assimilate inside out own country. We have no one to blame but ourselves here.

On 22 January, President Gorbachev made a statement which contained the following words: The events that occurred in Vilnius and Riga are not, under any circumstances, an expression of the policy of presidential rule. The president resolutely swept aside speculation and suspicions, as he put it, that the Soviet leadership had backpedalled on the policy of democratization and reforms. Clear political signals from Moscow of a return to the road of dialogue and commitment to political methods of tackling all conflicts, even the most acute ones, could give these assurances real substance and restore the civilized world's good relations with us. The law of force must give way to the force of law. The train has not yet left. We must not miss it!

[Andrianov] With that we come to the end of our program. All the participants—Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of ZA RUBEZHOM weekly, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Golyakov, political observer of NOVOYE VREMYA, as well as myself, presenter Boris Andrianov, thank you for your attention, comrade listeners. Goodbye, and all the best to you.

CEPA Session Opens, Delays Baltics Discussion

LD2801203791 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 28 Jan 91

[BY TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Strasbourg January 28 TASS—The winter session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA), which opened here today, focuses on combat operations in the Gulf, the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics and prospects for the development of European cooperation.

The Council of Europe now unites 24 European states. In addition, some countries, including the Soviet Union, have an observer status in the CEPA.

This status grants them the right to send members of their respective legislatures to CEPA sessions with the a non-voting right and to participate in the work of CEPA commissions.

It is expected that the number of the Council of Europe members will increase after the current session: An item on the agenda provides for admitting Czechoslovakia to the European Community.

It is planned that the session will be addressed by West and East European statesmen, including Bulgarian President Zhelyuo Zhelev, Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman, Austrian Federal Chancellor Fraanz Vranitzky as well as Czechoslovak and Spanish foreign ministers.

Before discussing the agenda, a group of legislators suggested that the situation in the Baltics (scheduled for discussion on Wednesday) should be discussed as an "urgent matter".

According to the CEPA regulations, in this case the debate on the issue should be completed by the adoption of an appropriate resolution. Co-sponsors of this proposal insisted that the council must give an immediate assessment of the situation in the Baltics.

This proposal was not supported by the assembly's bureau and some deputies who participated in the discussion, however. Sharing anxiety of their opponents over Baltic events, they expressed concern, nevertheless, that emotions may take the upper hand over a sober analysis in this situation, which will not be conducive to making correct assessments.

During the voting, the proposal on an urgent debate on the Baltics was rejected, since it did not win a required two-third majority. Thus, this question will be examined as a routine item on the session's agenda.

Legislators today began work with the debate on the Gulf situation and general issues of the Council of Europe's policies. A report on this topic was compiled by Portuguese representative Soares Costa.

The CEPA session will end on February 1.

United States & Canada

Bessmertnykh Continues Visit to Washington

Continues Meetings With Baker

LD2801160591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1426 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jan (TASS)—Talks between USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have continued here today. They are taking place within the framework of the new USSR Foreign Minister's working visit to the United States and they reemphasize the importance of the close working contacts that have been established between the leaders of the foreign policy departments of the United States and the USSR.

During the second discussion with the U.S. secretary of state, the Soviet minister and James Baker touched upon all aspects of the broad Soviet-U.S. agenda, including political, disarmament, and bilateral and regional issues. The ministers of the two countries evaluated highly the state of readiness of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and they are discussing the remaining difficulties and are looking for the necessary ways of resolving them, which will allow them to make a breakthrough in this key area of Soviet-U.S. disarmament affairs. They are also examining several issues regarding conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe.

As the TASS correspondents learned, an important part of the discussion was taken up with the crisis situation in the Persian Gulf in connection with the start of the war in this strategically important region, and equally, the prospects for the development of the overall situation in the Near East.

Today Aleksandr Bessmertnykh will be received at the White House by U.S. President George Bush. Prior to this he will have talks with General Brent Scowcroft, the President's state security adviser.

Treaty Reductions Discussed

LD2801175991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov, Stanislav Lunev, and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington, 28 January (TASS)—The second round of talks between heads of the foreign political departments of the USSR and the United States ended at the U.S. State Department this afternoon. During the second coversation, which was held tete-a-tete, the harmonization of issues related to the completion of work on the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons continued.

During a two-hour conversation, a wide range of international problems and issues of bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations was also touched on. Discussion of the crisis regarding the war in the Persian Gulf region occupied an important place. Also, the overall situation in the Near East in the aspect of unravelling the tight knot of contradictions that has accumulated in that explosive region was examined.

"We had very intensive discusions on many issues of Soviet-U.S. relations with the U.S. secretary of state," Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told journalists after the conversation. "We have adopted a decision to hold yet another round of talks on Tuesday, 29 January."

Answering journalists' questions about the forthcoming summit, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh expressed confidence that this summit will take place. As he noted, however, the issue of the time for holding it is at the stage of being resolved and will be discussed in the course of a conversation with U.S. President George Bush at the White House.

The Soviet minister stressed that conversations are being held in the businesslike, frank, and constructive atmosphere that has recently characterized the Soviet-U.S. political dialogue.

Meets With President Bush

LD2801192891 Moscow TASS in English 1915 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Alexey Berezhkov, Stanislav Lunev, and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jan (TASS)—A meeting between U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has just begun in the White House. Bessmertnykh is currently here on a working visit.

A wide range of problems concerning the current international situation and Soviet-American relations are being touched upon. Bush and Bessmertnykh are discussing in-depth and in detail primarily matters connected with the drafting of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic offensive arms and expansion of cooperation between the two countries in all spheres. The Gulf situation is under discussion as well.

Present during the meeting are Vice-President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State James Baker, Presidential National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates.

White House official spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told journalists prior to the meeting that the U.S. President wanted to discuss the Soviet-U.S. summit issue with the Soviet minister.

"Our main concern is just the Persian Gulf conflict," he said. In this connection Fitzwater emphasised that Bush wanted to bring to the notice of President Mikhail

Gorbachev the difficulties that might arise at a time when Bush would be outside the United States.

Fitzwater said that a final decision on summit would be taken after the Bush-Bessmertnykh meeting was over.

Summit Postponement Announced

PM2901151991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by V. Nadein: "Summit Meeting Will Take Place Later"]

[Text] Washington—The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow, initially scheduled for February, will take place later in the first half of 1991. This became known from a joint statement by the USSR and U.S. presidents read here immediately after President G. Bush's meeting with USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh.

The statements gives two reasons for rescheduling the meeting. The first and main one is the need for the U.S. President to stay in Washington because of the war. The second, subordinate, reason is that work on the treaty on strategic offensive arms has not yet been completed and there is a likelihood that all the problems would not be successfully overcome before 11 February, when it was planned to begin the meeting in Moscow.

The agreement to hold it was reached in December last year, when USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze was J. Baker's guest in Houston, in the homeland of the secretary of state.

Although G. Bush's intention to refrain from visiting Moscow for the time being has already been under discussion for a long time in the U.S. mass media, as a result of which the deferment of the Moscow meeting was not a political sensation, a whole series of signs attest to the White House's unchanged line aimed at preserving and improving relations with the Kremlin.

Observers include among them primarily the fact, a sensitive one for us, of the absence of mention of the events in the Baltic among the reasons for the deferment. You form the impression that the White House assesses realistically the unrivaled complexity of Soviet domestic political problems, which have no obvious solution. "It is clear that President Gorbachev is struggling against a number of difficulties, but that is nothing new, since similar problems have also faced him in the past," the U.S. secretary of state said, answering a question from one journalist.

At the same time at both meetings—in the State Department and the White House—U.S. concern was voiced at the use of force in Lithuania and Latvia. But the White House has shown no intention of reacting positively to the appeal of representatives of the Baltic republics that their state independence be recognized and that the problem be passed on to the United Nations. Nor did the U.S. Administration react to a number of signals from B.N. Yeltsin regarding the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between the United States and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The statement that A. Bessmertnykh made on arrival in Washington regarding the need to observe precisely the framework of the UN Security Council resolution aimed exclusively at the liberation of Kuwait has generated profuse commentary in the U.S. press. The Soviet position has often been interpreted as a sudden departure from mutual accords.

At the journalists' request the Soviet minister specified a number of points. It is not a case of the Soviet stance differing from the U.S. Stance. It is a case "of the danger which is created by the very logic of war and a military conflict" which no one can predict or control. The USSR believes that "one must constantly bear in mind the existence of this threat and do everything to avoid it."

If you compare this position with President Bush's recent statements about how the allies are not setting themselves the aim of destroying the state of Iraq and have no hostile feelings for the Iraqi people, then either there is no difference between the positions of the USSR and the United States or else this difference is not so substantial right now, observers believe.

A. Bessmertnykh's concluding talks with Secretary of State J. Baker are scheduled for Tuesday. It is proposed that the sides will concentrate on eliminating differences over the text of the agreement on strategic offensive arms reduction, which has been under discussion for eight years now and has never been so close to completion as now.

Delay Seen as 'Joint Decision'

LD2901005991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2339 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov, Stanislav Lunev, and Vladimir Matyash]

[Excerpts] Washington, 29 Jan (TASS)—U.S. President George Bush on Monday received at the White House USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Bessmertnykh who is here on a working visit. [passage omitted]

At the request of TASS correspondents to comment on the talks with President Bush, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stated: "The conversation with Bush was very intensive and serious. It touched upon basic components of Soviet-American relations and their prospects and future. We also discussed matters concerning the Baltic region, arms limitation, and also other aspects of our mutual relations".

The question was asked: "Was the Soviet Union disappointed by the decision to postpone the summit?" "No, this was a joint decision, so there is no disappointment," Aleskandr Bessmertnykh said.

Responding to a question on the Soviet evaluation of the implementation of Operation "Desert Storm," the USSR minister of foreign affairs noted that the Soviet and American sides "have not been conducting a joint analysis of the military operations being mounted and have not been comparing their evaluations of their conduct".

"As I already said earlier, however, we have nothing which would distinguish our position from the American one," he stressed. "What I would like to draw attention to is the existence of danger which may be engendered by the logic of war and which may be neither predicted nor controlled. For this reason we ought to show caution and know that such a danger exists and also do everything possible in our power to avoid it".

Speaking of the development of the situation in the Persian Gulf region, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stated that "the USSR and the United Sates act together in accordance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council." He stressed that "the United States is fulfilling a difficult and important part of implementing the UN Security Council resolutions. The United States is receiving moral and other support for its actions inasmuch as they are directed at expelling the aggressor from the country he has occupied. This task is our common goal, and we will strive to ensure that it is fulfilled."

News Conference Held

LD2901101591 Moscow TASS in English 0906 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov, Stanislav Lunev, and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington January 29 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Monday held a news conference following their meeting with President George Bush.

Baker noted that the sides discussed Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations, work on the START treaty, the Gulf crisis and situation in the Soviet Union.

Asked if the fact that the summit will be rescheduled reflected the U.S. belief that the Gulf war will be over in a matter of weeks rather than months, Baker answered in the negative. But he made it clear that "if the Gulf war is still continuing then, I suppose we would have to look at the situation at the time".

Speaking about work on the START treaty, Baker noted that "there are a few problems, some of which are of a technical nature". "The Soviet minister and the president just agreed that we would continue to try and conclude the strategic arms treaty if possible during the months of February. We will continue to work as hard as we can to conclude it," Baker said.

Baker said the position of the two governments is "to go forward with the strategic nuclear arms treaty as rapidly as possible, keeping in mind that this treaty has been eight years in the negotiation, and we are getting down to the very end of the line here".

"The two countries spent quite a bit of time negotiating when the relationship between the two countries was far less good than it is today," he said.

"I think it is obvious that President Gorbachev is wrestling with a number of problems, but that's nothing new. He's had these problems in the past, and he is coping with them to the best of his ability," Baker said.

"The question of the Baltics was discussed at quite some length. It has been discussed by the minister and myself over five hours. It was discussed here by the minister and the president during the course of their meeting. We have made our substantial concerns known to the Soviet Union in a substantial way," Baker said.

Asked to comment on his meeting with President Bush, Bessmertnykh said they "had a very substantive discussion that dealt with the prospects and the basic, the fundamentals of Soviet-U.S. relations", the Baltics and arms control.

Asked if the Soviet Union was disappointed with the postponement of the Soviet-U.S. summit, Bessmertnykh said it was not.

Asked about the Soviet assessment of the Desert Storm operation to liberate Kuwait occupied by Iraq, Bessmertnykh noted that the Soviet and U.S. sides "have not analysed together the military actions and we have not compared the evaluations of how it goes".

"But what I have referred before is not something that puts our position different from the U.S.," Bessmertnykh said. "The thrust of what I was trying to say is that there is a danger which could be brought up by the logic of war, which may not be predicted or controlled. So, we have got to be careful to know that such a danger exists and to do the best we can do to avoid it."

Speaking about the development of the situation in the Gulf, Bessmertnykh said "the Soviet Union and the United States are acting together in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions".

"The United States is doing its heavy and important work in implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions. It is getting moral and the other kind of support in those actions, because the aim is to get the aggressor back from the country he occupied. This is a goal which is a mutual goal, and we are going to get that task achieved," Bessmertnykh said.

Talks Called 'Repair Work'

PM2801203791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Report by V. Gan: "'Repair Work' in Washington"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jan— The talks that have begun in Washington between the new USSR Foreign Minister

A.A. Bessmerthnykh and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker have been likened to "repair work" here.

Why? There are as many opinions as there are people. But the general line that is emerging is relatively clear—a lack of complete understanding together with differences in a number of assessments and stances have emerged in Soviet-U.S. relations of late.

In diplomatic language, the objective and content of the meetings sound patently prosaic: ...to continue close working contacts... to examine the state and possibilities of Soviet-U.S. relations...—and it is virtually impossible to detect a hint of any friction. It has long been accepted that diplomats have a language to conceal their thoughts, among other things, behind formulations of this kind. Nonetheless, the range of differences of view which have arisen is quite plain.

There are several reasons. The war in the Persian Gulf, which demands the constant attention of the White House incumbent if only for the reason that he is the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, has been described as the main reason. The situation in the region remains unpredictable and has failed to develop as the U.S. strategists had planned. Saddam Husayn is working toward drawing out the military actions, and this is fraught with serious consequences for U.S. troops which are forced to follow the tactics imposed by Baghdad. The massive use of U.S. air firepower has so far failed to produce a breakthrough in the war and is inflicting damage mainly on the civilian population and Iraq's economic installations. In a brief conversation with journalists, A.A. Bessmertnykh stated that although the Soviet Union backs the UN Security Council resolution, it believes at the same time that "it is necessary to display caution as regards the scale of military operations so as to avoid people—Americans and Iraqis—Iraqi cities, and the Iraqi economic infrastructure suffering." He added that the Security Council resolution does not envisage any of this.

On the other hand, there is mounting criticism here of the Soviet stance—people are saying that the USSR backed the UN Security Council resolution, but is not taking part in the military actions. Probably deliberately, they are forgetting that from the outset Moscow did not promise to send its troops to the Gulf.

A most important factor, of course, are also the difficulties in concluding the work on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty which was scheduled to be signed at the Moscow meeting. It was thought that it would be the main event of the presidents' meeting. The talks held in Washington last week between the Soviet and U.S. delegations failed to produce results, however. Bush himself and ranking Administration officials declared that progress at these talks "is zero," although only a few problems remain to be resolved. In the opinion of specialists they are "not complex" and could be dealt with, given the desire to do so. This is lacking so far, however.

At the same time, the administration has failed to submit the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed last year in Paris, for ratification by the Senate. The reason for this is differences with the Soviet Union as to the numerical strength of the forces and armaments subject to reduction. On the admission of both sides, this problem has proved more complex than had once appeared.

Not without a desire to exploit the current political situation, much noise is being raised here in connection with events in the Baltic republics. Highly influential forces are even trying to attach paramount importance to them, demanding that the Moscow meeting be cancelled.

Incidentally, none of this is new. As in the past, both in the Senate and the House, all kinds of resolutions are being bandied about—13 in all—calling on President Bush to discontinue technical exchanges with the Soviet Union, to "freeze" trade and economic relations, and to review his intention to assist our entry into international financial organizations.

There is no need to succumb prematurely to excessive pessimism. It has always been obvious that our relations will by no means be cloudless, that there have been, there are, and there will be differences, variant readings, and a lack of total understanding. The improvement in Soviet-U.S. ties which has taken place in recent years has laid firm foundations for their development, and it is to be hoped that the cracks which have now appeared can be repaired. Otherwise, in U.S. parlance, the situation in the world today will be more dangerous than in the era when Reagan, Bush, and Gorbachev declared that the USSR and the United States have stopped being enemies.

A.A. Bessmertnykh's meetings in Washington are aimed precisely at trying to halt the trend of the two states' sliding back to the times of confrontation.

Immediately upon A.A. Bessmertnykh's arrival in the U.S. capital, I asked the Soviet minister whether he brought with him any kind of message to G. Bush from M.S. Gorbachev.

"I have with me a number of M.S. Gorbachev's very important and interesting ideas which I will transmit to President Bush," he replied.

We will have to wait and see how the White House responds to them.

Diplomat Deplores Summit Postponement

LD2901112291 Hamburg DPA in German 0957 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Moscow (DPA)—Soviet diplomat and journalist Boris Pyadishev has said the postponement of the Soviet-U.S. summit is "not very encouraging". In an interview with DPA, Pyadishev, who is chief editor of the Foreign Ministry magazine MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, said today the news was "not unexpected." As the most important reason the Soviet diplomat named the situation in connection with the Gulf war and the "sharp, extremely sharp reaction of the United States to the events in the Baltic and other Soviet internal affairs." [passage omitted]

Pyadishev said the Soviet-U.S. relations had gone "up and down" in the last 10 years. The present situation is reminiscent of the situation after the Vienna meeting between President Jimmy Carter and state and party chief Leonid Brezhnev, who signed the Salt II treaty in 1979. Then Soviet-U.S. relations were at a peak; however, they "sharply" declined "at the initiative of the U.S. side", Pyadishev said. The United States has not ratified the agreement.

According to Pyadishev, the positive period finally ended at the end of 1979 when Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan. "It would be said if certain events that slow down the development were to lead to a regression in Soviet-U.S. relations", the ambassador declared. "We do not want this and we think the relations should improve. The conditions for this are there."

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev, Mongolian Leader Hold Talks 28 Jan

LD2801190191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jan (TASS)—M.S. Gorbachev today met P. Ochirbat, president of the Mongolian People's Republic, who is in Moscow en route from Washington. The meeting took place in the Kremlin.

The meeting reaffirmed the mutual interest in strengthening friendly Soviet-Mongolian relations, in ridding them of various kinds of outdated stereotypes, and in developing everything positive and good that has been achieved by the joint efforts of the peoples of the two countries over a number of decades.

Work on renewing the treaty-law basis of cooperation on a foundation of full equality and respect for national specifics and the underlying state interests of the Soviet Union and Mongolia will be continued. In this work, the major political and economic reforms being undertaken in both countries are to be taken into account.

It was agreed that topical and long-term issues of economic ties will be examined at inter-governmental level, proceeding from the need to enhance their effectiveness and mutual benefit and to take sober account of the realistic capabilites of each side.

M.S. Gorbachev and P. Ochirbat advocated deep and thoroughgoing stabilization of the situation in the Asian-Pacific basin. Bold expansion here of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation opens up new and favorable prospects for all countries without exception in this extensive and varied region, which is so important to the whole world community.

The conversation, in which I.A. Rogachev, N. Mishigdorj, and J. Ganibal took part, passed in a warm, friendly, and businesslike atmosphere.

Official Sees Progress Toward Korean Unity

SK2801092491 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Interview with Colonel General Konstantin Kochetkov, first deputy Soviet defense minister by station reporter (Sergey Kozlov); place and date not given—recorded; Kochetkov's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into Korean]

[Text] A Soviet military delegation led by Colonel General Konstantin Kochetkov, first deputy Soviet defense minister, has visited Pyongyang recently. In his interview with our station reporter (Sergey Kozlov), Colonel General Kochetkov talked about Korea's reunification and military detente on the peninsula as follows:

[Kochetkov] Both the DPRK and the ROK are probing ways to resolve this issue. The two sides have complete differences in their reunification proposals, however.

The three rounds of premier-level talks between the North and South failed to narrow the difference. This issue will not be easily resolved.

The reunification issue must be resolved by peaceful means and in constructive dialogue between the two sides of Korea, however. Reduced military confrontation on the peninsula will be the key to solving the Korean problem. Almost 1.5 million troops are based along the 38th Parallel. In addition, approximately 40,000 U.S. troops are deployed in the southern region of the peninsula along with their nuclear weapons, under circumstances in which the two sides of Korea have not formally promised peace yet and in which only the armistice treaty, which was signed after the fierce 1950-53 war, has been effective. Therefore, easing military and political tension on the Korean peninsula and, moreover, removing it is the most urgent task.

In connection with this, I would like to recall the fact that the Soviet Union fully supports proposals for reducing the Armed Forces of the North and South and removing foreign troops. I say this with the DPRK's overtures last year in mind. We also welcome Pyongyang's proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. We are willing to become one of the guarantors of this nuclear-free zone.

I must also point out that Seoul, too, put forward constructive proposals for military detente. I firmly believe that progress in the arms reduction will hasten Korea's reunification. [end recording]

ROK's Foreign Policy Objectives Discussed

SK2801070691 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Commentary by Igor Lebedev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] In Seoul, President No Tae-u has discussed the ROK's basic foreign policy with Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok. The ROK foreign minister has announced the foreign policy objectives. Our station commentator Igor Lebedev writes on this:

Promoting cooperation with the Soviet Union is included in Seoul's basic foreign policy objectives. Cooperation can be promoted in trade and economic relations, investments, and the development of natural resources, and a basis has already been established for such cooperation. The volume of trade between the Soviet Union and the ROK increased to $1 billion in 1990.

A few days ago, in Seoul, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov signed a series of documents on deepening and expanding reciprocal relations. Seoul is planning to increase the volume of bilateral trade into the 1990's. In December last year in Moscow, President No Tae-u expressed his hope that his visit will serve as a turning point in promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in establishing a new international order in Northeast Asia. When expressing this hope, the president said that one of the ROK's basic foreign policy objectives is peacefully reunifying the North and South and easing tension on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang, too, expresses this hope.

Carrying out diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe and establishing diplomatic relations with China are the urgent tasks of Seoul's foreign policies. As is known, Seoul has established diplomatic relations with a series of East European countries. I point out that prospects are good for normalizing relations with Beijing. The volume of trade between Seoul and Beijing is several billion dollars, and it is increasing every year. The Korean Trade Promotion Corporation will officially open its Beijing office on 31 January. No Chae-won, who has already been appointed as chief of this office, said that relations between the ROK and China will be normalized following the development of economic relations.

Near East & South Asia

PLO Delegation Holds News Conference on Gulf

PM2901095991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by V. Lashkul: "PLO Advocates Cease-Fire"]

[Text] A PLO delegation paying an official visit to the USSR has held a news conference at the State of Palestine's Embassy in Moscow. Addressing Soviet and foreign journalists, Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, member of the PLO Executive Committee, set out the PLO's stance on the war in the Persian Gulf.

As always, he noted, the PLO leadership favors the peaceful settlement of the Kuwaiti problem. In his opinion, the Arabs themselves must strive to achieve this.

Y. 'Abd-Rabbuh advocated a cease-fire in the Persian Gulf and the resumption of peace talks, including at the UN Security Council.

In response to a question from your correspondent as to whether some Palestinian leaders' calls for terrorist acts against the United States and their allies would not provoke a wild outburst of terrorism, Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh stressed that the PLO has always opposed and will oppose any actions of this kind.

Reactions Assess, Evaluate Persian Gulf War

Reports on Iraq's Demise Doubted

LD2801120791 Moscow International Service in Czech 1800 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Excerpts] We are going to acquaint you with Soviet Arabists' views on the Persian Gulf war. Novosti employee Aleksandr Smirnov summarizes them in an article for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

The world media has published a number of groundless reports about the destruction of the entire Iraqi Air Force, the total paralysis of the Iraqi air defenses, and the mass defection of Iraqi soldiers, writes Aleksandr Smirnov in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

Fears were voiced at a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session as well as at other less public sessions held in Moscow that the United States has clearly exceeded the range of aims declared earlier—those of the UN Security Council resolution.

Why did the United States demand Saddam Husayn's capitulation in the first few days of the war if they were well aware that the Iraqi ruler was never going to surrender? Why has the fighting been on Iraqi territory? Why are not only military strategic compounds but also those securing the population's vital needs being bombed? Millions of Iraqis have already been deprived of electricity and water. We must not allow the punishment of the aggressor to be replaced by the aggression—holocaust of the Iraqis. Over half the Iraqi population is children less than 16 years old and they cann be held responsible for the actions taken by the regime.

There is no doubt that Iraq is going to be defeated in this war. Nevertheless, are allied military successes going to become the victory for peace, the legal order of the world, and the rule of law? We doubt it, especially if

USSR and Third World countries' efforts do no result in a rapid end to the war, continues Aleksandr Smirnov. [passage omitted]

Whatever the political future of the Soviet Union and Russia is going to be, our relations with the Arab world must be preserved. In fact a break off is impossible. The majority of the Arab states are dynamically developing countries which have much interest in both importing from the Soviet Union and supplying various goods and services to the Soviet Union. That is why it would be very unreasonable to vacate the extensive Arab market or close our economic space to the Arab world. [passage omitted]

U.S. Motives Questioned, Cited

PM2801130791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Vitaliy Gan: "View from Washington": "White House Conundrums"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Of course, the aims expressed in UN Security Council decisions of protecting international law and stopping aggression have been reflected somewhat in Washington's actions. It is hard to deny that the United States went to war in the Persian Gulf, however, above all to protect its own economic interests. Rebuffing aggression and restoring the overthrown amir of Kuwait to power—all this seems secondary. The chief motive was to prevent what people here called the abuse of oil strength, not just to ensure an inflow of cheap oil. I believe that an administration staffer was right when he said: "Our troops are there because Husayn must not be given the right to control two-thirds of the world's oil stocks. He would then start blackmailing the whole world, and Iraq would become a nuclear superpower."

It only appeared that Washington was ready to begin a war with Iraq out of righteous anger. Soon after the Iraqi aggression the U.S. aims were presented as far broader in statements by Bush and other high-ranking administration people. Whereas the UN resolutions demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, people on the Potomac did not want to confine themselves to that. They spoke, for example, of the need to ensure regional security and stability by destroying its military, nuclear, chemical, and industrial potential. Defense Secretary Cheney openly declared in one interview that the United States set itself the task of virtually destroying the Iraqi Army or, at any rate, depriving it of the ability to wage offensive operations and project its force beyond its national borders.

To all appearances, those aims have now been amended. The White House now declares that S. Husayn must surrender and lay down his arms. They are also speaking of putting Husayn and his entourage on trial for war crimes. According to recent data, incidentally, Washington would not even object to S. Husayn's physical removal and is gearing U.S. military chiefs up to resolving precisely this task.

You can imagine the conundrums the White House is now coming up against. The most complex of these is to prevent Israel's involvement in the conflict—which is obviously Baghdad's aim in subjecting it to missile attacks. It is perfectly obvious that an Israeli "strike of retribution" against Iraq would unequivocally mean broadening the conflict and, maybe, breaking up the coalition because of the Arab countries' departure from it. The latter are not prepared to fight against Baghdad side by side with their historical enemy. This would mean success for Baghdad's tactics. Washington seems to have succeeded so far in enlisting Tel Aviv's promise to exercise restraint.

From the viewpoint of the long-term prospect, i.e. the region's political development after the war, nothing is particularly clear yet. It is precisely this question that is of concern to the most far-sighted U.S. politicians. For it is perfectly obvious that the conflict in the Persian Gulf has opened a "Pandora's box." I will hardly be exaggerating if I say that the Near East political map will never again resemble the former one that existed before this war. Naturally, the questions of convening an international conference on the Near East, of resolving the Palestinian problem, and of a new system of collective security remain current.

Even the greatest optimists in Washington are saying that only a Hercules is capable of ensuring stability in such an unstable region, however. At best, they agree that in the final analysis a U.S. victory will most likely resemble a Pyrrhic one. Arab nationalism is already blazing in the region, regimes which have grown rich on oil are shaking under pressure from destitute sections of the population, and the Palestinian question is becoming an increasingly burning issue.

The removal of S. Husayn will compel the United States to maintain its military presence, because otherwise Iran, Syria, or Turkey, which, moreover, have long had plans to dismember Iraq, will endeavor to fill the political vacuum. The realization of such plans would really be a tragedy for the whole Near East—the borders there are so arbitrary that, in the event of a precedent, their complete recarving would begin. But, on the other hand, the presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Near East would mean a sharp activation of pan-Arab, anti-Western sentiments.

A legitimate question might occur to the reader: What role do the computations of certain Washington strategists allocate to the Soviet Union, which is certainly not indifferent to such a nearby region? It may seem strange but, as a rule, these plans do not take us into account. They evidently reckon that we are too occupied with our own internal problems to tackle external ones as well. Then, so they believe, Moscow is now of the "wrong weight" to appear in the Near East ring....

The expression "new world order," which, as it were, draws a line under decades of confrontation, has now become commonplace. The premise contained in this formula with regard to substituting political and economic cooperation for military-ideological rivalry has been recognized as realistic. But does Washington have sufficient realism in its approach to the events in the Persian Gulf?

Deviation From UN Mandate Noted

LD2801221791 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Arman Oganesyan commentary]

[Text] U.S. officials say American aircraft have attacked Iraqi-controlled oil pipelines in Kuwait to prevent further oil dumps into the Gulf, which has already led to a huge oil slick there. The Americans accuse Iraq of ecological terrorism but Baghdad blames the oil slick on U.S. aerial attacks on economic installations. The disaster consequences may take years to eliminate.

U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney does not believe that a ground offensive by the multinational force would start before later next month. In the meantime, the United States says it is not going to use either chemical or neutron weapons, even if Saddam Hussayn brings in chemical weapons. Iraq has again made it clear that it would not stop at using them. Here is a commentary by Arman Oganesyan:

As operation Desert Storm unravels itself further, more and more questions are coming to the fore. The United States-led coalition can hardly refer to the UN mandate that it got for the use of force against Iraq to justify some of the things that the operation's military planners had failed to foresee. One is the huge oil slick in the Gulf causing major environmental disaster there. Carried away with the hunt down of President Husayn in the first days of the war, the Americans have clearly underestimated his military potential, treachery, and resolve to hold hostage the surrounding environment itself. The U.S. dismissal of the ecological aspects of the war had from the outset led to massive air attacks on the Iraqi centers for developing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Because of military censorship, no detail is given of the consequences of these aerial strikes which may have a slow bomb [as heard] effect similar to that of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Doubts are also raised whether these strikes have really been justified, given that neither the U.S. command nor military experts of other countries are at all confident that Iraq has not retained its arsenal of arms of mass destruction to retaliate both on its enemy and civilian targets in Israel.

The media euphoria and the exotic sandy background for Army uniforms are vanishing by the day to be replaced by widespread concern over the possible implications of the war for mankind as a whole. As fallacies of Desert Storm operation become more apparent, the alarm heightens. Instead of a storm, what all of us can see now is an unpredictable and protracted war in a volatile region and with no end in sight.

Limited War Said 'Unlikely'

91UF0376A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by N. Sinyavin: "A Step Toward an Apocalypse"]

[Text] *The use of weapons of mass destruction in the region is disastrous for mankind.*

The Rubicon has been crossed.... The explosions of American missiles over Iraq have sounded the signal that all of us without exception have taken the first step to an ecological apocalypse. The "green light" on this route, as is known, was given by the U.S. Congress, which on 13 January of this year adopted a resolution on the employment of military force against Iraq. Not since the Second World War has mankind been so close to self-destruction. We do not know the date of birth of the first human being on the planet, but now a unique opportunity has opened up to calculate, with the help of computers, the death of the last one with an accuracy of up to a month.

It is unlikely that military operations in the Persian Gulf will be kept within the framework of a "limited" war. The illusory nature of such hopes is apparent when the military capabilities of the two opposing armadas are analyzed. The uniqueness of the crisis in the Persian Gulf lies first and foremost in the fact that, in contrast with regional conflicts that have taken place before, it is fraught with the employment of virtually all types of weapons of mass destruction. It is at the very least naive to count on the "capacity to localize" military operations, given such arsenals.

Since the beginning of military operations, nuclear weapons are mentioned more and more frequently in the press in connection with the Persian Gulf. Their employment—either sanctioned by one of the sides or accidental—by no means looks like a hypothetical version now. Iraq has nuclear installations, including the reactor "Tammuz," which was built by the French. Moreover, the French delivered 12.5 kg of highly enriched uranium to Iraq, which is enough to manufacture nuclear munitions.

The United States has announced that it will not employ nuclear and chemical weapons against Iraq. But it is one thing to come out with assurances in peacetime, and another to decide this question during combat operations. The fact is that a significant amount of American nuclear weapons are concentrated in the area of combat operations. As it appears, no one can give any guarantees that an incident with nuclear munitions will not occur during battles as a result of their accidental destruction by an enemy projectile or missile. If something like this happens, then new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis cannot be avoided, this time close to ports of the cities of Gulf countries. The probability of this is heightened by the fact that, as was recently revealed, some types of tactical nuclear weapons in subunits of American troops in West Europe were brought to light as having design defects that could entail a nuclear explosion even in the accidental dropping of a nuclear projectile during loading.

Iraq has pressure effect munitions, whose power is comparable to that of nuclear munitions. Thus, the total power of all of the combat charges that can be employed in battles, to all appearances, exceeds the corresponding index for the Second World War.

Meanwhile, one single nuclear explosion or pressure effect munition explosion could act as a trigger mechanism for an abrupt intensification of underground storms in an already seismically active area of the world. We will recall the version of scientists concerning the association of powerful earthquakes in Mexico with nuclear tests on the Nevada test range and the earthquake in Armenia. Still fresh in our memory are television sequences that captured the aftereffects of the earthquake in Iran. It cannot be ruled out that in this country, which resounds with cannonades, the underground elements will once again show their power.

In an exchange of strikes, ordinary radioactive waste, much of which has accumulated in Iraq, could lead to an ecological catastrophe of the Chernobyl type. Waste, besides incidental discharge into the atmosphere during explosions, can be used as a radiological weapon: in projectiles and containers, by the method of dispersal from aircraft. The combat effect will not be instantaneous, but several generations will feel the ecological consequences. When dispersed from high altitudes, radioactive particles are carried over long distances, affecting not only Kuwait and Iraq but also neighboring Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. But if combat operations start in the northwest, then there is a real threat of radiation contamination to Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The area of contamination will expand not unlike a wet stain. For centuries these lands will not be suitable for human life. The employment of chemical weapons creates a serious danger for the civilian population of the countries of the Middle East. Iraq has been conducting programs for their production since the 1960's, and it has purchased technological equipment in the FRG, France, and Belgium. According to statements by the Iraqi military, they possess the third largest arsenal of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, after the United States and the USSR. Western experts estimate the Iraqi capability to produce chemical weapons to be 10,000 tons of military toxic agents annually. The Iraqi Army is armed with nerve-paralysis toxic agents of the "sarin" and "tabun" type, and also of the blistering action "yperite" type.

Considering the hot climate of the region, the high percentage of civilian population, and the obviously inadequate resources of the civil defense services, the number of casualties of Iraqi chemical attacks could reach hundreds of thousands. The availability of chemical weapons delivery systems to the Iraqis does not rule out such a scenario, especially since the main part of the population of the region is concentrated along the shores of the Persian Gulf: Clouds of toxic gases can blanket the defenseless city ports of al-Hufuf and Ra's Tannurah in Saudi Arabia and the oases of Kuwait.

No less dramatic for all of the countries of the Middle East will be the aftereffects of the employment of biological weapons. Western experts have indicated that the Iraqis are capable of gearing up large-scale production in several weeks. In an interview for THE NEW YORK TIMES, Colonel R. Williams, director of the U.S. Army scientific research institute for infectious diseases at Fort Detrick, admitted that Iraq is capable of employing biological weapons against American troops. Iraq has stores of agents for plague and cholera, typhus and tularemia, and high fever viruses. No less threatening are the toxin weapons that are available to the Iraqi military.

Biological weapons are dangerous most of all because of their ability to spread quickly from their primary nidi. Even in the event of an Iraqi defeat, colossal quarantine measures will be required to prevent the "conveyance" of especially dangerous infections throughout the world by servicemen who participated in combat operations.

Analysis of the aftereffects of a conflict will be more precise if consideration is given to the fact that the effect of the employment of each individual type of weapon of mass destruction is intensified in combination with others, however. Thus, if chemical and biological weapons are accompanied by the employment of nuclear and radiological weapons, the countries of the Middle East will be transformed into a lifeless wilderness. The ecological balance of the planet could be so disrupted that human existence will turn out to be simply impossible.

In this connection, mention should be made of the somewhat forgotten "nuclear winter theory." Iraq has repeatedly let it be known that in the event of war the large reserves of oil and petroleum products stored on the territory of Kuwait will be set on fire. The fires will discharge large amounts of dust and cinders into the atmosphere at high altitudes. The spread of clouds will lead to a lowering of the temperature on the planet by several degrees, which is tantamount to the approach of the ice age.

War with Iraq will cause, and there is no doubt of this, a powerful outburst of terrorism directed first and foremost against the United States and the countries of Western Europe. It should not be forgotten that in recent years terrorist organizations have been displaying an increased interest in chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. One CIA report notes that this department uncovered 25 attempts to use biological weapons for terrorist purposes.

An aggressor must be punished. It seems that an absolute majority concurs with this affirmation. But now, as never before, the question of the price of restoring justice is urgent. Should it be calculated in tens of thousands of zinc coffins for young boys from many countries of the world who participated in the anti-Iraq coalition, and in hundreds and thousands of lives of the peaceful population of the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, who are at risk, in the final analysis, for the very existence of mankind?

Postwar Mideast Security Urged

PM2801155791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by political observer Vikentiy Matveyev under the rubric: "Surrounding the Events in the Persian Gulf Zone": "Days To Come"]

[Text] After the cessation of present hostilities the Near East will no longer be the same.... This idea is now being voiced in various ways by the world press.

What is meant? An even deeper split in the Arab world than before? Internal changes in Iraq and certain other countries of the region? The future role of the United States in the Near East? Shifts in Israel's policy? The situation in the oil market? Many questions, to which the future will supply answers, but the future is shaped by current events, while they follow on from what has determined the course of history in the past.

The late fall of 1956 proved a watershed in the region, marking the failure of armed intervention by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt and the collapse of the "gunboat diplomacy" of the colonial era. The final disintegration of the overseas empires then became merely a question of time.

One hundred years ago there were only two internationally recognized independent states in the Near East—Iran and Oman. There are now more than 20 there.

It is is a bitter twist of fate that Iraq, which overthrew the regime of hated Nuri al-Sa'id, a stooge of Western reaction, at the end of the 50's, should now find itself under the rule of Saddam Husayn, who has been condemned almost unanimously at the United Nations for annexing neighboring Kuwait.

The U.S. military machine has been mobilized and set in motion and the joint forces of around 30 states, among which are those which opposed each other until quite recently (for example, Syria and the United States), deployed in the Persian Gulf region on the basis of that UN decision, .

The scale of the combat operations launched shows that their aim is not just to liberate Kuwait. President Bush confirmed this when he made the destruction of Iraq's potential to produce nuclear and chemical weapons a priority task in his statement on the start of hostilities.

In that same statement of his, there is talk of "ousting Saddam Husayn," although that objective was clearly not stressed because President Mitterrand of France and certain other Western leaders were not in sympathy with it.

Finally, Bush in that same statement expressed his certainty that "the realization will come out of the horrors of the fighting that... no country will be allowed to carry out a brutal attack upon a neighbor," and this in turn will provide a real chance "to build a new world order."

I would like to think that this is not mere rhetoric and that the lessons which were not learned from the previous upheavals befalling the peoples of the Naer East will be drawn from the present crisis. Four Arab-Israeli wars in the five post-war decades is, after all, quite something!

The fact that today's military operations were undertaken on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution does not make them any less devastating or serious for millions of people. It is a very old truth that while wars are not started by peoples, it is they who pay the cost for them.

Since U.S. weapons now constitute the main agent in that section of Arab land which is Iraq the anti-American placards held aloft by participants in furious demonstrations held from Tehran to Rabat, about which we receive daily reports, are not surprising.

Who knows, perhaps these sentiments will be the most tangible legacy in the Near East after the war? In that case the task of securing an all-embracing settlement in the region will be made even more difficult rather than facilitated. The need for such a settlement will become even more pressing rather than diminishing, however.

The first few days of hostilities have already shown that the security of countries not involved in the conflict like Israel can be the target of missile attacks. Distance plays an ever-diminishing role so far as modern ways of waging war are concerned. Meanwhile at least half-a-dozen countries in the Near East have missiles.

Consequently, ensuring one's security by national means alone is becoming less and less reliable. Systems of collective security which take account of the legitimate interests of all the countries of a region have to be considered. This is perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from what has happened recently in the Near East, a lesson which will have to be transformed after the end of the war into constructive diplomatic efforts to draw up a collective security system in the Near East.

Difficult, complex? Of course. But far from hopeless. The present war must be the last in this region with its constant war alarms. Not everything depends upon the cooperation of powers such as ours and the United States, but a great deal does. The end of the cold war puts [kladet] an end to their confrontation in the Near East. That confrontation did add considerable combustible material to the region. Our and U.S. diplomats have taken the first steps in joint consultations on the problem of limiting and stopping the supply of arms to the Near East. Far more has to be done. Then I want to hope that the slogan of "building a new world order," which affects one of the most dangerous regions of our planet, will take practical form.

Soviet Presence in War Zone Explained

91UF0380A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 5

[Unattributed article under the rubric "A Burning Issue": "Save Our Souls!"]

[Text] The other day a barricade of reinforced concrete blocks surrounded the building of the U.S. Embassy on the Sadovoye beltway in Moscow. Similar "pieces of architecture" appeared around American missions in many other countries. The U.S. Government considers that there is a threat of Iraqi-instigated terrorist attacks in those countries.

As our correspondent D. Makarov was told by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in spite of the danger that exists now in the conflict zone since the outbreak of the war, the Soviet Government has decided to maintain the USSR Embassy in Baghdad, as it is considered to be an important channel of communications with the leadership of Iraq. The personnel of the embassy has been cut down to 43 people. This is the minimum number of people necessary to ensure the normal functioning of a diplomatic mission.

Since August 1990—the beginning of the Kuwait crisis—the Soviet Embassy building has been considerably reconstructed and equipped in view of a possible worsening of the situation. Basements have been transformed into bomb shelters capable of withstanding most powerful strikes. Means for protection against chemicals were not forgotten, nor were stocks of water, food, and fuel. The latter was of particular importance as the power supply was disrupted after the very first air strikes against Baghdad. The radio transmitters get their power from the embassy generator as they maintain communications with Moscow. The same power source is used for various home appliances.

The USSR Embassy building is located in the "diplomatic quarter," along with many other foreign missions, and that is another guarantee of their safety. The anti-Iraq coalition planes do not fly over this area as they deliver their "surgical strikes" on military targets only.

The nonfunctioning telephone lines present another problem. For this reason, as early as on the second day of the war Soviet Ambassador V. Posuvalyuk had to go personally to meet with the Iraqi leadership to hand over a message from the USSR president.

As we learned, apart from the Soviet diplomats there are also six Soviet journalists in Baghdad, who went there on their own initiative despite the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommending abstention from visiting this dangerous area. They are two journalists from Lithuania, two from independent Ukrainian TV, one from Vologda, and one photojournalist from the Novosti Information Agency. All of them are staying in a city hotel and do not wish to either leave the country or move to the embassy.

Their work in Iraq is seriously impeded as they have no means of communications enabling them to broadcast their materials to the USSR. Foreigners have been categorically prohibited from appearing on city streets with television or still cameras.

Apart from Iraq, there are some Soviet citizens in other countries in the conflict zone:

Jordan—50 people have temporary residence there; that number includes embassy employees. There are about 300 permanent residents there;
United Arab Emirates—118 people;
Qatar—16 people;
Oman—22 people;
Saudi Arabia—five people;
Israel—95 temporary and 600 to 700 permanent residents.

There have been no victims among the Soviet citizens residing in any of these countries.

Kuwait Grants $1 Billion Credit to Soviet Bank

LD2201152191 Moscow TASS in English 1424 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS special correspondent Yuriy Stepanov]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—The Soviet Union and Kuwait signed here today letters of exchange and a credit agreement. Under the documents, the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) granted a $1 billion credit line to the Soviet foreign economic affairs bank Vnesheconombank.

The documents on the seven-year general purpose loan facility were signed for the Soviet side by Timur Alibegov, first deputy chairman of Vnesheconombank, and for the Kuwaiti side by 'Abdallah al-Gabandi, chairman of KFTCIC.

Alibegov told TASS that the credit was extended on terms that are most favourable for Vnesheconombank. He stressed that this transaction was the third carried out by KFTCIC and Vnesheconombank over the last three years. In May 1990, Kuwait granted a $300 million medium-term loan facility to the Soviet Union.

Kuwaiti Ambassador to the USSR 'Abd al-Mohsen al-Du'ayj said at the signing ceremony that the loan represented another milestone in the development of relations of cooperation and reflected the excellent traditional relationship between the USSR and the State of Kuwait.

Afghan Interim Government Activities Examined

LD2701170791 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 27 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Islamabad January 27 TASS—The Afghan interim rebel government, based in Peshawar, Pakistan, is curbing its activities. Practically all ministries are to be shut down. The media information service has already announced its closure. Nearly 90 percent of the government controlled office staff is dismissed and will return to refugee camps. The only remaining offices are those of the self-styled president, Sebgatullah Modjaddedi, and Prime Minister Rasul Sayaf, which will have to move from sumptuous villas to much more modest premises.

According to the FRONTIER POST newspaper published in Peshawar, the rebel government, so widely publicized by the Pakistani press in its time, is forced to curtail its activities by a financial crisis caused by the nearly 80 percent cuts in aid earlier given to the rebel forces by the United States and Saudi Arabia. Until recently, these two countries were the chief suppliers of money and weapons to the Afghan armed opposition. After war broke out in the Gulf, however, the donors forgot about holy war fighters in Afghanistan.

Many Pakistani analysts are now wondering, quite reasonably: What is the real worth of numerous statements by rebel leaders that the holy war idea was supported by the majority of Afghan people? Is the idea viable at all without financial injections from overseas donors? Are rebels a force to be relied upon in Pakistani policymaking with regard to Afghanistan?

Answers to these questions are being provided by the course of events. They need no comment.

East Europe

Military Official Speaks on Pullout From Poland

PM2801152791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Statement by Colonel General V.P. Dubina, Soviet Government representative for the presence of Soviet troops in the Polish Republic and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, under the general headline "Logic of Forgetfulness;" first paragraph is editorial introduction: "I Am Ashamed Before Those Who Perished"]

[Text] Statement by Colonel General V.P. Dubina, Soviet Government representative for the presence of Soviet forces in the Polish Republic and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, made to the Polish delegation at the Soviet-Polish talks on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory in Moscow 10 January 1991.

Esteemed Director of a department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, esteemed members of the delegation!

As a member of the Soviet delegation, representative of the Soviet Government for the presence of Soviet forces in Poland, and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, I am obliged to make a statement to the Polish delegation and the mass media.

The Polish Government made a proposal to the Soviet Union concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory. In response to this our government started talks based on goodwill and respect for the sovereignty of the Polish Republic, and today we are participating in their third round.

During the second round of talks in Warsaw, the basic articles of a treaty between the Governments of the USSR and the Polish Republic on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory were discussed.

The contracting parties agreed with article 3 of the treaty, which states that until the Soviet forces are fully withdrawn from the territory of the Polish Republic, the provision of the Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and the Polish Republic on the Legal Status of Soviet Forces Temporarily Stationed in Poland dated 17 December 1956, together with the supplementary agreements and protocols in force, will be in effect.

Before the third round of talks in Moscow, the Polish side proposed a new draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Contrary to all logic, new conditions for the presence of Soviet forces on Polish territory have been included in it along with other questions....

We are discussing a troop withdrawal treaty, so why have conditions for the continued presence of the Northern Group of Forces in Poland been included? We have a joint agreement dated 18 June 1958 on the procedure for and terms of use by the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in Poland of various types of installations and services, and protocols dated 28 December 1963 and 2 August 1975. Therefore I see no need for further discussion of any terms or the signing of a new document.

I believe that the Polish side did this with the following aims:

first—to drag out the talks and sidetrack the Soviet delegation;

second, and most important—to obtain the greatest possible profit at the expense of the Soviet people, in violation of international laws, and in complete contempt for the sovereignty of Soviet citizens in Poland.

In the new draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet forces the Polish side is trying to represent the servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces as occupiers and international criminals and proposes that they be removed from its territory like prisoners of war, in railroad trucks locked and sealed by Polish customs, and without personal weapons or combat equipment. To remove ignominiously and in disgrace the forces that in 1944-1945 liberated the Polish people from the brown plague and the fascist occupation and gave East Pomerania, Prussia, and Silesia to the Poles in perpetuity and established the western Polish border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers. I recall that over 640,000 Soviet soldiers perished for the freedom and independence of Poland. Another 1.1 million of our compatriates were killed in concentration camps....

Neither individually or collectively did any of them contemplate any kind of future compensation. Indeed, what compensation could there be for the most valuable thing a person possesses—life?

But since the Polish side, on its own initiative, is rejecting norms that are accepted in the civilized world, the following reciprocal question is legitimate: Who will pay us for the losses of human life involved in the liberation of Poland, and in saving Krakow and other historical centers and values from destruction?

We have fulfilled an international duty in Poland for over 45 years. During this whole time we ensured peace in your land and, together with the Polish Army, prevented any possible aggression and provocation. Not only did our army protect and defend your country free of charge, it also paid and is continuing to pay for being here....

I am ashamed before my officers and men because of the humiliating conditions the Polish side is putting forward. I am ashamed before the older generation of Soviet people who liberated Poland. I am doubly ashamed before those who perished.

Nevertheless, the Polish side is continuing to insist on an examination of its version of a protocol whose aim is the enslavement of the Soviet Union. A protocol that envisages millions [currency not specified] in contributions for every Soviet soldier who returns home. As a member of the Soviet delegation I demand that the Polish side stop this humiliation of representatives of the Soviet Union. Who gave you the right to dictate humiliating and deliberately unacceptable conditions and mock a great power such as the Soviet Union?!

I propose that a treaty on the transit of the Western Group of Forces across Polish territory be examined as a priority. If the Polish side does not agree with this—then I say we should hold talks on the transit problem between the USSR, the FRG, and the Polish Republic separately. But the Polish Republic must bear responsibility for the obstacles we are faced with in carrying out the Treaty on the Withdrawal of Soviet Forces From German Territory.

As I have understood from the course of the talks, the Polish side has not brought with it a package of proposals demonstrating goodwill toward the Soviet Union, or respect for the Soviet people, and it is adopting a stance of infringement of the rights of Soviet citizens carrying out their official duties on Polish territory. Therefore I propose:

1. That the draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces (Polish version) is not discussed, but that only the Soviet draft is discussed. If the Polish side is not prepared to accept this, then the discussion should be postponed.

2. The withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces is a question for the future which is now at the discussion stage, whereas a treaty has already been concluded on the problem of the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from German territory. Hence the urgent need to discuss first and foremost the problem of the transit of Soviet forces and material resources across the territory of the Polish Republic.

In accordance with the aforementioned treaty the troops of the Western Group of Forces were to start returning home as of 1 January 1991, but the Polish side is blocking the movement of the troop trains. Discussion of the transit problem is a question of the utmost importance.

3. Speaking about the problem of the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces, we cannot fail to note the following: The Polish side is not leaving any hopes that an appropriate treaty will be concluded as quickly as the intergovernmental agreements on the Southern Group of Forces and the Central Group of Forces. Or that the military townships will be vacated in a hurry. It is simply not prepared to accept (purchase) these latter, or the installations leased and built by the Soviet Union. We became convinced of this during the handover of installations in the town of Swidnica....

Thus, proceeding on the basis of the capabilities of the Polish side, it will need no less than 5-6 years to accept all the Soviet military townships and other installations. So is it worth hurrying events along and getting on each other's nerves?

As commander of the Northern Group of Forces I state with authority: We will return home—there is no alternative here. But we will leave with our heads held high, with unfurled military banners, with a feeling of satisfaction from the international duty we have fulfilled, and with dignity and honor. If the Polish side does not agree with the Soviet protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions and does not display goodwill, then the Soviet forces will return to the territory of the great Soviet power in accordance with our plans and along the routes planned by us. In that event, however, we will bear all responsibility only for the life and health of Soviet people and we will shed responsibility for the Polish side.

In conclusion I want to stress that there can be no question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the Polish Republic until the full withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from German territory has been carried out.

Legislator Views Withdrawals From East Europe

PM2801120191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

["Conversation wih L.V. Sharin, leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee," conducted by S. Karkhanin, under the general headline "Logic of Forgetfulness"; place and date not given: "Those Who Are Selling Off the Barracks"]

[Text] The Soviet war memorial in Berlin's Treptow Park will probably be dismantled and returned to the USSR.... At the same time, the young men in soldier's uniform are already en route for home. What preparations are being made to greet them at their new posting, and what is the atmosphere like in the neighboring states where Soviet garrisons were previously stationed? To get the answer to this, representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee have visited the oblasts where the troop are to be stationed and the countries of East Europe. L.V. Sharin, who headed the deputies' group and is acting chairman of the committee, talks here about this:

"The first such trip took place back last summer, and instructions were issued to the Defense, Finance, and Foreign Economic Relations Ministries and transportation organizations on the basis of its findings. Incidentally, we did draw attention at the time to the fact that the troop withdrawal treaties are manifestly deficient: They do not require ratification in the Supreme Soviet and lack a range of additional agreements clarifying areas of contention. The committee adopted a resolution and has carefully followed the development of events. It has become clear that the problems regarding Army property left at places of former deployment are not being tackled in the best way. Poland has recently hiked its transportation rates, which are payable in convertible currency. It is demanding $500 per combat vehicle and $30,000 per train transiting its territory.

"After the unification of Germany we began receiving alarming letters that the Germans now treat our servicemen differently from before. Intolerance and various kinds of attacks are being increasingly encountered. There are cases of desertion from Soviet garrisons, and the Germans are not handing deserters over to the Soviet military authorities. This problem is not provided for in the treaties, and it too needs to be regulated. Other incidents are not uncommon: Our servicemen are arrested, hauled off to a police station, and subjected to lengthy interrogation allegedly on suspicion of some crime or other....

"When we set out on our trip in January we wanted to clarify the stance of the legislators of East European countries and inform them how we see the problems, since our servicemen enjoy different status in different countries. In Germany our troops, who entered there as victors, are regarded as occupiers. In Poland they are liberators. As far as Hungary is concerned, let us not forget that it fought on Germany's side and that there was also 1956. You cannot disregard 1968 in Czechoslovakia either....

"First we traveled around those oblasts in our country where deputies had been before to see what work had been done. If you bear in mind how many difficulties there are in the country, a very great deal has been done. All the soldiers who have returned from abroad are living and working normally. There are training facilities, canteens, baths, and medical centers everywhere. There are also clear improvements regarding accommodation for officers and NCO's. In Nizhnyy Novgorod Oblast, where the local organs of power have helped, construction work is actively under way and there are almost no complaints.

"We are sometimes asked why the troops are being withdrawn specifically to those regions of the USSR. The answer is simple—the Army is stationed not where it is most convenient but where it is most needed under the new defense doctrine. We are completing the withdrawal of 123,000 men from Hungary and Czechoslovakia—a huge operation. In carrying it out the 'small, everyday things' which in many respects determine people's frame of mind must not be neglected, however.

"Incidentally, people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Uzbekistan were part of our delegation and they have also carried out a lot of work.

"In Poland we met with deputies of the Sejm and representatives of ministries and visited Soviet garrisons. Our talks were complex. We expressed our dismay at cases of Polish authorities' delaying Soviet military trains. How is the following to be regarded: Our garrison handed over a military camp to the local authorities, but people are now removing it piecemeal, taking advantage of the small number of guards. This property should be sold, but the Polish side is already beginning to sell it off, alleging environmental damage caused by our troops.... It transpires that the USSR will not only have to hand over the remaining military property to the Poles free of charge but also pay a sizable sum on top.

"V.P. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces in Poland and authorized reresentative of the Soviet Government in respect of Soviet troops in Poland, has issued a statement in this regard in which he gave an assessment of the Polish side's proposed new draft protocol on regulating legal, property, and financial questions.

"In our arguments with Polish representatives we made it known that delaying the withdrawal of our military units from Germany is not in the interests of the Poles themselves and that the way the USSR Supreme Soviet regards the treaty with Poland and the prospects for relations between our countries will depend to a large extent upon their stance. It was decided to continue consultations.

"In Hungary, where the withdrawal of troops is coming to an end, we also had to contend with problems which were again mainly property-related. Housing and hospitals constructed for the Soviet military are now being left for the Hungarians. The Hungarians are in no hurry to make payments and are putting forward counterclaims, however. I think their plan is to wait until the last Soviet soldier has left and then grab it all for free. Which means that the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] must act more intensively.

"Hungarian legislators are adopting a very rigid stance, although they do acknowledge that the withdrawal of troops is taking place in a well-organized and efficient way.

"In Czechoslovakia we conversed with Alexander Dubcek, who said, turning to his colleagues: 'Do not forget that the Soviet Union needs us less than we need it.' Many people are now giving consideration to how partnership ties between the USSR and the countries of East Europe will develop. So is it necessary for our neighbors to try to derive benefit by 'selling off' Army property, thereby jeopardizing good relations with the Soviet Union? Nevertheless there is no letup in attempts to reduce this to a 'zero option' whereby no one owes anyone anything.

"We had many conversations in Germany, including in Bonn. We reminded people that our troops are in the country not as 'guests' but as victors. It is for Germany to solve the problem of transit through Poland. The billion marks [DM] allocated by the Germans are not enough, in the Poles' opinion, and if the treaty is aborted, it will not be our fault. Moreover, if we have to withdraw 533,000 men, facilities have to be provided for them. The Germans are to construct military townships in the USSR costing DM7.8 billion, but things have not yet gone beyond talking.

"The general conclusions are as follows: Treaties are concluded at a state level, while the military department alone has to bear the responsibility and solve all the problems. Commerce and the environment have need of specialists here. It is certainly necessary to set up a permanent group of specialists in Poland and Germany capable of providing skilled, prompt assistance in troop withdrawal. One more thing. Britain has concluded with Germany a treaty for the withdrawal of just one division. The document stipulates two years for preparation and four years for withdrawal.... Of course, the political situation surrounding our troops in East Europe is different. But it would nevertheless be worth providing a longer timetable for our garrisons, too. We must not conclude treaties detrimental to our interests.

"We also intend to propose that an interparliamentary observer group be set up which will be able to monitor how the withdrawal of troops is progressing. Governments are not always able to do what legislators can.

"And finally, we fully share our officers' ideas and feelings that it is essential to return home with our heads held high in pride, with combat banners unfurled, and with honor and dignity. Our Army has earned the right to respect."

Western Reactions to Troop Withdrawals Noted

PM2901103091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jan 91 First Edition p 6

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "European Itineraries"]

[Text] The events that have been taking place in recent months in Eastern Europe do not leave Soviet people indifferent. The editorial office mailbag bears witness to this. In many letters, such as that of M. Aushev from Saratov, there is an incipient anxiety about the possible consequences of the changes in the military and political landscape of the renascent Europe. The accelerated timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the East European countries as well as the movements of other states' troop contingents which are planned or already being realized, give rise to no small amount of questions.

Redeployment. It looks like this will be for the coming few years the most widely used word when describing the actions of troops stationed in Europe. Troop trains from Hungary and Czechoslovakia are traveling east carrying home servicemen of the Southern and Central Groups of Soviet Forces. Our Western Group of Forces deployed in Germany is beginning to move. Talks are proceeding on the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces from Poland.

Apart from the Soviet Army, the armies of other member states of the Warsaw Pact are also participating in the changes taking place at the moment on the European strategic map. Although it would probably be more correct to say those states that are still member states. For, after the well-known changes that have taken place in these countries, they are declaring with greater or lesser degrees of urgency their intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, or at least in the initial stages to eliminate its military structures.

Of course you can only welcome the elimination of the blocs and their replacement by new common European security structures. But the point is that there is no talk of eliminating the military structures of Europe's second military and political bloc—NATO.

Moreover, at the series of NATO conferences held last December, the need to maintain the bloc's military structures, equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons, was reaffirmed.

One of the pretexts to justify the need to maintain and develop NATO is the threat of instability in the Soviet Union. In the foreign mass media you hear the most diverse reports on the theme of the possible uncontrollable stream of refugees from the Soviet Union caused by the exacerbation of the food situation and the escalation of interethnic clashes in the republics. According to calculations cited, from 2.5 to 8 million Soviet refugees can be expected.

I personally am not very convinced by these calculations. I think that fears have been greatly exaggerated. But be that as it may, the East European countries' leaders, guided by such ideas, are planning, and in some places are even putting into effect, measures to limit this hypothetical stream of refugees from the USSR by the strengthening their border security. These actions also fit well with, say, the policy document "Armed Forces-90," recently approved by the Polish Government. In accordance with this concept, it is proposed to redeploy a part of the Polish Armed Forces from the western to the eastern border.

Of course, any state has the right to locate its Armed Forces on its territory in any way its sees fit. When I think about this redeployment, however, for some reason I recall U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney's recent visit to Poland, during which the possibility to "include the Republic of Poland in the international program of military and combat training, which the United States and other Western countries are implementing," was discussed among other things.

Taking into account the existence of similar processes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, I would risk suggesting that someone would like to erect in place of the collapsed Berlin Wall a new European wall—further east, closer to the Soviet borders. Such an impression is only intensified by the never ending conversations centered around the possibilities of profiting from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the East European countries.

The contours of our continent's new future were outlined at the meeting in Paris last fall of representatives of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is the documents adopted then which should guide the political and military redeployment taking place in Europe now.

Hungary-Poland-Czechoslovakia Meeting Viewed

PM2801111191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Valentin Sharov "Viewpoint": "'Troika' In Central Europe"]

[Text] The foreign ministers of three neighboring countries—Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—have met in Budapest. The talks were brief and no unexpected decisions were adopted. Nonetheless, the results of the talks generated a great deal of interest in the world community and media reaction. What is the reason for this?

There are two reasons, I believe.

First, the presidents and government heads of the "troika" were supposed to meet last Monday in the old Hungarian town of Visegrad. The top leaders did not arrive. The heads of the diplomatic departments arrived instead—but not in Visegrad.

Second, the agenda aroused interest. It included, in particular, a discussion of the question of the Warsaw Pact's future.

There are plenty of hypotheses and opinions about the talks that never were. People are right when they put it down to the sudden exacerbation of the international situation, the complex, contradictory processes in each of the "troika" countries, and the sides' differnces in certain matters. I would add another one to the list: The "polishing" of the final document had not been completed.

This was pointed out, in fact, by Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski on his return from Budapest: "A declaration is being prepared—the result of rather lengthy work, which is to determine the three states' common aims, aspirations, and interests."

I also noticed that, so to speak, confrontational motives are present in the Western and in our press. Namely, a desire to set Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia against... the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. As if the "troika" wanted to determine common approaches to the main international events without the participation of the remaining members of the Warsaw Pact. Some are even more trenchant: The "troika" is seeking to overcom "Moscow's gravitational pull."

What can one say in this connection? The bloc mentality is so deeply ingrained in our consciousness that we sometimes keep faith with it even when we want to say the opposite. Yet new realities are emerging in Europe. What has crystallized and taken root is the awareness that the security of the peoples of the continent cannot be strengthened by building up military political blocs' muscles; it is a collective undertaking.

Bilateral and multilateral contacts, even if they are of a local nature and involve part of the continent, must been seen in the context of common efforts. Balkan dialogue has been developing fruitfully for some years. Five countries that gravitate toward the Adriatic coast—Yugoslavia, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary—are switching to talks and cooperation on a permanent basis. Their joint projects include the reconstruction of railroads and highways leading to the sea, the creation of modern tourist facilities, and environmental protection.

A Hungary-Poland-Czechoslovakia alliance could play a positive role. Let me cite K. Skubiszewski again: "Cooperation involving Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is very important. Our countries possess definite potential, they have similar, coincident, and, in a number of matters, identical interests, and they are trying to develop a new regional cooperation in this part of the European continent. It strengthens European cooperation and meets our varied interests."

So let us not try to scare ourselves and others when we fail to see all the participants in a particular military political bloc at the negotiating table.

In Budapest there was a discussion of the Warsaw Pact's future. The communique notes that the foreign ministers advocated the earliest holding of the Political Consultative Committee conference, which has been postponed several times at the USSR's request, and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact's military structures. In view of this one keeps on hearing funeral motifs in the commentaries on the meeting.

Everyone likes his own songs. But I must mention the collective initiatives that have come out of the Warsaw Pact over its 35-year existence. Was it not it that gave the fillip that led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? Was it not the Warsaw Pact that resolutely advocated the elimination of the two military political blocs in Europe? Back in the summer of 1989 a routine Political Consultative Committee conference set the practical task of shifting the center of gravity of cooperation from the military to the political sphere.

Of course, the Budapest meeting is only a stage. So we will hold fire with our final conclusions and assessments.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuba's Vice Foreign Minister Interviewed

PY2601234591 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 25 Jan 91

[First part of an "exclusive" interview with Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Raul Roa by Vladimir Stigneyev in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] [Stigneyev] Without a doubt, the USSR and Cuba are undergoing two processes that I believe are very similar. I am referring to perestroyka or restructuring in the USSR and the process of rectification in Cuba. As I see it, the two processes have some differences and points in common which I would like you to discuss.

[Roa] That is a question that cannot be answered briefly, but I will try. I agree with you, but the Cuban process of rectifying mistakes and negative trends began one year before perestroyka began in the USSR. I think the objective of the two processes is to strengthen socialist society. Cuba's problems are different from those of perestroyka in the USSR. Although they are different processes, they are both based on authentic revolutionary experiences.

We cannot assert that in both cases these were imported revolutions. Rather, these were revolutions with popular origins which maintained their commitment to the masses to build a society meeting the people's demands. I think, however, that some differences do exist (?in keeping), I think, with their historical processes. For example, in Cuba we have not thought of resorting to a market system to boost our economy because we think it is not necessary. Actually, the economic situations in the two countries are as different as the levels of development. Therefore, I do not think that the same mechanism can be applied to the two countries.

[Stigneyev] Comrade Roa, the following question has to do with conjectures on the future of economic relations between the USSR and Cuba, taking into consideration the difficulties and deficiencies which have lately appeared in the USSR, which is Cuba's most important economic partner. It is no secret that some groups with a critical vision of the future of these economic relations have recently appeared in the USSR. What do you think about that?

[Roa] In the field of economic cooperation, I think Cuba and the USSR maintain relations which have been described as exemplary by President Fidel Castro. Ever since we joined the CEMA we have expressed the need to adjust trade and economic cooperation, and all kinds of relations among developed and underdeveloped socialist countries, using concepts that are different from those which regulate trade among capitalist countries. That is, these relations should have eradicated what contemporary economists and politicians call unequal exchange. I think that in our relations with the USSR we have eliminated that unequal exchange.

Clearly, trade relations between countries should be based on reciprocal, real interests. I would say relations between Cuba and the USSR are based on mutual realistic interests. I do not think these objective interests will change in the future. On the contrary, as long as the Soviet economy increases its high technology and quality production, and as long as Cuba diversifies its economy and its exports, our exchange will increase rather than diminish in the future.

Consultations With Cuba Viewed Favorably

LD2601115791 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—The Soviet Union and Cuba held political consultations at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 24 and 25.

The discussions, held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, focussed on ways to strengthen global and regional security, including in the light of the Gulf ward.

The sides had a constructive dialogue on bilateral cooperation at the United Nations and other international organisations, including the agenda of the forthcoming session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

The sides discussed Latin American problems and ways to strengthen Soviet-Cuban relations.

The Soviet side was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and other diplomats, the Cuban side was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Raul Roa Couri and Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jose Ramon Balaguer.

Nicaragua's Chamorro Postpones Visit to Moscow

PM2801155591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, REUTER, UPI roundup: "V. de Chamorro's Visit to USSR Postponed"]

[Text] Nicaraguan President Violeta de Chamorro has postponed her official visit to the Soviet Union scheduled for February. This decision has been adopted due to the war in the Persian Gulf and because the Soviet Government is preparing for the summit between USSR President M. Gorbachev and U.S. President G. Bush, a spokesman for the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry said.

V. de Chamorro will visit Japan in mid-February, where she will meet this country's prime minister, T. Kaifu. They will discuss, in particular, economic aid for Nicaragua. From Japan she will go on to Germany and Czechoslovakia.

U.S. Crew's Murder in El Salvador Eyed

PY2601221091 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Spanish 0200 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Valentin Mashkin commentary]

[Text] Before starting [words indistinct] it will be necessary to give you some background on my commentary. Early in January 1991, a U.S. military helicopter was shot down by Salvadoran guerrilla forces in San Miguel Department near Lolotique.

The helicopter was one of the many stationed in Honduras that fly over Salvadoran territory under the control of guerrilla forces. The guerrilla forces said the helicopter opened fire on the population of Lolotique, on the civilian population. The guerrilla forces answered the fire immediately. The helicopter was carrying three Americans. One of them died when the helicopter crashed, but the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the other two Americans were not very clear.

Initial reports from the guerrilla forces indicated that the three Americans died in the crash. Then another report stated that two of the Americans, Lieutenant Colonel Pickett and a mechanic named Dawson, were seriously injured when the helicopter hit the ground. The report noted that they were given medical assistance and handed over to the local population for hospitalization, but that the colonel and the mechanic died soon thereafter from their wounds.

This story would not have been (?questioned) had the bodies not been taken to forensic doctors. The doctors who did the autopsy discovered that Pickett and Dawson, who were injured when the helicopter was shot down, were reportedly murdered.

Let me now ask listeners to understand me: I do not believe that the guerrilla commanders lied when they gave their initial reports. But they were led to make a mistake [words indistinct] by the guerrillas who committed the murder. This is the assumption because the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front], immediately after the forensic doctors released their report, announced that it would carry out a thorough investigation of the case. The murder did occur. [words indistinct] that the Americans were murdered by rebels and civilians. But the real names of the murderers have been kept secret to prevent reprisals against their families by death squads.

The FMLN labeled this case a military crime and I believe that this is correct. It should be noted that the FMLN respects agreements [words indistinct] which demand that the two sides in the conflict treat war prisoners humanely. The guerrilla leaders will hang the murderers. They promised that the trial will be just and absolutely impartial. From my point of view, the FMLN leadership acted with dignity.

Latin American Group Seeks Peace in Gulf

LD2801154791 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Yiriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—Latin American countries can make a serious contribution to the search for ways to end the Gulf conflict, Valeriy Nikolayenko, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Latin American countries, told TASS.

He referred to a consultative meeting of the foreign ministers of the Rio de Janeiro group member-states, opening in the capital of Venezuela today, as a "Forum of Exceptional Importance". They will discuss possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the Gulf conflict and analyse its consequences for the Latin American economy.

The desire of Latin Americans, Rio de Janeiro Group members, in particular, to more actively participate in the search for ways to settle the Gulf crisis is being ardently welcomed in the Soviet Union, Nikolayenko said.

The Gulf situation insistently calls for enlisting the efforts of the entire international community. Blood is being spilled, tremendous damage is being inflicted upon the environment. Traditional economic ties have been disrupted and the possibility that the Gulf war will spread over to other countries is not ruled out. Under these conditions, Nikolayenko believes, it is essential to do everything to prevent an Arab-Israeli armed clash.

The Soviet Government, for its part, does everything depending on it to prevent a further aggravation of the Gulf situation, Nikolayenko said.

"We are prepared to cooperate with Latin American countries and to help all those who seek to localize the conflict and end the senseless bloodshed," he emphasised.

Nikolayenko said that with this end in view Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh maintains contacts with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Reinaldo Figueredo, coordinator of the Rio de Janeiro group meeting, and the Soviet Foreign Ministry is in contact with its Latin American counterparts.

"We believe that the authoritative say of representatives of the Rio de Janeiro Group and their strong influence on Iraqi leaders may be of invaluable importance," Nikolayenko stressed.

Political & Social

Alksnis Predicts Civil War Over Baltics

91UM0298A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy, by V. Romanenko; place and date not given; published under the rubric "They Are So Different-...These Generals and Colonels": "'Moscow Has Abandoned Us'"]

[Text] **Before you is an interview which we considered we did not have the right not to publish. USSR People's Deputy V. Alksnis undoubtedly understands that he is responsible for the information, for his words. And if they contain if only a grain of truth, may this serve as a warning to those who believe that all that has happened in the Baltics has been by chance. For its part, the editorial office promises to immediately publish a refutation of the information which Colonel V. Alksnis gave us.**

[Romanenko] In conversation with Western correspondents you said that the national salvation committees in the Baltic republics were set up on the initiative of USSR President M. Gorbachev in order ultimately to impose direct presidential rule in these republics.

[Alksnis] Yes, this corresponds to reality. I was speaking recently with comrades from the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee. They said: We have done all that Moscow asked of us. Moscow promised that it would travel the second half of the way—the introduction of direct presidential rule—itself. But Moscow has abandoned us. We have been betrayed by the president, we have been betrayed by the supreme soviets of the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the USSR Government, we have been betrayed by B. Yeltsin.

[Romanenko] Your forecast of the development of events in the Baltics?

[Alksnis] Civil war.

[Romanenko] In the Baltics?

[Alksnis] No. It will inevitably grow into a civil war on a Union-wide scale.

[Romanenko] War between whom?

[Alksnis] It is starting as an interethnic conflict; but this is only the outward form. Everyone already understands today that it is essentially a political conflict. The process of stratification into the supporters and opponents of the path chosen by the supreme soviets of the Baltic republics will intensify.

In addition, a total collapse of the economy and a stoppage of the major plants are coming. Millions of workers will take to the streets. It is then that the situation will become uncontrollable. In which direction will this mass of workers swing? Whom will it follow—the Communists or the radicals? God only knows. Whom will it consider its enemies? Ultimately appalling chaos and complete anarchy.

It is here that a new, third force, of which currently no one knows or suspects, could emerge. It would not be Yeltsin or Gorbachev but a person completely unknown who in this situation could come to power by accident.

[Romanenko] But the correlation of forces, in Lithuania, for example, is, after all, far from even: 80 percent Lithuanians and 8.9 percent Russians. Without the intervention of the Army the Russian-speaking population is doomed to defeat. Do you hope to come to power at bayonet point?

[Alksnis] That the Army will switch to an autonomous operating mode cannot be ruled out either. The situation in the Army now is akin to the situation in 1917.

[Romanenko] Has the president already lost control of the Army, in your opinion?

[Alksnis] He controls it as yet; but there is a growing protest in Army circles in connection with the fact that it has for the umpteenth time been "exposed" in the events in Lithuania and that it is constantly being made the "scapegoat," while the true culprits of the tragic events remain in the background.

[Romanenko] But you do not think that the Army also might "stratify"?

[Alksnis] In the Baltics, no. This could happen in Moscow, among those who are serving in the warm offices of the General Staff and various directorates; but there, no. There the Army is "homogeneous." The ideas of "Democratic Russia" are supported in our officer corps only by a few percent.

[Romanenko] In what specifically, from your viewpoint, is the president's "betrayal" of the Army expressed? The fact that he has lacked the resolve to impose direct presidential rule in Lithuania?

[Alksnis] Yes; because if a specific decision is made, it should be fulfilled. Otherwise it is better not to begin.

[Romanenko] But there have been no official reports of such a decision on the part of the president.

[Alksnis] It has not been advertised, that is true; but a set of measures pertaining to the preparation of such a decision has been implemented.

Now, however, because to the president's indecisiveness, we have found ourselves in a worse situation than before. We have been pulled into this adventure. I knew from day one that this was an adventure because—I repeat—the president has betrayed us. He is afraid to take responsibility. I envy the Americans. Following the incident involving the U.S. U-2 aircraft in the Sverdlovsk region, President Eisenhower assumed personal responsibility, declaring that it was he who had sent the aircraft, although this was not truly the case.

I am also amazed by some of our Baltic leaders, who were unduly confident in saying that everything was all right, that we would win, that the center would support us, that we would receive help....

This evening I had a discussion with A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee. He is no longer counting on the support of the president and the center. Comrades from Lithuania are also in despair. Why did all this have to start? Imagine, a surgeon starts an operation, makes the incision in the body of the patient, and leaves him....

Cabinet Meeting Discusses Oil, Gas Industries

PM2901112591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "USSR Cabinet of Ministers Sitting"]

[Text] USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, who chaired a USSR Cabinet of Ministers sitting 28 January, spelled out rigid timetables for elaborating specific actions to rectify the complex, grave situation in which oil workers have found themselves and the difficulties which gas industry workers are increasingly encountering.

The participants in the sitting—Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov; his deputies; I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers; Union and republic people's deputies; leaders of ministries, departments, and concerns; general directors of major oil and gas extraction production associations; and scientists—discussed the question of steps to stabilize the work of the oil and gas industries.

During a frank and interested discussion they outlined the most painful points in these leading economic sectors and analyzed the reasons for the drop in the level of oil extraction and the slowdown in the gas extraction growth rate. The participants focused their attention on the quest for specific means of escaping from the situation that has taken shape. Problems involved in the sectors' funding, their provision with material and technical resources, and supplies of food and consumer goods to oil and gas regions were the subject of serious analysis. Specific cases were cited of a lag in the construction of housing and sociocultural facilities, particularly in the largest oil and gas region itself—Tyumen Oblast.

The speakers spoke, in particular, of the need to resolve issues of more fully extracting oil from the depths of the earth and more comprehensive processing, along with the development of an oil and gas economy programs. It was also noted that enterprises in the machine building and metallurgical complexes are inadequately meeting oil and gas workers' demands for equipment and materials, and well-founded complaints were voiced about the poor quality of a considerable proportion of the output. Defense complex capacities that are being freed up as a result of conversion must be enlisted more extensively in resolving these tasks. The need was also stressed to give priority to exploration work, speed up work to complete the preparation of a long-term USSR power generation program, and resolve environmental problems.

Summing up the results of the sitting, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the development of the oil and gas industry is of all-Union significance and reflects the interests of all republics, all sectors, and the entire population. This task can only be resolved by the efforts of the whole country.

The USSR president divided all oil and gas complex problems into two groups: urgent problems relating to work this year and long-term problems. On the former, instructions have been given for USSR Cabinet of Ministers decisions to be prepared within a week on funding, material and technical supply, and improving the supply of food and essentials for workers in oil and gas regions. With regard to the second group of problems instructions have been given for a package of solutions to be developed within the first six months of this year creating real conditions for the reliable operation of market mechanisms designed to ensure the stable, effective working of enterprises in the oil and gas industry—fundamental sectors within the national economy.

Program Examines Oil, Power Questions

LD2501222691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 25 Jan 91

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program with presenter Valentin Gubernatorov, and guests Igor Surguchev, Viktor Levin, and Sergey Pravdin, not further identified]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Gubernatorov] Comrade Fayzullina, who lives in Kaliningrad oblast, asks: How is the Druzhba oil pipeline and the Mir power grid now being used? Where do the countries of East Europe purchase oil?

First of all, I will remind you that the Druzhba oil pipeline and the Mir power grid were set up within the CEMA framework some 30 years ago. These are major structures, built jointly by the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, including Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

In the past few days, the pace of development of the USSR's energy industry has slowed by at least two-thirds. Oil recovery is being reduced sharply. Instead of the 70 million tonnes of oil planned for 1990, the countries of East Europe received from our country approximately 20 million tonnes less. The lines at the gasoline pumps in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland are getting longer all the time. The anxiety of the governments of the East European countries is growing more and more acute. In the new year, a further drop in the supplies of Soviet oil to these countries, by approximately 50 percent as compared with last year, can be anticipated. In previous years the difference between world prices for oil and prices on the Soviet market—some $20 per barrel in Western prices and ranging from 20 cents to $1.50 on the Soviet market—enabled our East European partners to save considerable funds and even to resell a proportion of the oil being imported, thus earning foreign currency. Now they are forced to purchase from Near East and African states for hard currency.

The difficulties of the East European countries are being aggravated by the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The more than doubling of world prices to $40 per barrel has reduced these countries' ability to purchase oil on the world market. If the crisis is drawn out and the present level of prices is maintained, then next year virtually all export revenues of the East European countries will be used for pay for the import of oil.

As regards the Mir power grid, not everything is smooth. Consumption of electric power inside our country has increased. The insignificant increase in the capacities of electric power stations has turned out to be totally inadequate. The aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe is having an effect.

It is increasingly difficult to exchange goods for the convertible rubles being earned by means of the Mir grid. There is a need to change over to a new system of contracts.

The change this year to accounting at world prices and freely convertible currency between the Soviet Union and East Europe will force many East European countries to look for reliable sources of hard currency revenues to pay for the import of fuel and electric power, and to change their attitude toward cooperation with the Soviet Union. They must not regard it as a source of fuel in exchange for uncompetitive goods, compared with Western goods.

Moreover, at the international conference taking place in Sweden in November, where the prospects for Soviet exports of energy raw materials was examined, it was noted that with the USSR changing over to the market, a more rational management of the energy economy is possible. This will make it possible to save up to 60 percent of the energy now being consumed.

This is how I want to reply to Comrade Fazzulina's question. [passage omitted]

Cabinet Resolution on Nuclear Plants Issued

PM2901090991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Official": "In the USSR Cabinet of Ministers"]

[Text] The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a resolution on measures to enhance the interest of local organs and the population in the siting of nuclear power projects on their territory.

The USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry is entrusted, effective 1991, with including in the cost of constructing new AES's [nuclear power stations] and enlarging existing ones up to 10 percent of the capital investments allocated to this for the construction of projects in the social sphere inside 30-km zones around AES's (according to the lists, volumes, and times agreed with the corresponding local soviets).

Plans for the construction of new AES's and the enlargement of existing ones must provide for the construction of individual farmstead-type dwelling houses with heating, a central water supply, and sewer system for their workers in population centers located around AES's. Up to 10 percent of the funds earmarked for civilian housing construction are allocated for these purposes. Up to 20 percent of such houses will be transferred to local soviets.

It is also planned to include in the plans the construction of health camps for schoolchildren and preschoolchildren, based on providing all children living in a 10-km zone around an AES with passes, and to set up diagnostic centers attached to medical treatment establishments in AES settlements, where citizens living within the 30-km zone of AES's will be screened on referral by rayon health care departments in addition to the workers of these stations.

It has been decided, effective 1 January 1991, to grant the population living in 30-km zones around existing AES's a 50-percent discount on the set charge for using electricity for domestic needs (except rural consumers).

The USSR Ministry of Finance together with the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry is entrusted with drawing up proposals in the first half of 1991 for introducing compulsory state insurance covering the person and the movable and immovable property of citizens living around existing AES's against the risk of the effects of radiation, with compensation for those who have suffered possible harm occasioned by such effects.

For the purpose of funding the work to be done in regions where existing nuclear power generation projects are sited on constructing and modernizing health care, cultural, and public education projects and public consumer service and municipal service enterprises, as well as developing the material and technical base for the production of consumer goods during 1991-1995, the profit tax liable to be entered in the Union budget is reduced by up to 30 percent for AES's.

The governments of Union republics which are divided into oblasts are recommended to leave at the disposal of kray and oblast soviets most of the tax on the operating profits of AES's located on their territory that is liable to be entered in the republic budget.

The USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry has been charged with setting up automated information centers in all population centers located in the 30-km zones around existing AES's and other nuclear power generation projects during 1991-1995, so as to keep the population constantly informed about the radiation situation, and providing local sanitation services and the inhabitants of such zones with dosimetric and radiometric apparatus to monitor the radiation situation and the radioactive contamination of agricultural produce, as well as ensuring technical servicing and checking of this apparatus.

Validity of Army Patrolling Questioned

PM2801165691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by N. Burbyga, F. Ivanov, and V. Rudnev under the "Details for IZVESTIYA" rubric, followed by commentary by observer Yu. Feofanov: "What Lies Behind the Two Ministers' Order?"]

[Text] As already reported, a joint order of the USSR ministers of internal affairs and defense "On the Organization of Joint Patrolling by Personnel of the Internal Affairs Organs and Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy" comes into force 1 February 1991.

Here are just two quotations from that document, dated 29 December last year:

"...Soviet Army and Navy servicemen armed with firearms are to be assigned to joint patrolling: when complications arise in the operational situation, including mass actions by citizens—for a 24-hour period; in the context of the preparation and holding of sociopolitical events and on holidays—for the evening, or on nonworking days—as necessary."

"...There is to be a permanent reserve of patrols in vehicles (armored carriers) and duty subunits of company or battalion strength at every garrison, with the corresponding arms and ammunition."

For what purpose is armed patrolling with armored carriers being introduced?

"Joint patrolling is a measure that has been forced upon us," says Colonel E. Ryazanov, first deputy chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Administration for the Protection of Public Order. "Robbery, murder—all this, unfortunately, is a feature of our life. People are afraid to go out. Something must be done. But the militia does not have the resources. And we are glad of the Army's help."

[IZVESTIYA] "But will help of this kind not lead to even greater instability? After all, servicemen, even armed and in armored carriers, are still not trained to combat violators of law and order."

[Ryazanov] "The servicemen will operate together with militia workers. And their task is to halt the crime wave."

"The state of law and order in the streets of the country's cities and settlements, despite the measures being adopted, is deteriorating every day," Lieutenant General V. Yermin, General Staff directorate chief, claims. "The number of serious crimes involving violence and often of a brazen and cynical nature has increased sharply. Acts of vandalism and outrages against monuments and the burial places of dead servicemen are being committed throughout the country.

"The number of attacks on representatives of the organs of law and order, military facilities, sentries, and individual servicemen has increased. There are instances of the blockading of military facilities and camps, and attacks on the lives, honor, and dignity of servicemen and members of their families...

"In the course of our duties we will be guided strictly by the requirements of USSR laws and the laws of the union republics, USSR Armed Forces regulations for garrison and patrol service, and Soviet militia regulations for patrol and post service. Servicemen brought in to carry out joint patrolling will study the fundamentals of Soviet legislation."

The USSR MVD and Defense Ministry officials' answers seemed inadequate to us.

We called Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor Boris Lazarev, deputy chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

"We oversee only decisions by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the country's president, and the Cabinet of Ministers. It is for the USSR General Prosecutor to assess the legality of the two ministers' joint order. So I will refrain from comment."

USSR General Prosecutor N. Trubin was not in—he had flown to Alma-Ata. But two of his deputies—A. Vasilyev and V. Kravtsev—had just returned from trips and, they both assured us, had not yet seen the joint order. The other USSR deputy general prosecutors did not know about it either.

Here is USSR Justice Minister S. Lushchikov's reaction to our call:

"Unfortunately, I am not familiar with the problem. I do not have the text of the order. So I had better refrain from any comment..."

Now we come to the Moscow City Soviet press conference, where Sergey Stankevich, acting chairman of Moscow City Soviet, and Yuriy Luzhkov, chairman of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee, answered Soviet and foreign correspondents' questions.

Sergey Stankevich described the issuing of the order and its substance as unprecedented. He stressed: What it is effectively is the introduction of elements of a state of emergency in the country as a result of a decision by just two ministers. S. Stankevich said: The order on changing the regulations in public places, adopted back on 29 December and is to come into effect on 1 February, was not only not coordinated with the legal authorities in the city, but has not yet reached Moscow City Soviet through official channels. That, in my opinion, is an infringement of Moscow Soviet's authority and discredits soviet power.

Yuriy Luzhkov noted that although, according to Moscow militia and KGB information, the operational situation in the city is difficult, law-enforcement organs are in control. There is no need for troop subunits to get involved in public order protection. Moscow City Soviet intends to contact the USSR general prosecutor and USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee chairman concerning the order's legality.

Our Observer's Commentary

[Yu. Feofanov] Very many citizens are sure to have greeted even with delight the joint order by the ministers of defense and internal affairs on armed patrolling with the use, if necessary, of armored personnel carriers and other formidable hardware. You can understand people: Rampant violence, robberies, and hooliganism have reached a "danger point" in some population centers. At the USSR Supreme Soviet session, incidentally, the country's president shared his Stavropol experience—at that time, according to him, the Army was also asked to help in keeping public order in difficult moments.

It seems to me that this reference to the president's former experience contains the essence of what we did not see in the two ministers' order—words to the effect that armed patrolling is permitted **at the request of the local authorities**. Without this proviso the aforementioned order just does not fit within a legal framework.

Formally, everything has been complied with. The order, as it points out itself, has been issued in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1016 of 11 October 1990 and USSR Council of Ministers Instruction No. 1829 of 27 October the same year. However, in its findings of 29 November 1990 the Constitutional Oversight Committee spoke bluntly of the inadmissibility of validating any normative acts concerning citizens' rights, freedoms, and duties if these acts have not been published. The government's resolutions and instructions were not published and were seemingly kept secret from the USSR Supreme Soviet itself, which was holding a session at the time. Yet actions of this kind, directly concern citizens' rights and freedoms, the democratic norms of the life of society, and the foundations of the rule-of-law state, should not be promulgated without the knowledge of parliament.

There has never yet been a ruler who would renounce the possibility of interpreting the law in his own favor. This was said long ago. The legal principle that power is limited in its actions by the law proceeds from this premise. The principle that whatever is not prohibited by law is permitted, applies exclusively to citizens. Executive and administrative power must operate only within the limits prescribed for it by law; any unauthorized action on its part ("If it is not mentioned in the law, you can do it") is unlawful.

Following the tragic events in the Baltic republics, 22 January this year, the USSR president declared: "No unauthorized actions by troops are acceptable... Any attempts to appeal to the armed forces in a political struggle are unacceptable." These words of the president had not died away before we learned of an order that somehow does not tally with them very well.

Yes, I realize there is reliable cover for the order—the fight against crime. And then it is not unauthorized—it is "in accordance with the resolution." And yet these covers are not convincing. They do not correspond to the spirit of reconciliation and concord that we all want so to feel.

I do not know how law-protection organs—the general prosecutor and the Constitutional Oversight Committee—and the president will evaluate the order. But their assessments are extremely necessary. Or at least explanations.

MVD Official Interviewed on Joint Patrols

LD2801201291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Studio interview with Eduard Vasiliyevich Kalachev, chief of a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration, by announcer Leonid Yefimovich Elin; from the "Vremya" newscast—live or recorded]

[Text] [Elin] At the end of last year there was a joint order by the USSR minister of internal affairs and by the Ministry of Defense on the organization of patrols on the streets of our major cities, joint patrols by employees of the internal affairs' bodies and Soviet Army servicemen. What brought about this joint order? I ask you to comment briefly on its main points.

[Kalachev] Leonid Yefimovich, this order was brought about by the extremely bad situation regarding the maintenance of public order on the streets of our cities. This is precisely why the Council of Ministers adopted a decision back in October 1990 on urgent measures to strengthen law and order in the country.

[Elin] Specifically, what are the figures?

[Kalachev] Over 1989 the increase in street crime was 65 percent. We ended 1990 with an increase of 5.9 percent. In other words, we have not achieved a reduction in crime on the streets of our country's cities, although you know that we are using all possible forces: our militiamen are working overtime, and we are using the forces of cadets and students from academic institutions of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry.

[Elin] I do know that you are undermanned.

[Kalachev] We are undermanned by about 6,000. One can mention here the reasons for this shortage: the low wages and the overtime I have already mentioned and the poor technical facilities. That is another matter. But the main thing is that there are inadequate forces in general—those forces that are now being used to protect public order. We are raising the issue of significantly increasing, of doubling, the militia patrol-post service.

[Elin] To be specific, what will the patrols look like?

[Kalachev] In reality, we see them in this way: an experienced militia officer, armed of course, accompanied by three to four servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy, on guard during the evening and night on the streets of our cities.

[Elin] Not just on festive days?

[Kalachev] Of course, of course, and not so much on festive days as on ordinary days because, as you know, people are already afraid to go out on to the streets, are afraid to come home from work in the evenings and at night, and feel unsure. It is for this reason that we published this order. I am convinced that it will help us to establish order on the streets, along with all the other...

[Elin, interrupting] A question that many people probably ask you and that we are asked—letters and phone calls are coming in—is: Does this not mean that when rallies and demonstrations and marches [manifestatsiya i demonstratsiya] are being held, we will see a picture of solid rows of militia with armed Soviet Army servicemen accompanying these rallies?

[Kalachev] No, Leonid Yefimovich, I assure you that this will not happen. This was not why this order was created. Let me stress once again that this order was issued to establish order on the streets during the evening and at night and not for accompaning the participants in demonstrations [manifestatsiya].

[Elin] Eduard Vasiliyevich, thank you for the interview. I believe that if this order is implemented—after all, it is our misfortune that certain orders, good ones, and decrees are not implemented—if it is implemented, then people will feel more confident and safe on the streets of our cities.

[Kalachev] We hope this will be the case.

[Elin] Thank you.

MVD Deputy Minister on Crime Statistics

LD2801024591 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1600 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Interview with Lieutenant General Petr Stepanovich Bogdanov, deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by correspondent Anatoliy Fedorov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Fedorov] Petr Stepanovich, I read in the press and I hear more and more often on the radio and on television that criminals are using firearms. What do your statistics show?

[Bogdanov] A dangerous tendency toward the use of firearms and technical equipment by criminals has been steadily recorded. Active resistance to the staff of internal affairs organs in curtailing illegal activity has, of course, a tangible influence on the operational situation in the city. Over the year more than 120 crimes have been committed using firearms; 3,400 crimes have been committed using other weapons. Militia officers have, while curtailing crimes, detaining the persons committing them, and protecting citizens, been forced in 745 cases to use authorized weapons. I would like to note here that in 1989 there were 324 cases, and if we compare it with 1988, then in 1989 weapons were used by militia officers 12 more times. This is what is currently happening in the city.

[Fedorov] And what does the Procuracy say? Were the militia officers' actions always justified regarding the use of weapons?

[Bogdanov] Yes, we keep very careful track of this, and I have to note that in 1990 we had practically no reprimands over the use of weapons. Against the backdrop of acute shortages on the consumer market there has been a substantial rise in the activity of thieves, speculators, swindlers, and black market dealers. Abuses in the trade network have reached massive proportions. All of this requires that work be stepped up on curtailing dangerous and serious crimes in the sphere of the economy. Last year 7,800 crimes were detected in this area of work; of these 1,270 were serious, that is, respectively, 27 percent and 2.1 times higher than in 1989. There has been a rise in the number of detected cases of theft and speculation on a large scale, and on a particularly large scale also of cases of bribery and other crimes involving officialdom. More than 500 officials in the trade network have been brought to criminal account for receiving and illegally selling goods from the subsidiary premises of trading enterprises to a value of 5.5 million rubles [R]. Six figure sums in stolen goods have started appearing more and more often in criminal cases brought on the evidence of the BKHSS: [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation]. For example, in just one criminal case the theft of about R20 million was established, committed by means of a series of transfers of money from account to account among cooperatives and state enterprises. A bribe of R500,000 was received by the head of one of Moscow's rayon branches of the savings bank and by his deputy for granting permission for the allocation of a R10 million loan to underpin fictitious labor contracts, and moreover, about R2 million of this sum were stolen by representatives of nonexistent cooperatives. Losses from crimes uncovered by BKHSS officers have been reimbursed to the state to a value of more than R26 million. Over the past year the overall number of detected crimes in all areas of work has gone up by 4.4 percent, and serious crimes by 18.8

percent, which is, as you know, the main criterion for assessing our work. One hundred fourteen criminal groups have been eliminated, and the illegal activities of 336 active members of these communities have been curtailed, including a number of their organizers. [passage omitted]

New Foreign Ministry Appointments Reported

LD2201173291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1611 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jan (TASS)—It has been reported here that Sergey Razov has been appointed head of the Far Eastern and Indochinese Countries Administration of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

S. Razov, a Russian, was born in 1953. In 1975 he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He is a candidate of economic sciences. From 1975 to 1978 he worked at the USSR trade mission in China. From 1979 to 1989 he was a junior adviser [mladshiy referent], adviser, and section head in the department of the CPSU Central Committee for ties with communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries. Since 1989 he has been leader of the China group of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Mecheslav Senkevich has been appointed head of the Third European Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

M. Senkevich, a Belorussian was born in 1937. In 1965 he graduated from the Minsk Higher Party School. He has worked as a diplomat since 1977, when he graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Foreign Ministry. From 1977 to 1979 he worked as first secretary, from 1979 to 1983 as an adviser, and from 1985 to 1990 as an adviser-envoy in the Republic of Poland.

Representative Expects Over 1 Million Emigrants

AU2701185991 Vienna KURIER in German 26 Jan 91 p 5

[Interview with V.Y. Sherbakov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Council of Europe conference on East-West migration held in Vienna from 24 to 25 January, and chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, by Norbert Stanzel in Vienna; date not given: "One to One and a Half Million Emigrants"]

[Text] [Stanzel] How do you assess this international conference?

[Sherbakov] We believe that a uniform social and economic area will form in Europe. Just like other democratic states, the Soviet Union supports the idea of free movement of citizens between the states. At this conference we want to start creating an order for free movement.

[Stanzel] How many Soviet citizens do you expect to leave the country in the next few years?

[Sherbakov] If we assess the situation realistically, we must proceed from the assumption that one to one and a half million Soviet citizens will leave their country.

[Stanzel] Do you not think that the dramatic economic situation and the measures, such as the invalidation of 50 and 100 ruble bills, will increase pressure among the population for emigration?

[Sherbakov] These are two different processes that are not linked. The exchange of bank notes does not mean that the state plans to take the money from the working people. It will primarily the corrupt who will suffer. This measure is directed against those who are corrupt. However, every new measure of the government meets with a certain misunderstanding among the population. This present unease will again vanish after some time. People have not been thoroughly informed about details of this measure and therefore panic. Once they know why we made this decision they will accept it. By the way, similar measures were taken in states like Germany and France in the past.

[Stanzel] A paper drafted by the Council of Europe states that civil war-like unrest might lead to an increase in the number of emigrants. Do you believe that events similar to those in the Baltic republics might occur in the near future?

[Sherbakov] No, I do not think so.

[Stanzel] Thus, you do not expect the use of more force against pro-independence movements is the Soviet republics?

[Sherbakov] There can always be individual incidents. However, there is no "state policy" advocating the use of force. Events that are similar to those in the Baltic republics cannot be ruled out. In any case, the state is obliged to prevent bloodshed.

Soviet Leaders Sign N.V. Talyzin's Obituary

PM2801150991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of Nikolay Vladimirovich Talyzin]

[Excerpts] Nikolay Vladimirovich Talyzin, formerly deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and a personal pensioner of union status, died 23 January 1991 aged 61 after a severe illness. [passage omitted]

[signed] M.S. Gorbachev, G.I. Yanayev, V.A. Ivashko, V.S. Pavlov, A.I. Lukyanov, M.M. Burokevicius, S.I. Gurenko, A.S. Dzasokhov, I.A. Karimov, P.K. Luchinskiy, A.A. Malofeyev, A.M. Masaliyev, K. Makhkamov, A.N. Mutalibov, N.A. Nazarbayev, S.A. Niyazov, S.K. Pogosyan, I.K. Polozkov, Yu.A. Prokofyev, A.P. Rubiks, G.V. Semenova, Ye.S. Stroyev, I.T. Frolov, O.S. Shenin, O.D. Baklanov, B.V. Gidaspov, A.N. Girenko, V.A.

Kuptsov, Yu.A. Manayenkov, V.M. Falin, V.M. Velichko, V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, N.P. Laverov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, N.I. Ryzhkov, I.S. Belousov, L.A. Voronin, V.K. Gusev, L.D. Ryabev, S.A. Sitaryan, M.S. Shkabardnya, O.G. Anfimov, K.F. Katushev, V.G. Kolesnikov, G.I. Marchuk, E.K. Pervyshin, V.I. Shimko, A.K. Antonov, N.K. Baybakov, A.P. Biryukova, L.N. Zaykov, G.D. Kolmogorov, M.S. Smirtyukov, P.P. Anisimov, I.I. Prostyakov, A.A. Rusanov, V.V. Sychev.

New Premier's Career, Character Examined

91UN0760A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 3, 23 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Vladislav Yanelis under the rubric: "Life of Our Country: Politics": "Man Who Does Not Like To Borrow Money (Subjective Touches on a Portrait)"]

[Text]**The president's personnel policy can confuse even those people who are most well versed in the field. The appointment of V.S. Pavlov to the post of prime minister became one more surprise for the Council of Ministers officials, for the Supreme Soviet, and for tens of millions of taxpayers. But do we know this man, one of the least talkative members of the government, so well that we can condemn Gorbachev's choice?**

Individuals who shared their information with the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent did not want their names mentioned. At some time in the past they studied, worked, and made their careers together with the prime minister to-be.

Well, we all know that a man's character is formed long before his chin learns what a razor is. Later it just gets polished. Valentin Pavlov is no exception to this rule. People who knew him well in his young years, when he was a student of the Finance Institute, say that Pavlov stood out among his peers. He was stubborn in the nice sense of the word, he knew well how to set his priorities and strategies, and he was moving steadily forward towards his main goal—the mastering of a most sophisticated mechanism of finance.

However, he was not a goody-goody boy in the traditional meaning of the word. He would join a students' party and he was sociable and active (he has preserved the latter quality to this day). While at the institute, he played on its basketball team and did not like to lose. Though very well-balanced, he would get fired up during a game and preferred to play in an attacking manner. But the excitement of the game did not rob him of his ability to analyze the situation and that made Pavlov the leader of the team. He valued friendly relationships and hated to borrow money.

He did not like to learn by rote but that does not mean that he did not do it, especially where it concerned subjects that were mandatory but of little interest. He preferred not to use cribs but relied instead on his outstanding memory, which rarely failed him. That is not to say that Pavlov had no problems during term exams. But he had no obvious failures, either, as he knew how to concentrate and pass the test. At the same time he often expressed ideas, blasphemous at the time, about the advantages of the market economy and the variety of complexes in the Soviet financial system.

He married a student from the same institute but from a different department. He accepted his job assignment without a word and did not try to look for a better place—but then he did not have any connections. He was satisfied then to work for the financial department of the rayon soviet. Children from the most successful families could have felt jealous of his future career. Soon he was working in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Finance. The republic ministry at that time had very little decision power—people with any imagination were suffocating there. The financial policy was being made in the USSR Ministry of Finance. Pavlov went to work there. He was noticed by the minister at that time, Garbuzov, who patronized young employees. He was promoted to an administrative position. Later he got a transfer to the State Planning Committee where he became head of the financial costs and prices department and he was made a member of the board; nobody in the agency could remember such a young official being made a board member.

In this position Pavlov had to deal with the industrial high command more than ever before. The financial well-being of separate enterprises, as well as whole industry branches, depended on him. This power did not make him more ambitious, nor did it did set him apart from other people. He was capable of understanding the person he was talking to and of accepting his arguments. He could not forgive deception and inefficiency, which made him bored with the person, and he would tactfully let him understand this.

Gradually, his name was becoming better and better known in the financial world. Pavlov became known for the distinct strictness and originality of his ideas: They displayed his deep knowledge of the subject and the philosophy of finance.

The budget deficit under Gostev reached R100 billion. After having moved several times through the highest stories of the financial skyscraper, Pavlov came to his aid, first as his first deputy, later as a minister. During his first year there the deficit fell to R60 billion...

His return to the Ministry of Finance became some kind of an enjoyable hard labor. He always brimmed with ideas and hundreds of other people had to implement these ideas, not always popular with the people. Sometimes he continued working till 0200 hours. His wife, Valentina, was in despair. Sometimes she would call for the car, go to the ministry after midnight and call her husband on the intercom: "I am here." Then she would wait downstairs. Pavlov did not like it, but he had to close his files and go downstairs.

Sometimes he would stop working in his office and go wander around the ministry. He would visit different rooms, sit in the visitor's chair; he would listen to the people, tell jokes, laugh, and pay compliments to women. He was incomparable at those moments—nobody would have recognized him as the powerful minister, a person able to schedule his day minute by minute, a demanding man who would notice any error.

He can baffle one with a single question; he can cancel the work of a group of people because of the tiniest inaccuracy. But he is interesting and comfortable to work with, mainly because he possesses a wide—some even call it a global—financial-economic vision; there is no haughtiness about him and he knows how to prove he is right even when it would be sufficient just to say "no."

Pavlov possesses one more quality. He does not kowtow to anyone. His gods are logic and professionalism. But he has also preserved a talent to improvise and innovate that does not mean adventurism. His son is also a financial expert: He recently published an interesting book on stock exchange and he is now working in Luxembourg. Pavlov is not a stranger to sentimentality: He was very upset when he lost his favorite dog. He prefers winter scenery; he always remembers the birthdays of all his loved ones. It seems that he has kept only one of his hobbies—swimming. He likes to swim for a long time and for a long distance, with powerful breast strokes.

Pavlov's Chances for Success Examined

91UN0760B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 3, 23 Jan 91 p 3

[Five commentaries on Pavlov's appointment under the rubric "Life of Our Country: Politics": "Whether the New Government Has a Chance...(Quick forecast)"]

[Text]

Otto Latsis, first deputy editor in chief of KOMMUNIST magazine

Pavlov's cabinet will have played its part if it manages to change a spontaneous transition to the market economy—i.e. transition with maximum social losses—into a directed one and allow a minimum of losses at that. But I mean a transfer to the market economy and not to something else. When I say "directed," I mean such actions of the government that would allow inflation to slow down and state budget expenditures to diminish. We have known about these measures for a long time.

First of all we need to cut back on defense spending and to introduce new markets—residential, production means, etc. Being an educated economist, Pavlov knows how to do it perfectly well. I am concerned about the fact that he is closely surrounded by a crowd from the military-industrial complex that so far has been fighting against a real conversion. If they can be persuaded that the present volume and structure of our defense spending do not serve to ensure proper defense potential in our country, then there might be changes for the better in this area also. Unless Pavlov uses his expertise to slow down inflation, the government's task may remain unfulfilled.

One more thing. Repressed inflation, prices on unavailable goods set by the administration, is nothing but a fake. Pavlov must understand perfectly well that the task is to make prices real; they have to be the prices at which goods **can be bought.**

Oleg Bogomolov, academician, USSR people's deputy

This copy cat team was formed according to the one-party principle; it does not include any of the perestroyka activists who have gained public recognition, not to mention any representatives of constructive opposition. I do not believe that this team is capable of achieving something that was beyond the power of the first group. Premier Pavlov's speech in the Supreme Soviet cannot be qualified as a program one in any way. You just cannot get a clear picture of future activity from it. Lately there was some snickering heard from the center about the downfall of Prunskiene in Lithuania, who had wanted to raise prices. But the new Union Cabinet cannot function without declaring a general increase of retail prices, by at least 150 or 200 percent. In essence, this has been preordained by all the previous government decisions and the president's decrees. I am not convinced that this government will escape the fate of the Lithuanian Government.

Mikhail Antonov, journalist

Generally speaking, a new government, of course, has a chance, because ours is a great country of immense natural and intellectual resources. Whether this very government has a chance—that is a different question. The answer depends on it understanding the deep causes of the country's disastrous situation. These causes are rooted in the 73 years of despondency in our economic and cultural life. We are living through what is primarily a spiritual, religious crisis. The economic, social, and political crisis, the crisis in culture are just its consequences. Apart from that, our policy was nonethnic, it was internationalist in a cosmopolitan sense, it was based on the false principle of "overtaking and surpassing the West." To get out of the crisis we need to turn to spirituality, we need to have a tight link between the government of the ruling party and the church; we need to return to Russia's unique way of development.

Yuriy Chernichenko, journalist, USSR people's deputy

According to the rules of our top partocracy or according to the rules of our top nomenclature, the minister of finance signs absolutely all of recent documents of any importance. That means he has signed the hundreds of billions of "false rubles." I cannot help feeling concerned that the head of the Cabinet of Ministers is now the man who is, of course, well-educated and knowledgeable but who has been immediately involved in the inflation waterfall. This is more than strange. I do not think that

Ryzhkov alone should be held answerable for the heaps of false money and for the collapse of the financial system in the country.

Speaking of ways out. We need to convert, and I want to emphasize that, to the gold ruble, whatever the costs may be or whoever's prestige may be concerned. There is one more thing—the real value of our country is its land: The land should be given to the people. There is no need for us to set up a duel between Kazbek and Mount Shat, no need to have this Lermontov argument, no need for the president's decrees to try and catch up with already completed laws of the Russian parliament. But we need, as soon as possible, as the highest priority, to give away and to sell the land to Russian farmers, whether they now live in a city or in a small village.

Vasiliy Selyunin, journalist

The appointment of Valentin Pavlov to the post of prime minister is not very easy to understand. In some other country they would not let him get within shooting distance of such a position. It was no other but he who confidently brought the country's finances to a catastrophe; it was under him that printing presses started to work round the clock. Here are some figures. In the first half of the 1980's only 3 to 4 billion rubles [R] were added annually to the circulation. In 1989, after Pavlov became minister of finance, the emission jumped to R18 billion and in 1990—to R25 billion, 2.5 times higher than the approved ceiling.

By the end of 1990, it transpired that the budget revenues of all levels would make up R350 billion, R400 billion maximum. Expenditures would exceed this sum by R250 billion. This kind of a deficit was probably never heard of in any country. Is the situation hopeless? Yes, it is, but not for Pavlov. He displayed miraculous creativity as he tallied, on paper, the revenue with spending. According to the estimates done by international experts, the volume of our economic activity will drop by five percent in a year, at least. According to the forecast of the world famous economist Grigoriy Khanin (whose theories always proved true), there will be a 15 percent drop in production. But Pavlov's version is based on an assumption that the main economic indicators will show some improvement in the new year. Then the profits, as well as the budget revenue, will, naturally, increase. New taxes have been introduced and now enterprises will have to give over 60 percent of their profits to the government and their incentive funds on top of that. People have to pay three types of taxes on their salaries—the income tax, "Abalkin's" tax, and a newly created one. Who is going to work in such conditions?

Now Pavlov, prime minister, has to implement the plan designed by Pavlov, minister of finance.

It would be definitely unfair to put all the responsibility for the financial collapse on him alone. After all, finances only reflect the general condition of the economy. I personally will be very surprised if Pavlov's cabinet can drag on till this summer. It does not have a single chance to succeed. Most likely, it will be the last union government.

Lenin Mausoleum Temporarily Closed

LD2801084791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0824 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jan (TASS)—The commandant's office of the Moscow Kremlin reports that to carry out preventive work [profilakticheskiye raboty], the mausoleum of V.I. Lenin is closed to access by visitors from 15 February to 15 April 1991.

Split in Donbass Miners' Movement Reported

LD2801210991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1421 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS-UKRINFORM correspondent Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk, 28 Jan (TASS-UKRINFORM)—Seven miners' collectives of the Donetskugol association are leaving their territorial trade-union committee. At a founding conference in Donetsk, southeast Ukraine, they decided to unite in an association of independent trade-union organizations as part of the industry-based trade union. Thus the split in the miners' trade-union movement which had formed has now been registered organizationally.

The articles of association which were endorsed state that the new formation represents a voluntary association of primary trade-union organizations of miners' collectives. It is a component part of the USSR Union of Coal Industry Workers.

"The trend toward formation of associations is the right path, in my view, but the method of creating it is flawed", Nikolay Kolesnikov, secretary of the Central Council of the USSR Union of Coal Industry Workers, said, commenting on the results of the conference. "Instead of consolidating trade-union organizations, their fragmentation is taking place. Of course, it is difficult to take account simultaneously of the interests of every group which makes up part of an industry-based trade union. Evidently, we need to form a federation or confederation which would meet the needs and hopes of every trade-union group. But what has happened in Donetsk—an association of the trade-union organizations of 7 mines out of 21—cannot be called anything but separatism," he observed.

Fundamentals of Employment Legislation Adopted

PM2801113491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[V. Shirokov article: "Protection Against Unemployment"]

[Text] "The Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Republics on Employment for the Population," about which a corresponding USSR Supreme Soviet resolution has been adopted, is coming into effect.

The new law defines legal, economic, and organizational principles for the population's employment in the market economy and equal rights of various forms of property, and also state guarantees of the exercise of the citizen's right to work.

Section 1 states that citizens have the exclusive right to deploy their capacities for productive and creative labor and to carry out any activity which is not forbidden by law, including those not involving the execution of paid work (raising children, housework, full-time education, social activities). Any kind of administrative coercion to work is not allowed, with the exception of those cases stipulated by the legislation of the USSR and the republics.

For the first time a definition of the unemployed has been given. They are deemed to be able-bodied citizens below retirement age, who for reasons beyond their control do not have a job or a wage (income from work), who are registered at the state employment service as being in search of employment, ready and able to work, and to whom the service has not made a suitable offer of employment.

Substantive state guarantees for the right to work are stipulated: free general education and vocational training, freedom to choose type of employment and job, free assistance in selecting suitable employment, protection from any kind of discrimination, and much else besides.

The law pays particular attention to those categories of citizen most in need of social protection—the young, single parents and those with many children, people approaching retirement age, internationalist servicemen, and war wounded.

To provide citizens with employment, it is envisaged that employment programs will be drawn up at state, interrepublic, republic, and regional level.

The State Fund for Employment Assistance, formed out of mandatory payments by enterprises, institutions and organizations, cooperatives, the funds of Union, republic, and local budgets, and voluntary subscriptions, will operate as an independent financial system.

The section "Social Guarantees on Loss of Work" comes into effect on 1 July 1991. However, the republics are free to "launch" it even earlier if the necessary funds are found. These guarantees stipulate the payment of a stipend during professional training or retraining, unemployment benefit, and material help for the unemployed citizen.

The USSR Government is instructed in the first half of 1991 to submit for the USSR Supreme Soviet's consideration proposals on the introduction of USSR legislative acts in accordance with the fundamentals adopted.

Registration of Parties Continues

LD2601110791 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 26 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—A total of 26 public movements and organisations have filed a registration request to the Soviet Justice Ministry since the law on public associations entered into force on January 1, a Ministry official told TASS today.

Only one party—Liberal Democrats—has applied for registration so far, Vladimir Zhbankov, chief of the department registering public organisations, said.

Lawyers doubt that the Party has enough members required for registration. A party has to prove it has no less than 5,000 members to be registered. Liberal Democrats have so far failed to submit a list of their members, Zhbankov said.

Among other applicants—the USSR Writers' Union, The Association of Free Trade Unions, The Soviet Scientific and Technical Society and The Association of Socialist Trade Unions, he said [sentence as received].

The Soviet Communist Party has not yet filed for registration, he said.

All applications will be discussed within two months since filing and refusals to register a movement will be strictly motivated, he said.

Economic

Baltics, Not Black Market, Hit by Money Change

LD2801205691 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS news analyst Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—The recently completed exchange of banknotes of large denomination for those of a new pattern has not seriously affected shadow-economy operations inside the country but did deal a powerful blow to external structures of shadow-economy dealers, three representatives of the shadow economy told TASS. They agreed to meet the analyst of the TASS World Service provided their anonymity is preserved.

The reform seriously undermines the financial position of the Baltic republics and may seriously hinder the nascent process of their withdrawal from the USSR, the interviewees said.

Some data given by them is confirmed, some is firmly denied by official spokesmen for the USSR State Bank and the Finance Ministry, and some part is unverifiable altogether.

However, their version of the motives and results of the monetary reform constitutes a rather harmonious logical sequence, although the scope of clandestine financial operations is staggering.

The following scheme emerges from the interview. "Carloads" of Soviet money were taken out of the country in recent months in echange for dollars at the black market rate. This accounts to a considerable extent for the sharp drop in the rate of the rouble against the "hard" currencies over the past year. It is clear that even the generally deplorable state of the Soviet economy could not account for such sharp fluctuations in the rate of the Soviet national monetary unit.

On both sides, deals were made through front companies. However, quite real commercial banks stood behind them as "generators of money" on the Soviet side, and banks and investment companies—on the Western side.

The decisive motive for foreign financiers to participate in such deals was expectation of privatisation laws in the Soviet Union and hopes to participate in bidding during the selling off of the state sector in the USSR.

According to the interviewees, the scheme began to take shape following the advent to power of popular fronts in the Baltic republics that planned to secede from the USSR.

Almost immediately plans by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to issue their own currencies were made public and at the same time control over expatriation of Soviet roubles abroad was intentionally slackened in the Baltics.

Billions in "unlaundered funds" from all republics of the USSR came pouring in to the Baltic region which based its financial policy on mediation and independent large-scale speculations with currency.

The interviewees believe that huge funds, many times as large as those mentioned by officials (Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov said the amount was seven billion roubles), have wound up in the money boxes of Western banks.

According to the shadow economy dealers, foreign holdings of 50 and 100 rouble banknotes alone amounted to not less than 50 billion roubles.

The interviewees estimated the reform's effect inside the country as rather low. Big shadow-economy dealers unloaded all their 50- and 100-rouble banknotes in December 1990, immediately after an information leak that an order was placed with one of the money-printing factories to print new money.

At the time Valentin Pavlov had to address the Union parliament to deny rumours of monetary reform. (Incidentally, this is why officials stubbornly refuse to refer to the reform otherwise than an "exchange of money." The printing of new money had to be suspended also because of the leaks. This brought about many complexities during the exchange of money for private citizens.)

State Bank Issues Statement on Money Exchange

LD2701191891 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 27 TASS—In a statement released here today, the USSR State Bank says that the country's banks have almost completed taking in 50 and 100 ruble notes first issued in 1961.

Starting on January 28, these notes will only be accepted by banks with the approval of deputy commissions at the district and city executive committees from people to whom a longer term was envisaged by the resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

New notes will be issued to citizens at the same places where they handed in their old notes after protocols signed by deputy commissions are received.

According to experts, as sums of money given in for exchange in most cases are not intended for immediate spending it would be correct to propose that citizens volunteer to deposit these sums of money in savings bank accounts in order to derive interest on deposits and not worry about cash.

Savings Bank offices have been advised to allow citizens to freely withdraw from Savings Bank accounts such sums of money as were transferred to these accounts under the exchange procedure.

Finance Ministry Extends Deadline for Retirees

LD2501165391 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The Soviet Ministry of Finance has instructed the ministry's and the USSR State Bank's agencies to prolong for pensioners the exchange of 50 and 100-ruble bills issued in 1961 for two extra days, January 26 and 27.

The decision was made at the request of local governing bodies, trade union organisations and social security offices.

Agroprom Bank Decides Decree Does Not Apply

LD2501195291 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] This decree does not apply to us. This is the decision of the chief of the cash transactions department of the Pavlovsk commercial branch of the Agroprom bank. Using her official position, she changed 900 50 ruble notes into smaller ones for the chairman of the

Altay cooperative. In addition, 50,000 rubles surrendered in the same denominations were registered in favor of the cooperative. On 23 January alone, they exchanged a total of 665,000 rubles in banknotes. The Altay Kray Procurator's Office has instituted criminal proceedings as a result of these incidents.

Officials Interviewed on Currency Decree

Pavlov Explains Features

PM2501161991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS report on interview with USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov by unidentified Soviet television correspondent on 22 January: "Prime Minister Explains"]

[Text] USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov explained some of the principal features of the presidential decree removing large-denomination banknotes from circulation in an interview given to a Soviet television correspondent on Tuesday.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Valentin Sergeyevich, the text of the presidential decree has, I think, undoubtedly produced disquiet in virtually everyone. What is it—a further step to remove the monetary imbalance which has arisen in our economy, our monetary economy, or it a step designed to infringe the interests of consumers and citizens?

[Pavlov] I think that everyone should fully and clearly realize that we we are not pursuing here the goal of confiscating from the bulk of our citizens their monetary savings in whatever form. All banknotes of 50 and 100 rubles [R] forming part of monthly wages are immediately exchangeable without difficulty at the place of work or where people receive their pension or other income of a lawful nature.

They also hand over what they have to clarify the origin of this money. If your monthly wages are R150 and you come to exchange R150,000, then a natural question will immediately arise. That is the first aspect of the question.

The second is that R50 and R100 banknotes are one of the most important components of the shadow economy in general, since they make it work. In general R50 and R100 notes makes up more than one-third of the cash in the population's hands. And according to figures from our banking establishments, they circulate very slowly, that is to say, the state gets them back half as quickly as it does banknotes of R10-25.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does that mean that as they now circulate in the shadow economy, they remain there?

[Pavlov] They circulate without the state getting them. This indicates that these banknotes are not at all a means of payment in the state sphere of the economy. That is one side of the question. The second is that these banknotes are now being very widely used to undermine our trade as a result of contraband. According to various estimates—I will take the average, optimal one—of the order of R7 billion in these notes are now abroad.

I would also like to talk about the restriction regarding the issuing of no more than R500 per month in cash to each depositor this current half-year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But what happens if I want, say, to buy a television or car—to make a large purchase?

[Pavlov] In that case no questions arise, and there are no problems for ordinary citizens, because there is no restriction on the sum which a citizen may withdraw from his account for payment in the retail trade market under the right granted him of paying for any purchase for any amount in a noncash form.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, many specialists too are now worried by the following question: To what extent was this move calculated in advance and to what extent were the consequences of such a measure forecast?

[Pavlov] We prepared this measure some time ago, as you yourself realize. We argued over and prepared this measure, weighing up different aspects of it, for almost a year. It has been said that economic measures, not just administrative ones, are needed to combat the shadow economy.

Deputy Finance Minister Comments

PM2501155191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

["Continuing a Theme" interview with V.Ye. Orlov, USSR first deputy finance minister, by G. Yastrebtsov; date not given: "It Was a Necessary Step"]

[Text] So the three-day period for the surrender of 1961-issue large 50- and 100-ruble denomination bank notes, announced in the USSR Cabinet of Ministers resolution, ends today. This sudden action instantly became the number one news item in the Soviet and foreign media. The reaction of newspapers, radio, and television was by no means uniform, of course, and the same goes for the first, sometimes, to be frank, shock impressions of many of our fellow citizens, who have accumulated money through their own labor.

Yesterday our paper published the explanation of one of the leaders of the USSR State Bank board. Today, continuing this topical theme, PRAVDA interviews V.Ye. Orlov, USSR first deputy minister of finance.

[Yastrebtsov] Vladimir Yefimovich, I would like to obtain first-hand, so to speak, reliable information on what actually prompted such a rapid exchange of large denomination bank notes. Some papers have already voiced suspicions that it might not be entirely due to the intrigues of the shadow economy. They say that the phenomena that caused the financial "shock therapy" are more deep-seated than that. What do you have to say about this?

[Orlov] I would like to add the following to what was published yesterday in PRAVDA. We have at last set about carrying out the will of the great mass of our people, who are demanding a curb on the shadow economy, rampaging speculation, and squalid financial chicanery. The action that is being carried out has one aim only: to confiscate unearned income. We had no other purpose in this case. Anyway, no one wanted to damage the interests of honest people.

[Yastrebtsov] Has operation "Exchange" had any practical results yet?

[Orlov] There are results. They are not expressed in any particular sums, figures, or economic gain. But, I repeat, they are there. I have in front of me a pile of telegrams from the provinces. The character and tone of them have changed dramatically over the two days. On the first day there were many complaints about the confusion, the lines outside Savings Banks, the bureaucratic red tape, and other complications, but in the past 24 hours the situation has improved in most regions. Incidentally, I have to say that the muddle and the lines outside Savings Banks in many cases were caused by... resistance to the government action on the part of some local organs of power.

[Yastrebtsov] People, particularly older people, who called us at PRAVDA on the first day, complained that Savings Banks and post office branches would not exchange big bank notes. Who is to blame?

[Orlov] Take it from me that there were ample monetary resources for the exchange, more than enough in Moscow, in fact. But given such an enormous flood of people, it was difficult to deal with them all quickly and well from the purely technical viewpoint. It is the first time in the country's history that such an operation has been carried out, so there was no experience to go on.

[Yastrebtsov] There has been criticism of the finance and banking people on the part of the sick, who cannot leave their homes or stand in line...

[Orlov] We too have received telegrams from these people. But this is more a criticism of local organs of power, soviet executive committees, and deputies' commissions. People's deputies can do a great deal in this difficult situation: organize extra groups and mobile commissions, which would not overlook a single old person, a single invalid.

[Yastrebtsov] What was the attitude toward the president's decree and the Cabinet of Ministers' resolution in the republics?

[Orlov] There were problems, many indeed, on the first day. We sent representatives and gave and are continuing to give every assistance. The operation got off the ground. The initial information is that the exchange of big bank notes is going well in Turkmenia and Estonia. But there are republics where even now there is resistance, not to mention sabotage. In some places they have willfully decided to extend the deadline for the surrender of the old money. This will have an adverse effect on the results of the action as a whole.

[Yastrebtsov] Can you name the specific republics?

[Orlov] It is reported that in Uzbekistan the deadline for the exchange of money has been extended to 1 February. We are categorically opposed to such willful actions. There are other things. I would point out that I do not as yet have the official documents on this, but telephone calls from Azerbaijan show that permission has been given in that republic to exchange up to 30,000 rubles [R] per person, without a declaration of income. Lithuania has also willfully decided on an amount, although a more modest one of R5,000. There are many examples of this. The effect of the operation cannot be allowed to be undermined. By removing from circulation money that has been obtained by dishonest means, we are seeking to ensure that the enormous mass of money places less pressure on the consumer market.

[Yastrebtsov] In this connection, I would like to report to our readers what measures will be taken in the very near future to fundamentally improve our entire financial system.

[Orlov] We are very well aware that the current action to exchange large denomination notes will only have a temporary effect, which will last, say, for some months. Tackling the main, long-term task, that is, making the ruble strong, is, of course, a difficult and lengthy task. At the moment, there are goods worth only 13 kopecks for every ruble. This is an intolerably small amount. What needs to be done to ensure that this ruble is matched by goods to the same value, or, even better, to the value of one ruble and some kopecks? The answer is simple and, at the same time, complex: These goods need to be produced. There are no miracles in the economy. The way to improve finances is primarily to ensure national economic efficiency. At the moment, there is not much going for us in this area, as indicated by the results of the economy's work last year. Rates are declining and pay is rising more quickly than output. This is abnormal. The mass of unearned money is growing and it is providing fertile ground for the shadow economy.

[Yastrebtsov] Which is what the action with which we began our talk is against?

[Orlov] Indeed. The exchange of large bank notes was an enforced, but necessary step. Of course, this operation is not a panacea for the economy's ills, but there was nothing else we could do.

[Yastrebtsov] In conclusion, I would like to ask the following question. Yesterday the papers reported that a branch of the ecological production firm "EKHO" had had the idea of selling R140 billion abroad for

$7,756,000,000. In their accounts of this, some papers were quick to call it a "standard barter" deal. What do you think?

[Orlov] Barter is trade that does not involve money. This is a financial deal, the sale of rubles for dollars. I consider it disgraceful. It merely undermines our economy. What is R140 billion, when we currently have in circulation approximately R130 billion in cash? Whether it was an intentional or unintentional act it is not for me to judge. But there is no sign here of any concern for the economy's health, that is for sure.

Gosbank Chairman on Exchange

LD2601104191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Statement by Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko, chairman of the board of the USSR State Bank, in Moscow—live]

[Text] Tomorrow the Savings Bank system, the system of the State Bank, the banks, and the institutions of the Ministry of Communications will be fully operational and will be working with those retirees who have not managed to exchange their banknotes, although we are receiving more and more information to the effect that the process is almost complete in many republics. There is, therefore, as it were, a residual phenomenon. The money-changing operation is all but completed in Belorussia and Estonia, and it is coming to an end in the Ukraine, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia. It is somewhat harder in the republics where there are difficult geographical conditions—mountainous Georgia and Azerbaijan.

I would even say that now, perhaps, the brunt of our work has shifted to accepting the money that was collected from working people at enterprises, institutions, and organizations. That work will be carried out all day tomorrow, and, of course, in the event that we find we can not manage the schedule for the acceptance and conversion of the money that has already been inventoried at enterprises, we'll carry out the work on Monday too.

There is now some incomprehensible panic in Moscow. Either a rumor has been spread by someone, or someone is trying to show that he was rather shortchanged since he was previously obliged to sell 100 ruble [R] notes for R10. A rumor is current to the effect that notes of other denominations will be changed—R25, R10, and so on. I can only state once again, with full authority, that neither the government nor the USSR State Bank have any plans for that eventuality, either now or in the nearest future. So all these panic-causing rumors are being spread with knowingly wrong and base purposes in mind.

Gerashchenko on Rationale

LD2501183791 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 25 Jan 91

[By TASS news analyst Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—"The USSR State Bank hopes to withdraw from circulation 10 to 15 billion rubles, including money illicitly taken abroad," Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the USSR State Bank Board, told TASS.

At the same time, he flatly denied that the decree by the USSR president on changing 50- and 100-ruble banknotes was meant only to confiscate money.

Gerashchenko linked the exchange with "the need to improve the appearance of Soviet banknotes and to combat possible forgery." In addtion, new denominations—200- and 500-ruble notes—will soon be issued, he added.

"In preparing them, we used the experience of other countries, where banknotes of various denominations feature portraits of national heroes. Up until now, we had only one hero (Soviet state founder Vladimir Lenin). There are also difficulties with the emblem of the renewed USSR just as with the number of signatures in the languages of union republics on future notes.

"There are 48 billion rubles in the form of 50- and 100-ruble banknotes in circulation at present," Gerashchenko said. This amount makes up 34.6 per cent of the total money mass. Gerashchenko thinks that "over a half of these funds were earned as a remuneration for socialy useful work." Part of the remaining funds can be laundered and, nevertheless, he believes that efforts to confiscate the aforementioned sum will succeed.

Gerashchenko said that the money illicitly taken abroad, "amounted to less then seven billion rubles" (Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov named this sum in a Soviet television interviewon January 22).

Gerashchenko claimed that low-income segments of the population would not suffer. He said the term for the exchange of money can be extended for pensioners and people of such occupations as oilmen working in shift teams, hunters, shepherds and persons who are currently on business trips.

Gerashchenko described "restoring a link betweeen a salary and the results of labour" as the key problem of the economy. He admitted that the measures taken did not accomplish this task and would make inevitable a return to the problem of the budget deficit, which Gerashchenko described as "one of the most difficult in the economy."

Gerashchenko refused to comment on the decision to partially freeze personal accounts in saving banks, permitting people to take out no more than 500 rubles a month. Information is coming in that Soviet bankers are displeased with this measure as discouraging deposits.

Many regard the latter measure as unavoidable and temporary (because otherwise the exchange of money could not take place as new banknotes began to be printed only recently and are in short supply). It can be cancelled soon—two to three months after the exchange of 50- and 100-ruble notes is completed.

Gosbank Deputy Chairman on Reasons

PM2801104491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with A.V. Voylukov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Bank Board, by G. Yastrebtsov; place and date not given: "Replacement of Banknotes—What Lies Behind It?"]

[Text] Yesterday morning on the way to work I saw crowds of people at the Savings Banks. Worried people, mostly elderly, who were anxiously discussing the newly published presidential decree and Cabinet of Ministers resolution of 22 January "On the Termination of Acceptance as Legal Tender of 50 and 100 Ruble [R] USSR Gosbank [State Bank] Notes, 1961 Design, the Procedure for Exchanging Them, and Restrictions on Issuing Cash From Citizens' Accounts." A lot of people had also gathered at the USSR Gosbank building. Questions were fired one after another at the militia man on duty, who was doing his utmost to pacify the visitors, referring them to the text of the documents printed in the newspapers.

Naturally, this unexpected action, which impinges on the material interests of millions of citizens, has prompted a storm of telephone calls to our editorial team. PRAVDA readers demanded explanations. We requested explanations from A.V. Voylukov, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosbank Board.

[Yastrebtsov] Arnold Vasilyevich, what has inspired the presidential decree and the Cabinet of Ministers resolution and what do they aim to achieve?

[Voylukov] Let me say straight away that the measures taken are among the practical steps being undertaken in this country to counter the rise of the shady economy and speculation, which have recently assumed a vast scale. The decree signed by M.S. Gorbachev states that this decisive and sudden action has been taken in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population to reinforce the struggle against speculation, corruption, smuggling, the forgery of money, and unearned income. There is no question of any major financial impact. This action affects ready cash only, or rather a portion of it. Moreover, by our estimation, cash dealings in the shady economy mainly involve large notes. What I have in mind is graft, bribery, and other mercenary activities directly contravening the law.

[Yastrebtsov] I don't know how our national mafia is feeling right now, but as far as ordinary Soviet citizens are concerned—honest people who have a small amount of cash in large-denomination notes—it is not hard to understand their fears, you only have to look out of your office window and around the streets.

[Voylukov] I must explain that the main bulk of our population, working people and retirees, are not threatened with catastrophe as a result of the monetary exchange. This is because special commissions comprising representatives from the leadership, finance and accounting services, trade union committees, and labor collective councils will be set up in enterprises, associations, institutions, and organizations to guarantee the full exchange of bank notes to the value of a person's wages.

[Yastrebtsov] You say to the value of a person's wages. But as everybody knows, at the end of the year workers everywhere were paid an extra one or two months' wages and various bonuses. Judging from the telephone calls to our editorial team, there are also many other "irregular" situations. Let's say a worker had been ill for some time and later received a lump sum representing several months' wages. What about him?

[Voylukov] I can answer that. The commission leaders will study all cases where sums exceed the established limit and compile a special document or register on this score, which they will forward to the relevant rayon soviet or city soviet ispolkom [executive committee] commissions.

[Yastrebtsov] How can all this be achieved in three days?

[Voylukov] Three days is the deadline for handing money in, but the ispolkom commissions will resolve each specific question over a 10-day period. This should be sufficient time despite the hullabaloo which has arisen now. I must stress once again that the honest man has nothing to fear. Additional months' wages and other bonuses are easy to prove, but if a sum is presented to the commission which greatly exceeds, let us say, the applicant's means, then that person will be required to give precise details of where this money came from.

[Yastrebtsov] What about those who are currently traveling somewhere on a train or in a truck on some remote northern route where there could be snowdrifts and other unexpected events?

[Voylukov] Of course, it is difficult to provide for every eventuality. But we have thought of this. For example, local ispolkoms may decide to put on a train a temporary team of workers, deputies, and representatives from the bank departments who will change money for people on the terms stated. Alternatively, they will issue a receipt in exchange for the money and forward it to their place of work. The same will apply to people on vacation, undergoing medical treatment, and so on. The Cabinet of Ministers resolution published in the press explains in detail how to act in each specific case. We are trying to resolve additional problems in an effective manner as they arise.

[Yastrebtsov] Nevertheless, it is only the first day and already there is a lot of confusion. Just now at the entrance to your institution I spoke to two visitors. One had come to Moscow in the hope of buying a new motor for his car and the other had simply decided to take a holiday here and naturally intended to buy something. Both had a lot of cash in large denominations. And both were in despair....

[Voylukov] I can only advise these and other citizens to approach the ispolkom commission.....

[Yastrebtsov] Which one?

[Voylukov] Any one. Approach them and explain the origin and source of the sum concerned.

[Yastrebtsov] A kind of declaration?

[Voylukov] Yes.

[Yastrebtsov] There has been mention in recent times in the press, on television, and in speeches by leaders of various rank, of vast sums of Soviet money in large denominations which is stockpiled abroad. Is our current finance policy connected with these sums?

[Voylukov] To a certain degree, yes. Billions of Soviet rubles have been accumulated abroad, in East European countries especially. Sometimes, money is secretly smuggled out of the USSR, then smuggled back in and used to buy up scarce goods. In short, underhand activities which damage the country's economy are being carried out. This must be stopped once and for all.

I will repeat once more that the presidential decree and the Cabinet of Ministers resolution pursue no other aim than this one: To suppress unearned income and strengthen the fight against the shady economy.

Savings Bank Chief on Difficulties

PM2501143191 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with V. Khorkin, chairman of the board of the USSR Savings Bank, by unidentified TASS correspondent; date and place not given: "USSR Savings Bank Asserts: Honest Workers Have Nothing to Fear"]

[Text] On the first day of the operation of the USSR president's decree on ceasing to accept for payment bank notes of denominations of 50 rubles [R] and R100, V. Khorkin, chairman of the board of the USSR Savings Bank, answered a TASS correspondent's questions.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] What difficulties have you encountered in connection with the new president's decree?

[Khorkin] You have to understand the aim of the decree and not begin with difficulties in fulfilling it. It stems from the basic avenues for the stabilization of the country's economy approved by the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies which provide for measures to put the country's money circulation and finances in order. The decree is aimed at the struggle against the shadow economy and it cuts off the sums which were in circulation but earned by dishonest means. This is naturally being done in the interests of the majority of our working people.

Like all our citizens, we learned of the thrust of the decree on the evening of 22 January from the "Vremya" program. The relevant instructions had been issued to the bank's institutions during the night. But the instructions took somewhat longer to reach some regions, for instance the Far East. In addition the Savings Bank daily serves about 10 million people. Naturally, it was necessary to prepare the cash desks, money, and so forth properly. In a number of places there was a lack of "actual" money in the necessary denominations and this of course created difficulties.

The State Bank leadership and the local oblast banks are now taking steps to fill the vaults with the necessary money. As for freezing the population's deposits that does not apply to money which is transferred to deposit accounts in the form of wages, royalties, pensions, and so forth. In addition no one is placing restrictions on cashless payments for goods and services: Savings bank cheques and paybooks operate as before. They can be used to pay for goods in stores. In addition there are no restrictions on the circulation of securities.

I shall stress once again that this is a temporary measure designed to stabilize money circulation. Under the conditions of an increase in the production of consumer goods these measures should produce quite a good effect. On the basis of the experience of the first of the three days allocated for the exchange we are elaborating the measures which must be taken to lift the tension.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] How realistic do you think it is to allocate three days to the exchange of money?

[Khorkin] Everyone will be able to exchange his monthly salary (but not above R1,000) or pension. Thus an honest person has nothing to fear. I stress that here there are no fiscal interests on the state's part and no infringement of the working people's rights. Of course there are difficulties—although I would call them not difficulties but inconveniences. If the money has been honestly earned or accumulated then no questions should arise. An honest worker will receive everything in full.

Official on Exchange Abuses

LD2701233591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Studio interview with Nikolay Pavlovich Sobol, first deputy head of the Main Department of the Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by reporter Vladimir Stefanov on 27 January; from the "Vremya" newscast—live or recorded]

[Text] [Stefanov] In the last few days we have all been concerned with exchanging money. For honest people, it would seem, this action has passed off more or less painlessly, that is, if one discounts the lines of retirees outside Savings Banks or other examples of what you might call lack of organization. As for those in the shadow economy, we can believe that they have experienced tangible losses as a result of this wide-scale operation. It would be difficult to assume that such people would meekly give up their underground millions. Precisely because of this, employees of the service for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation had a great deal of work during the days of the exchange. In our studio is Nikolay Pavlovich Sobol, first deputy head of the main department of the Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Nikolay Pavlovich, what phenomena did your employees come across during these last few days during the exchange of money?

[Sobol] Vladimir Fedorovich, in many regions of the country, many cases have been revealed of abuse of official position, forgery by officials, bribe-taking, and other offenses connected with the exchange process. In particular, Moscow is an example. Several bank employees tried to exchange large sums of money—100,000 rubles and over—for bribes. Unfortunately, such cases are not isolated. They are characteristic of the system of commercial banks and also of other organizations, both public and state. One of Aeroflot's agencies is an example. On the first day of the exchange they bought tickets on flights abroad and handed in receipts totalling over 400,000 rubles. the next day, these tickets were returned to the cash office.

[Stefanov] In this way, people received their money.

[Sobol] Naturally, this is an unlawful way of exchanging banknotes.

[Stefanov] Nikolay Pavlovich, how has our renowned trade sphere been behaving during these last few days of the exchange? I think that things have not all been calm and smooth.

[Sobol] It is precisely in the system of trade that the majority of such phenomena have been uncovered, where numerous cases have been recorded of the trading receipts coming into banks being five or more times greater, mainly in large denomination notes. For example, such cases have been uncovered in over 300 trading organizations in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, and in 400 in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Our department's employees in Kharkov Oblast stopped an attempt to hand in a sum of money over 200,000 rubles by one cashier in a retail trade base.

[Stefanov] One has to hope that investigations are being conducted into all these cases, and that some kind of measures will be taken.

[Sobol] Without fail. The appropriate checks and examination will be carried out and the persons guilty of this will be prosecuted.

[Stefanov] Nikolay Petrovich, my last question relates to the USSR president's decree yesterday. This is a document on measures to ensure the fight against economic sabotage and other crimes in the economic sphere. Tell me, to what extent will this decree help you in your work?

[Sobol] Vladimir Fedorovich, we have waited a long time for this decree. If it had come out three to four days earlier, it would have helped us even more significantly in carrying out this work. After all, certain heads of banking institutions did not even allow some of our employees access to relevant documentation which would have assisted us in halting all these different abuses.

[Stefanov] Now all these problems....

[Sobol, interrupting] Now none of these matters exist.

[Stefanov] Only a bit late. Thank you very much for the interview.

Commentaries View Currency Decree Implications

Article Questions Rationale

PM2901121191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by E. Gonzalyez: "Is a Hundred-Ruble Note Not Money?"]

[Text] Nor a fifty-ruble note. I went over the family cash once again and convinced myself that the number of large-denomination notes had not increased overnight. That meant that I personally would lose nothing this time. I can rejoice; but for some reason I do not want to. There is something in the monetary reorganization which I do not very much like. Not even in the reorganization itself and not in its conditions—here there is so far nothing to object to—but in the official and undoubtedly preprepared explanation for the decision which has been made.

Let's leave aside individual inconveniences and unforeseen situations in life. I find it hard to imagine that according to the reasons cited 22 January by the prime minister in the "Vremya" program it is possible to work up the whole country, take society away from work for three days, urge on buyers' stockjobbing, give work to thousands of commissions, and risk his reputation as head of government at the outset... And all this for the sake of changes in money printing technology? To harm the mafia? Because rubles are being taken abroad?

But after all there were serious reasons, there were. I do not know what is worse: The fact that the financial experts who have already acted do not notice them or the fact that they see them very well but do not want to talk about them. So let's talk ourselves as best we can.

Friends who naively suppose that I have a slightly better understanding of economics than they have recently been pestering me with identical questions: Will meat, vodka, shoes, bus fares, and the bath house become more expensive?.. I answer honestly and frankly: Everything will become more expensive, the question is when and by how much.

How could it be otherwise? Reducing the production of goods, printing tens of billions of rubles with no backup at all, transferring to market relations and retaining old prices? Alas, there are no miracles.

The Baltic republics have decided to increase prices at one go, but as it happens failed to consider the special features of the moment. Protests, demonstrations, and strikes began. In Moscow yesterday I bought eggs in an ordinary store for 2.4 rubles [R] for 10—and that was all right. A week earlier sausages had appeared for R5.2—today there is a line for them. So far a can of green peas for R1.78 can be easily acquired. But the new price for sausage (from R14 to R25) has brought a crowd to the shops. But not with posters but with money in their hands.

It may be confidently said that a similar prospect awaits us with industrial goods. The government has tried to close the "divide" between wholesale and retail prices for consumer goods, allocating subsidies to light and textile industry enterprises. But only for January. Thus the question of "when" is clarified. A little patience and we will know "by how much." So that the growth of prices, like many other economic decisions, is an enforced and inevitable matter.

Oh, if only the rise in prices could lead unequivocally to the balance of supply and demand, to the cooling of "hot" money, to an increase in the revenue section of the budget, and on that basis to the expansion of goods production. In theory perhaps it could but in practice one more precise—the growth of the population's income—is proceeding simultaneously.

This process, of course, does not give rise to protests, many of us do not even notice it. But that does not make things easier in the economy. It may very well be the case that your personal income is not actually increasing, but here is how the population's wages as a whole increased: in 1987 they were R452 billion, in 1988 nearly R494 billion, in 1989 they were R558 billion, and finally last year we all received approximately R640 billion for our minor and major expenses. The income of enterprises increased at nearly the same rate. One could only rejoice at that if the ruble had retained its strength and the division into cash and noncash had not become hypothetical.

We shall not dwell in detail on the methods of redistributing revenue in favor of the population and enterprises. The so-called full economic accountability [khozraschet], the cooperative sector, various funds, joint ventures, brokerage organizations, numerous social programs, and the increase in wages to some workers and employees whose numbers, despite the good intentions, are nonetheless increasing, have all played their part. There has also been the increased interest rate for deposits, the expansion of preferential credits, the extinguishing of loans, new prices in commission stores, and dozens of other sources of revenue. According to POSTFAKTUM figures, in 1989 the pace of the increase in wages in industry was 5.8 greater than the pace of the growth of production volume.

Thus there are two simultaneous processes: the growth of prices and of incomes. Prices can now be increased by enterprises, trade, and government organs. They are also concerned for incomes, but there is one more force interested in them—we ourselves. It must be honestly admitted that our ideal is to get more and work less.

Next: Prices cannot grow unrestrictedly—the population will not allow it. No limits are set for incomes—they are always too little. Enterprises even vie with each other in creating all kinds of funds, compensation payments, additional payments, and so forth.

But money is not an end in itself. In brief, today people have more in reserve than before: They have 150 percent more sugar, 40 percent more meat, 90 percent more canned meat, 80 percent more canned fish, and enough detergents for three to four months. Trade has long been trading in nothing—everything is distributed by vouchers, coupons, and visiting cards. It is a paradox that with a total shortage trade turnover growth has been 114 percent but delicacies, tea, coffee, candy, and vodka are now acquired exclusively on the black market.

Should this knot have been cut? It should. It is true that only yesterday it seemed impossible to do this. Today a solution has been suggested: withdrawing large-denomination notes. But how much is that? According to my own figures, which undoubtedly need checking, something in the order of R48 billion. Let us consider the brightest option for the Ministry of Finances: Only half (that is not likely!) of these notes will be exchanged for small-denomination notes. The rest will go into the furnace or into the shredder. How much is that? Nearly as much as was printed (or as the issue [emissiya]) last year.

Such coincidences are always a little confusing. Unfortunately, they attest not to a radical solution of the problem but only to en enforced step. And next, next? Will it be the turn of 25-ruble notes, 10-ruble notes, or five-ruble notes? After all, the processes mentioned are continuing. Moreover, they are being aggravated by the rapid growth of incomes in those sectors which do not work for the consumer at all and therefore do not even provide the opportunity of increasing prices for their output. A graphic example: What can be the cost of a tank made last year and destroyed this year? Yet it has been paid for twice.

Now it seems I am beginning to understand what is confusing about financial experts' commentaries on the president's decree. If they had treated us and their business seriously and set forth a program in which 100-ruble notes were only the start, a pretext, then that would be one thing. But if they restrict themselves to talk for public consumption about the shadow economy and smugglers—that is something quite different. Then I shall not be surprised if trust in the ruble in notes of any denomination declines to nothing, if the final incentives to work disappear, and if people began to live for the present. Indeed, will there be even one sane person who will believe that all our troubles stem from banknotes with watermarks?

But one can understand that the new government would like to free itself of the burden of the financial errors of the old government and turn over a new leaf, so to speak. But what does it intend to portray on this new leaf? A new 100-ruble note? Or a new economic structure, new economic relations, and a convertible ruble?

Reminiscent of 'Stagnation Period'

LD2501170591 Moscow TASS in English 1551 GMT 25 Jan 91

[By TASS commentator Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—What makes the latest move by the Soviet president vulnerable is lack of consistency in its implementation and its excessive duration in time, an early commentary on Gorbachev's money reform decree said.

The critic seems to have hit the nail exactly on the head: Local authorities all over the place seem eager to add a few more days to the terms stipulated in the decree and allow greater sums of money to be changed for new notes. Newspaper reports convey the idea of the country's uncontrollability at this sharp turn in history and demonstrate resourcefulness with which citizens get rid of notes suddenly declared invalid.

One must question the reason given for this move, which on the whole appears to be correct and the only possible—though by far not the last—step in a series of radical economic measures.

Officials of all ranks are stubbornly denying that the move amounts to monetary reform and insist that its only aim is to combat the underground economy. This ideological "substantiation" can undercut all the positive intentions behind the move as well as the prestige of the newly-formed old guard cabinet.

Indeed, assurances that the presidential decree was intended for the benefit of the country's overwhelming grass-roots majority take the problem from the economic to the sociopolitical field and open the new government to the volley of critical fire.

From the viewpoint of social justice this money change holds no water. It is absolutely clear that this move cannot but affect most dramatically the low-income sections of the population. While a mafiosi certainly stands to lose much more than an old-age retiree in absolute figures, still it can be no more than a flea-bite for the former and collapse of the last hope for the latter.

Apart from this, the unpopular measure taken "on behalf of the working people" is strongly reminiscent of the stagnation period lifestyle, when authorities robbed workers of their legitimate days off, sent prices sky high and organised work on weekends without remuneration, all "on behalf of working people".

Leonid Brezhnev, the then leader celebrated as the true follower of Lenin, said something that was difficult for the septuagenarian to articulate but that has not lost its topicality since his time. "Economy must be economical," he insisted. Today's interpretation of this mighty and fresh idea must be new, of course. The economy must deal with tasks economic, and as regards social problems they should be dealt with as such after effective production has been ensured, profits and dividends have been derived and distributed. Experience shows that the effectiveness of a social policy is directly dependent on the effectiveness of the economic policy. Their confusion under egalitarian slogans, as 73 years of our history testify, do not and cannot yield any good results.

Agricultural

Farms Urged To Sell More Grain to State

PM2801195191 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Istomin under the rubric "Topics of the Day": "Let Us Not Leave the Country Without Grain"]

[Text] A few days ago the USSR Government invited a group of farm leaders from grain-growing regions of Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to discuss the situation concerning the supply of the country's population with grain products. At first glance there should be no need for this type of conference. Farmers have gathered a good grain harvest, estimated (after finalization [dorabotka]) at 218 million tonnes. That is 21.3 million tonnes more than in the previous year. It would seem that the food industry, which uses approximately one-fourth of the grain that has been grown, should be able to function without disruptions in all parts of the Union, and that an adequate range of high-quality bread, groats, pasta, and bakery goods should be available in the stores...

However, in real life this is not entirely the case. The prescribed six-month food grain stocks have dwindled to one or two months' supply in 12 republics, and in the SSR [Soviet Socialist Reublic] of Moldova there is only a week's supply of wheat left. Even in individual oblasts of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], where the lion's share of the country's grain is grown, flour-milling enterprises are threatening to grind to a halt. As for feed, the rye and grain remaining from the grain exchange stocks are already being used for the production of mixed feed.

In brief, the situation as regards the production of essential food products is more than alarming. The reason is that many farms have failed to fulfill their state procurement contracts. Only 67.8 million tonnes of grain have been delivered to state stocks, and its marketability is the lowest in many years. An analysis has revealed that it totals 31 percent in the country as a whole, compared with 40 percent in 1978 when the gross harvest was approximately the same. It is true that kolkhoz [collective farm] members and sovkhoz [state farm] workers gathered an unprecedented grain harvest last fall, and that central farm granaries and team and section grain stores are by no means empty.

Simple calculations reveal that more than 150 million tonnes of wheat, rye, oats, barley, and millet have been retained at local level for internal farm consumption... Such plentiful grain stores in our villages would appear to be a cause for joy. But let us save emotions for later... Meanwhile, let us reflect on two serious and alarming circumstances. Both public sector and privately owned livestock is now frequently fed on pure grain. This is not exactly the best solution. What is needed are balanced, high-grade mixed feeds like those used in the West, to which we customarily refer, or at least something comparable. Meanwhile, the supply of feed grain at state mixed-feed plants in the Ukraine and Belorussia alone is sufficient for six and 15 days, respectively.

Why have only local interests been looked after, while the state as a whole got a bad deal? SELSKAYA ZHIZN has answered this question more than once. Let me recall right away that one of the main reasons given was the failure to fully back additional grain sales with material and technical resources and consumer goods in conditions of the absence of diktat from the center. During the meeting with the government, the veil was lifted slightly as to why this incentive failed to come into play—part of the resources were "siphoned off" at various levels by grasping administrative structures in republics, krays, oblasts, and rayons, and the grain grower was left with nothing but the dregs. It remains to be hoped, and we have every right to demand, that a thorough investigation be carried out along the entire length of this chain. The farmer must receive everything that he was promised.

But as the saying goes, this is more easily said than done... At present something else is of utmost importance. How can the imbalances in grain procurement be rectified here and now, how can the farmers be induced to share their grain right now, in the first quarter of the current year? After all, there is no denying that many kolkhozes and sovkhozes have considerable quantities of surplus grain. According to the most conservative estimates they could sell at least six to eight million tonnes of this grain to the state. In view of this situation, the farm leaders proposed that the sale of grain be effected in exchange for goods via grain reception enterprises. They conclude the contracts, therefore they must be responsible for the fulfilment of pledged commitments.

A number of other incentive factors, suggested by life itself and expected from the local governments, were also proposed. There was talk, for example, of lowering the grain sale rate for material and technical resources, and appropriating more construction materials. After all, the countryside must be able sooner or later to acquire proper amenities! It was also proposed to broaden the range of grain crops sold for hard currency. At present, as is known, this range comprises only strong and valuable wheats, and also peas. It was emphasized in particular that no incentives will promote grain deliveries to central stocks unless prices for construction materials and machinery are "frozen," and material and moral incentives of grain reception enterprises to fulfill and exceed the state order for grain deliveries are enhanced.

Clearly, many of these wishes will be heeded. An instruction has already been drawn up which, for example, envisages buying during the first quarter of this year one million tonnes of grain from farms for freely convertible currency at the actual prices which prevailed at the end of last year for grain purchases abroad.

The meeting participants appealed to kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and other agricultural enterprise collectives to come to the country's assistance in this critical situation. "We remember well," the appeal which they adopted says, "that the state never let us down, and always assisted us during difficult and infertile years with seeds, feeds, transportation facilities, fuel, fertilizers, and machinery. Having comprehensively weighed up their possibilities, the collectives of the farms with whose management we have been entrusted have decided to additionally sell to the state the largest possible quantity of grain. Our motive is that no one apart from us, agricultural workers, is capable of feeding the country. No one else will do it."

It is to be hoped that the appeal will find support at the local level, and that every collective will make its contribution to this noble cause. This is what has happened throughout our history at difficult times for the country.

Goskomstat Aide Interviewed on Food Situation

PM2401144991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with A. Ilin, deputy chief of the USSR State Committee for Statistics Agro-Industrial Complex Statistics Administration, by A. Klimenko, date and place not given; under the rubric "Tomorrow's Menu"; first four paragraphs are an introduction and reader's letter: "Jump Without a Trampoline?"]

[Text] Rural teacher V. Trufanov wrote to us from Orenburg Oblast:

"We were driven to distraction by food shortages all last year. Thus far 1991 has also been 'marked' by long lines. I read recently that a U.S. newspaper has made a forecast for us, after conducting research in 16 Soviet cities. 'The food situation is bad in Russia, but the Russian people will survive,' the Americans promise.

"Are we going to continue to be fascinated by forecasts like these, or would it be better to say what the food situation is in reality?

"I think this is a reasonable observation to make."

"According to our estimates," A. Ilin, deputy chief of the USSR State Committee for Statistics Agro-Industrial Complex Statistics Administration, said, "the gross grain harvest after completion totalled 218 million tonnes in 1990. That is 11 percent up on the previous year."

[Klimenko] So we are wrong to blame the harvest?

[Ilin] Yes, although the sugar beet and sunflower seed harvest was down 16.2 million and 0.6 million tonnes respectively in comparison to 1989. Potato production is continuing to fall. The gross harvest totalled 64 million tonnes. That is 12 percent less than the year before last and 59 percent less than in 1973.

[Klimenko] So what has happened?

[Ilin] The area sown to crops is being reduced. During the last decade, for example, the total area of land sown to potatoes has shrunk by 15 percent in the Ukraine and by 24-37 percent in Latvia and Estonia.

[Klimenko] There is no need to comment, as the saying goes. You had hoped that the reduced area sown to crops would be compensated by a good harvest. That has not happened. Is the livestock situation just as worrying?

[Ilin] A total of 108.7 million tonnes of milk was received in 1990, which is 0.2 million tonnes more than in the previous year. The improvement in the meat situation observed at the beginning of the five-year period did not continue, unfortunately. A total of 20.1 million tonnes was produced in 1989 against only 19.9 million tonnes last year. Moreover, these annual totals include 2 million tonnes of meat bought from the population. That is 86 percent up on 10 years ago, for example.

[Klimenko] So, it's thanks to the "private producer." But what about kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]?

[Ilin] In recent years, public sector farms have begun to increase the sale of livestock for meat, despite the low level of production intensification. Some 32 million head of cattle were supplied in 1986 and more than 34 million last year. But the number has recently dropped by 5 million.

[Klimenko] Let us be frank, this arithmetic is ominous. Is the picture the same everywhere?

[Ilin] Virtually in every Union republic. This trend could intensify because of feed shortages. A standard head of cattle now receives 17.3 quintals of feed against 18 quintals in 1989.

[Klimenko] Is the feed situation the same with poultry farming, which has put us all on a "starvation diet"?

[Ilin] Unfortunately yes. At the start of last year, egg production was down by 929 million. This drop was mainly accounted for by farms in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] (418 million) and the Ukraine (416 million). Last year's total was 2.9 billion eggs less than in 1989. The shortage of groats and other components has taken its toll. The sector is also afflicted by the general deterioration in deliveries discipline. [Ilin ends]

How long is this going to go on? What lies in store for us this year?

A. Serkov, deputy director of the All-Union Research Institute of the Agricultural Economy, pondered this question:

"Processes which could lead to a decline in agricultural output are, unfortunately, on the increase.

"The situation has deteriorated considerably since the fall as far as villagers' preparations for the next harvest are concerned. As much as 25 million hectares less have been plowed. Large quantities of winter crops have not been sown.

"That does not mean that these negative trends cannot be broken. Purchase prices for grain have increased, which would seem to be an improvement. But there must be goods to soak up this money. Not just for grain produced in excess of some order or tax in kind but for every tonne sold to the state. The material and technical base for grain preparation and storage must be created as soon as possible for economic units producing commercial grain. This program must be financed in part by the budget. Perhaps a single grain fund could be set up using Union republics' resources.

"Then there is the question of potatoes and vegetables. It would make sense to allocate vegetable plots in spring to all city dwellers and inhabitants of worker settlements who want them. This really could give us at least 6-10 million extra tonnes of vegetables and our second staple crop.

"A pound of 'appetizing' promises is no substitute for a pound of grain. If the 'miracle' of reviving masters of the land is still possible, it would be a sin not to try to use every opportunity to do so."

Military

Paper's Coup Rumor Cited, Criticized

PM2901104591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed column: "What They Are Saying, What They Are Writing"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 January:

"A rumor is going round Moscow: The talk is that the latest military coup is scheduled for Monday 28 January. As confirmation the following figure is cited: There are 150,000 'Marines' stationed near Moscow. One NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reader... has reported that he saw with his own eyes"black berets' disembarking at the Moscow railroad's Losinoostrovskaya station."

From the editorial office: Well, everything is clear as far as the "military coup" is concerned—we think that this bountiful topic will feed many more legions of journalists. We are surprised at how well informed the newspaper is when it emerges that the number of our marines has been a closely guarded secret for it so far. Yet everyone knows that the number of our marines in all our fleets is... 13,000. That is, slightly less than one reader of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has concentrated in the region of Losinoostrovskaya station. Incidentally, we were told at the Navy Main Staff that all marine units are at present at their permanent places of deployment. [passage omitted]

General Says 'Deep Changes' Planned for Army

LD2901101891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0905 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—Major General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the Directorate of Affairs [Upravleniye Delami] of the USSR Defense Ministry, has stated that the draft legislative acts on matters of defense building and the functioning of the Armed Forces, which should be adopted in the very near future by the USSR Supreme Soviet, "envisage deep changes". He gave an interview today to a TASS correspondent in connection with the submission of the defense bill to the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Issues of Defense and State Security for discussion.

According to General Ivashov, the whole system of legislation on defense matters has been drawn up by the military legislation commission of the USSR Defense Ministry. "The laws on defense, on general liability to military service and military duties, and on the status of servicemen should be the main laws of this system", the chief of the Directorate of Affairs stressed. In particular, he added, "the state guarantees servicemen proper conditions for them to carry out their military duty to defend the USSR, fixed procedure for performing military service, and the granting of constitutional rights and liberties."

The general claimed that, for the first time, at the level of law, military service is defined as "a special form of state service and its priority is established over other forms of labor activity, in the special protection, by law, of the rights and personal dignity of servicemen".

This is why, the general believes, the process has now already begun of restoring the lost traditions of the Russian officers' corps. Leonid Ivashov recalled a sonorous phrase reflecting the standards of behavior of Russian officers in prerevolutionary years: "Give your life to the fatherland, your heart to a lady, and your honor to no one".

"These standards are also alive today among our officers. That is why the perception by servicemen of the undeserved accusations levelled at them is rather keen", General Leonid Ivashov said in conclusion.

Concept of RSFSR Army Criticized

91UM0298C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General K. Kobets, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, chief of communications of the USSR Armed Forces, chairman of the legislative group of deputies of the USSR Armed Forces and the KGB, and RSFSR people's deputy, by A. Uglanov; place and date not given; published under the rubric "They Are So Different...These Generals and Colonels": " 'Being More Balanced'"]

[Text] **We have, it would seem, lived to see times of general suspicion and mistrust. Democrats are accusing patriots, everyone together, the conservatives, and so forth, and no end is in sight. Everyone is continuing to "bite" the Army and at the same time viewing it warily. A mythical significance—from an aspiration to lay down their lives for the CPSU to a disregard for the legitimately elected governing structures—is frequently attached to the words of Moscow generals.**

Our interviewee is K. Kobets, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, chief of communications of the USSR Armed Forces, chairman of the legislative group of deputies of the USSR Armed Forces and the KGB, and people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

[Uglanov] Konstantin Ivanovich, with what feelings have the events in Lithuania left you—a professional military man?

[Kobets] I will be honest with you: I am experiencing dual feelings. The first is, of course, profound sorrow. Sorrow for the commanders who were unable at that moment to get a hold of the situation. The Army needs, for all that, a more balanced approach to outward displays of emotions.

On the other hand, I understand these commanders. When one's family has been completely "crossed off," when a card has been dropped in your letter-box saying that your granddaughter will not make it to kindergarten today, when officers' wives are simply kicked out of their jobs, when there are more than 300 instances of a refusal to register the families of servicemen, when 24,000 Great Patriotic War veterans have been deprived of their benefits.... Approximately 40 instances of physical reprisals and approximately 20 assaults on sentries have been perpetrated. Remaining prudent in this atmosphere is difficult.

Social matters are the top priority for servicemen. For example, coalminers, transport workers, and iron and steel industry workers may solve them somehow if only to some extent with the aid of strikes. The military is deprived of this. And what could be more dreadful when such discontent with the feeling of hopelessness arises in a "man with a gun?"

[Uglanov] But some of their problems could be solved by the formation of a Russian national guard, possibly?

[Kobets] I have spoken on this subject with B. Yeltsin. I believe that this is unacceptable at this time.

[Uglanov] A whole number of deputies were the sponsors of this idea—the formation of a guard—and it emerged from a consciousness of their own helplessness, which has just been confirmed in the Baltic republics, when legitimately elected authorities were given ultimatums—with shots from assault rifles and tanks.

[Kobets] But B. Yeltsin should not feel this way because such conditions as there are in Lithuania and Latvia have yet to be created in Russia. There are there military formations armed with firearms.

[Uglanov] But, believe me, very many people are worried currently that, owing to some circumstances or other, an order will be given for the Army to do something similar in Moscow.

[Kobets] I have met with the president, and I have perfectly precise reason to state that such a thing will not occur. It was said clearly that there would never be an order for the Army to be used against the population and for the solution of interethnic and domestic conflicts.

On the other hand, there have been such assurances from the officer body of deputies of all levels. So the Army will never intervene in such affairs.

[Uglanov] And Lithuania?

[Kobets] But it was not a political question that was being decided here. People were defending themselves....

[Uglanov]...and occupying the television center?

[Kobets] Today the local government is fully in control of television. But why was it occupied at the request of the National Salvation Committee? Television was without ceremony calling for a direct armed uprising and civil war!

[Uglanov] In any event, sooner or later the sovereignization of the Soviet republics will assume final forms. The defense aspect of this question will be decided also. It would be interesting to know today how the top officer body and the generals would view the highest republic authorities—in Russia, particularly.

[Kobets] I would like to say first of all that we are in constant contact both with the Supreme Soviet and the government of the RSFSR. There are frequent meetings with the chairman and his deputies on various matters: communications, supply, and many others.

As chairman of the legislative group of deputies of the Armed Forces and KGB, just last week I met with B. Yeltsin twice. We discussed also such questions as the formation of an army and the position of servicemen and their social protection.

We arrived at the clear opinion that whatever kind of situation may take shape, it is necessary always to agree to contacts. In addition, the mutual viewpoint that the Supreme Soviet and Government of Russia should somehow regulate servicemen's social problems was expressed.

In addition, we agreed that a Russian army, as a means of defending sovereignty and the state or as a continuation of policy, is not really necessary.

But at the same time B. Yeltsin spoke about the fact that if some conditions were to emerge in Russia and information to appear which could not be refuted—concerning, for example, the creation of some committee for the purpose of overthrowing the government—it would be essential to create some security council for preventing such anticonstitutional activity. For such a situation, such a structure could be created, I believe. But we were not talking about our own army for the defense of statehood.

I sometimes wonder even what guides some deputies in stirring up this problem. I have concluded that the leadership of the Supreme Soviet does not put this question that rectilinearly. And my talks with B. Yeltsin satisfied me completely.

In addition, he goes further. Specifically, he is prepared to raise questions concerning the investment of additional resources in the social spheres for the Army, training of the youth, and financial support for families sending off their sons to Army service.

[Uglanov] I hear you and involuntarily recall newspaper articles and television material containing references to letters whose basic proposition was "Yeltsin is a traitor!"

[Kobets] Different strata of the population, owing to their training and evaluation of a situation, react differently. But when one familiarizes oneself with the stenographic reports and makes a detailed analysis of the situation, one sees for oneself that there are no real grounds for such hysteria.

I believe that we military also have no need to enter into any confrontation. We need to attempt again and again to find civilized solutions to complex situations. I am absolutely firmly sure that a common language may be found with the leadership of the republic. And in the place of certain military deputies I would be more restrained in the words I use.

Claim Draftees To Swear Oath to CPSU Denied

PM2101161991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Reply by V. Khristoforov, acting military commissar of Pskov Oblast, to reader's query under the "Briefing for the Reader" rubric; first three paragraphs are reader's letter: "In Pursuit of Sensation"]

[Text] Pskov's IMA-PRESS, the Estonian Telegraph Agency, Leningrad's SMENA, and certain other publications have circulated information to the effect that "...Colonel Leutin, the military commissar of Pskov, has been forcing draftees to sign the following statement: 'I approve CPSU policy and swear to carry it out.' The statements are put into personal files."

Can this possibly be true?

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel of the Reserve G. Kazantsev.

Colonel V. Khristoforov, acting military commissar of Pskov Oblast:

After these articles officers from the oblast military commissariat carried out a check at the city military commissariat. It transpired that the readers had been deceived. Why? I think that the best answer to this question is provided by a collective letter written by members of the draft commission and staffers of the Pskov City Military Commissariat. It was signed by 27 people. I. Kalinin, S. Lakhtin, S. Pavlov, and others write:

"With the utmost responsibility we state that City Military Commissar Colonel Leutin did not make and is not making draftees swear any oaths of allegiance to the CPSU.

"However, the authors of this disinformation are not in any hurry to publish a refutation. Evidently they have their own aims, namely to compromise the military commissariat's activity and present its leader as some kind of extreme conservative.

"Of course, we could decide not to pay any attention to these facts. But they are one link in a general campaign mounted by a number of publications aimed at discrediting the CPSU, the Soviet Army, and the activity of draft commissions."

Nothing really needs to be added to this.

Baltic Republics

'Aircraft Bomb' Explodes in Lithuania 28 Jan

LD2801193691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1857 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondnet Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Jan (TASS)—At about 1640 today a powerful explosion shook the Lithuanian villages of Statinai and Ciuzakampiai in Salcininkai Rayon. According to eyewitnesses, an aircraft bomb exploded next to a collective farm livestock unit and a peasant farmstead after an aircraft had flown over.

As a result of the explosion a crater was formed 4-5 meters deep and about 20 meters wide. There are no fatalities, but the livestock unit's water supply and a peasant farm building were destroyed.

The fact of the incident was confirmed at the local police department, but it has not as yet proved possible to discover which aircraft had dropped the bomb. An investigation has begun.

Soviet Troops Shoot 'Draft-Dodger' in Lithuania

LD2901121291 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius January 29 TASS— Soviet troops shot and wounded a 20-year old Lithuanian draft-dodger early today, the Lithuanian Interior Ministry reports.

Jonas Tautkus was admitted to a Vilnius hospital at 0215 local time with a head wound. He was said to have been shot at a military checkpoint on the Vilnius-Kaunas highway while fleeing Soviet troops.

The youth "was intoxicated, a conflict happened, he tried to run away" and "weapons were used", Vilnius Military Garrison Commander Colonel Grigoriy Belous told TASS this morning.

The young man is in intensive care following surgery, doctors said.

Earlier, the military fired on the Lavariskes customs checkpoint on the Belorussian border, seizing documents from customs officials, Lithuanian radio reported.

A similar incident occurred at the Madininkiai customs checkpoint in Vilnius district, it said.

Commander Grigoriy Belous refused to confirm or deny the report.

Vilnius streets were deserted on Monday night, except the city centre where up to 1,000 volunteers maintained a vigil outside the parliament. Approaches to the intercity telephone station are still blocked by large vehicles. Outside the city on the road to Kaunas a TASS car was stopped by a military patrol as several armoured vehicles blocked the road. TASS reporters were searched. Questioned about the legality of his actions an officer told the journalists he had "orders" from the city garrison commander.

Commander Belous cited President Mikhail Gorbachev's December decree "on certain (legal) acts on defence issues passed in Union republics", which allows the confiscation of weapons and disbandment of national groups.

Landsbergis Describes Incident

LD2901094991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0821 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] You may have heard that last night a young man was severely injured at an illegally established military cordon, where people are injured and dangerous incidents occur every night. The young man did not stop as ordered and his car came under fire. He was hit in the head. I do not like to have such sad thoughts, but his life is in danger. He is on a respirator. The part of the brain that regulates breathing may have been injured. In short, we might have yet another victim. [passage omitted]

MVD Seeks Witnesses

LD2901114191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0930 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Telephone interview with M. Atroskevicius, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officer, by unidentified announcer in Vilnius; from the "Crime Chronicle" program—live]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Esteemed Atroskevicius, about two o'clock this morning Jonas Tautkus was brought to Clinical Hospital No. 1 with a bullet wound in the head. I would not like to express someone else's opinion or elaborate on a version of this incident because so far we have only these facts: He was severely wounded in the back of his head and is in very serious condition. As far as we know Tautkus was brought to the hospital by unidentified persons at 0215. They stated that he was wounded by the military on the Kaunas highway. We would like to appeal to these citizens who brought the wounded man to the hospital if they can hear us to report to the nearest militia station because we have to record this, find the location of the accident and investigate it. Esteemed Atroskevicius, although I am almost sure of the answer I would like to verify the following: Were the people who brought the victim to the hospital civilians?

[Atroskevicius] Yes they were (?obviously) civilians.

[Announcer] This would mean that the MVD officers do not have to examine the car. What they need is statements by the witnesses.

[Atroskevicius] We must examine the car. We must examine the scene of the incident.

[Announcer] We will therefore use this radio broadcast and hope that these people who took Tautkus to the hospital can hear us. Please report. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Addresses Supreme Council 28 Jan

LD2801202191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0815 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, to plenary session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council—live]

[Excerpts] Good morning, esteemed deputies: I would like to share certain news, [word indistinct] and to present a document to you.

Well, this weekend, in recent days, yesterday and today, we have received various news from abroad, from the USSR, and finally, from Lithuania itself. There are some events that give rise to optimism and some that cause concern and prompt one to resort, as before, to political and other types of defensive measures. [passage omitted]

Among the matters that concern us—and not just us but also the Soviet Union and especially the republics struggling for their sovereignty, with Russia at the forefront—is the order which is perhaps already known to us and commented upon widely throughout the world, which had to date been held secret and which has been signed by Ministers Yazov and Pugo, concerning the introduction of military rule—without referring to it as such—in major cities, including the capitals of Union republics. Moreover, according to their interpretation, it will obviously apply to us as well. It provides for continuous patrols with heavy armored weapons; in other words, one may say it is an open move toward military control throughout the Soviet Union, beginning with Moscow. Or else that was supposed to be the concluding phase, had everything developed successfully, within the Baltic countries and in the spread of further activity. Thus, from 1 February, military control would have been officially implemented by, one might say, a Soviet Union that had been already subjugated.

However, the position to be further adhered to by Russia and by other large Union republics is of great importance. Well, the danger, understandably, is very great for us, since we have here already the tried means of blood-letting and total hate and animosity, because we have dared to possess a will of our own.

A strike force is being set up in Lithuania. It will be possible to give it the appearance of a so-called local force, since only a very few accept the thesis that is being reiterated so very persistently concerning the struggle and confrontation between Lithuania's political forces. Thus, success may be achieved in conveying that there are two law and order forces present in Lithuania, and that they may enter into a confrontation with one another.

Well, you are aware of that small isolated group, or the special purpose militia unit, that perpetrated the attack on the police academy, and later kept itself separated and undefined, apparently awaiting further instructions. Now it has come under the Army's umbrella. It is cared for there, fed there, armed there, and dispatched to carry out actions. Of course, it went into action under the guise of being of being a self-regulating force. However, as we were somehow able to foresee, a rampage by such a unit of Bermontists [group of pro-German White Russians and German units, active in Latvia and Lithuania, in 1919, formed mainly of Russians who were prisoners of war in Germany] may begin. It is already taking place in Vilnius in the form of terrorism, while in other areas of Lithuania it has begun assaults, namely, on the border customs posts. [passage omitted] However, this may only be the beginning. Well, I will describe it to you as banditry. The government must issue protests through its own channels.

Well, naturally, we also see a political goal in such actions. Perhaps they may succeed in creating chaos and in generating a need for direct dictatorial rule. Perhaps they envisage obtaining our own request for intervention by the Soviet Army against such a gang.

Well, a lot might begin on 1 February. From 1 February two documents will have crossed—the USSR presidential decree announced on 26 January and the order by the two ministers that I mentioned previously, dated 29 December, which was to become effective in a month's time. [passage omitted] Of course, such laws have no validity for us, in a legal sense; however, in practice they mask the position of the perpetrators.

We must have a clear political position on this. We must strive to try to prevent that which is being planned.

I asked Georgiy Tarazevich, who is leaving for Moscow today, to present this position, [words indistinct] the request that the USSR president put a stop to the implementaiton of this order, since its consequences are totally unpredictable. First of all, they are very dangerous for the civilian population. Moreover, this also constitutes a verification of the real intentions of the very top leadership. If it is stopped, it will indicate the presence of good will to reach some type of compromise. If they do not stop it, it will be evidence that the same ill will exists. It follows its path at any cost.

Well, it is very evident to us in a political sense that this will constitute a new intervention, an additional military intervention carried out by means of a creeping occupation. More and more will pass under military control, since this time they have not succeeded in overturning our government's functioning in Lithuania. In Lithuania, the opposing military force is very clearly in the guise of an enemy and separated from the lawful Lithuanian Government which continues to function and exist.

Well, there wil be a desire to undermine that functioning and perhaps to provoke some confrontation. [passage omitted]

And the pretext is so deceitful if all of a sudden the neighboring state becomes concerned over the fact that the incidence of robberies has increased here. Of course, it is a naive pretext for the introduction of troops here. However, increasing tension is an obvious goal and a destructive means seeking perhaps to undermine the Lithuanian Republic's government structures. [passage indistinct]

Statement on USSR 'Aggression' Issued

LD2801144291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1005 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Statement by the Lithuanian Supreme Council read by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at a Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Statement by the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Council concerning the threat of military dictatorship within the Soviet Union and the threat of its aggression in Lithuania:

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania notes, with great concern the danger to the public posed by the USSR president's decree of 26 January 1991 and also the heretofore unpublished law, dated 29 December 1990, signed by the USSR defense and USSR internal affairs ministers.

By these acts, official permission is accorded for unlimited license by the USSR KGB's regular and internal troops, by assigning round-the-clock heavy armored patrols in cities and forced entry into any buildings, in search of criminal acts, from 1 February 1991.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania strongly condemns such designs as a crude violation of human rights, and a fatal [word indistinct] military dictatorship, and expresses its solidarity with all Baltic and Union republic lawful governmental structures and democratic forces.

In the event of the forcible implementation of such unlawful, sovereignty-violating acts upon the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, a further spread of USSR aggression and creeping open occupation would ensue. This would constitute also a willful increase of tension and an attempt to block a last possibility for negotiations, and would be a great danger for the civilian population.

In truth, a different decision is vital—to withdraw the USSR paratroopers and the USSR internal armies without any delay and to return all seized objects to the Lithuanian Republic.

We reiterate that no foreign decrees and orders have any validity in Lithuania. Lithuania has its own laws and state institutions for maintaining law and order.

The formal pretext mentioned in the USSR documents of the supposedly ever-increasing criminal acts cannot be applied to Lithuania in a legal aspect and is also an unsubstantiated fact, as backed by statistics of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Discontinuation of USSR military crimes is of utmost importance in Lithuania. The aforementioned order of the USSR ministers, which attempts to legalize the use of the army against peaceful demonstrations and to provide supposed legality to the 12-13 January massacres in Vilnius and possible future massacres anywhere, will encourage them even further.

The Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic hereby cautions the USSR political leadership that its attempts to implement, not only within the USSR but also within Lithuania, its decisions concerning military dictatorship, would provoke especially difficult consequences in Lithuania, the entire responsibility for which would fall to the Soviet Union and its leaders.

In view of the danger, we appeal once again to the community of the world's nations, to the great democratic states, and the United Nations, requesting that they decisively block the path of armed coercion and dictatorship.

The threat exists, not only to the Baltic states and the USSR nations, but also to world civilization. Freedom and democracy must be defended before it is too late.

Driver in Vilnius Shooting Incident Arrested

PM2901092291 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak report: "Who Shot at the Paratroopers?"]

[Text] Vilnius—In the evening of 24 January an air assault forces subunit column left Vilnius en route to its permanent garrison. The column was constantly accompanied by a "Moskvich" all the way from the military installation.

As they were leaving the city, the car driver tried to block the vehicles' advance, and in so doing the "Moskvich" almost knocked down the officer directing the column's journey. Soldiers from the escort group tried to detain the offenders. Shots were fired from the "Moskvich" and it began to head out of the city. However, the car was halted by return fire at its wheels. Two young guys leapt from the car and tried to flee. One did not succeed.

...I arrived at the scene of the drama literally within a few minutes. The arrested man, a guy of athletic build, was already in the armored personnel carrier under guard.

He was shaking all over, whether from cold or from fear, and he answered questions readily.

"I didn't do the shooting, I was at the wheel. The other one did the shooting."

"And who is he?"

"I don't know him. All I know is that his name is Pyatras..."

The arrested man turned out to be Zigmas Slushnis, a Vilnius resident, born 1959.

"I work in the Supreme Soviet checking the passes. I served in the paratroopers, and I am married with two children," he said.

Apart from two passports (his own and his wife's), Slushnis had permits showing him to be a worker in the information bureau and a representative of the territorial defense department, a permit issued by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Security Department, and a police academy pass. With regard to the latter, Slushnis told me he goes there to work out.

They also confiscated from the arrested man a 1952 TT pistol and two magazines, one of which contained four rounds of ammunition. Another 48 rounds were discovered in boxes marked "color photographic film." As for the batteries for a Japanese-made radio set, Slushnis explained that the radio set itself was in his comrade's possession.

Among the various papers, the investigators will certainly take a particular interest in an address book containing a great many military license plate numbers and other information.

Who sent Slushnis and his colleague to follow the military and who armed them with pistols and a radio? The investigation will answer these questions.

Lithuanian Media Protest Military Occupation

LD2901120191 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Today the employees of Lithuanian Radio and Television sent a telegram to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The telegram protests the occupation of Lithuanian Radio and Television facilities by military units.

The staff has been working under extreme conditions for the past two weeks. Although we have been banished from our offices and suffer a chronic shortage of studios and equipment, we continue to work. No one among the 2,000-strong body has collaborated with the military.

In their telegram to Soviet President Gorbachev, the personnel of Lithuanian Radio and Television demanded the immediate withdrawal of the military from the occupied buildings and monetary compensation for the damages incurred. The previously planned protest that was to take place in front of the Lithuanian Radio and Television buildings was cancelled at the last minute due to possible (?complications) which could have endangered the participants' lives.

Swedish Radio Begins Lithuanian Programming

LD2801210591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Radio listeners in Lithuania were informed that broadcasts of programs in Lithuanian by Swedish radio start today at 1925 GMT on 254 meters on mediumwave and 50.2 meters on shortwave.

Accord Reached on Vilnius Deaths Investigation

PM2801112191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondents N. Lashkevich and A. Protsenko: "Prosecutor's Offices Have Reached Agreement"]

[Text] Vilnius—An agreement on the joint investigation of all the events which occurred 11-13 January in Vilnius, when 14 people died here, has in practice been reached between the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the Lithuanian Republic general prosecutor's office.

It looks as though as of today the situation in the republic may improve substantially. The reason is USSR President M. Gorbachev's statement. Attention has been drawn here to the fact that any committees and fronts may seek power only by constitutional means and that troops are forbidden to interfere in the antagonism of political forces. It was the appeal from the anonymous Lithuanian National Salvation Committee to the army which led to so many casualties on the "bloody Sunday" of 13 January.

A hope has now appeared that the law enforcement organs may be able to ascertain all the circumstances and background to the crime. Until yesterday, 22 January, this was impossible although criminal proceedings have been instituted in three cases on the basis of the events: The Lithuanian Republic General Prosecutor's Office is investigating an attempted coup d'etat, the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] is investigating the mass disorders, and the military prosecutor's office the exceeding of authority.

But there was no collaboration between these three prosecutor's offices. On the contrary: Each prosecutor's office even kept witnesses' evidence secret from the other offices.

The situation changed after M. Slavgorodskiy, chief of the USSR Prosecutor's Office administration for supervising the execution of laws on interethnic relations, arrived in the republic. He needed just 90 minutes of talk with A. Paulauskas, general prosecutor of the Lithuanian Republic, to reach agreement on the most important points. It was confirmed that the sides fully trust each other's professional honesty and conscientiousness. Instead of three criminal cases one will be investigated—the formulation is being specified now. The military prosecutor's office is "quitting the game" and handing over all materials on these events to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. The investigation will be headed by: on the Lithuanian side, Yu. Gauditis, chief prosecutor of the criminal investigation department, and on the USSR side Yu. Lyubimov, senior investigator for particular important cases under the USSR General Prosecutor. All materials in the possession of the two sides are open for all participants in the investigation to familiarize themselves with.

Procurator on Investigation

LD2801220191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1905 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Representatives of the USSR Procurator General's Office who came to Lithuania to investigate the events of 13 January in Vilnius have told a correspondent of the USSR television program, "Vremya," about the obstacles placed in the way of their work. Allegedly the facts that are inaccessible to the investigators are in the Lithuanian Procurator General's Office. Without its permission hospitals refuse to supply information, and the republic's procurator general himself is allegedly only verbally promising help.

This is what Lithuanian Procurator General Arturas Paulauskas told an ELTA correspondent about his contacts with the lawyers from the Soviet Union:

When the group of investigators came, we agreed to act together and discussed future work to be carried out. Because it was felt that there was a desire to direct the investigation we clarified this and reached the conclusion that we would work on an equal footing, without violating the rights of one another. Together we visited the scene of events at the television tower and the radio and television building.

A group of our staff members had already started cross-examination of the victims and witnesses. We hoped that those who had come would soon join us in this work, because it was probably easier for them to gain information about what had happened during these tragic hours from the Vilnius garrisons who gave the orders and what these orders were; who directed the action; what kind of weapons had been used; and the number plates of the military vehicles.

After all, the composition of the so-called National Salvation Committee whose demands were implemented by the military must be clarified.

According to the agreement, members of the USSR Procurator's Office can take part in our cross-examination and ask additional questions.

However, we were asked that the completed cases and the exhibits of bullets, shell-splinters of bullets, and others which were in our possession should be submitted for their investigation. Yet again we were confronted with the desire to take everything into one pair of hands.

We shall not do this because we would then lose the evidence of the tragedy in Vilnius. Let us remember that the murder cases of residents of Tbilisi and Baku have not yet been submitted to the courts.

We maintain a categorical and principled stance to the effect that the Procurator's Office of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and their officials there must not be mentioned in the investigation. It seemed that we had reached an agreement on this question. However, not long ago it was noted in one of the documents received from the USSR Procurator's Office that this institution, which from a legal viewpoint does not operate in Lithuania, is to be included in the working group. What is more, criminal proceedings are issued concerning mass riots in accordance with the article in the criminal code of the Lithuanian SSR which had already become invalid in 1990.

We want to cooperate and receive as much information about the events of 13 January. However, we cannot commit an offense against issues of principle. Representatives of the Lithuanian Procurator's Office will not work in such a group of investigators.

Lithuanian Independence Poll To Be Held 9 Feb

LD2901095991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] On 9 February all residents of the Lithuanian Republic will be polled. Yesterday, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, the text that will be printed in the questionnaire was finally confirmed. I will now acquaint you with it.

Do you agree that the Lithuanian state should become an independent, democratic republic? Yes or no.

The poll of residents will be conducted at the polling stations formed in 1990 for the elections of the deputies of the council of self-government. All the residents of the republic can take part in it who have Lithuanian citizenship and rights in accordance with the laws on citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic.

Lithuanian Editor Urges Presidential Rule

PM2801162591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Gelbakh, editor of LITVA SOVETSKAYA, under "Events in Lithuania" rubric: "Logical Analogies and the Absence of Logic"]

[Text] Vilnius—The exhausting and uncompromising struggle waged by the "revivalists" for the purity of the Lithuanian language, which began with perestroyka, has had a curious result. Nowadays it is the acme of oratorical art to litter the Lithuanian language with corrupted Russian. For instance, the phrase "Sovietu Sajunga" instead of "Tarybu Sajunga" (Soviet Union) is being introduced into currency everywhere and the word "rusai" (Russians) is being supplanted by "ruskiai," pronounced with a hiss, and so on.

In the opinion of those who have introduced these innovations into their vocabulary, this is supposed to mean just one thing: The Lithuanian language does not and cannot contain names for anything that displeases the separatists and nationalists. However, scarcely anything will make any impression on us after the "morons," "primitives," "drunks," "bloody occupiers," and other epithets that have been bestowed on all Russians and others—not only Slavs—siding with them for many months in the republic. Even the inept "political farces"—forgive me, actions—undertaken by the leader of the Russian parliament cause no surprise. Boris Nikolayevich has obediently called for a political general strike in response to the almost hypnotic separatist melody played by Vytautas Landsbergis, former musicologist and now head of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

The "liberal democratic" heart of the former ardent Bolshevik and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo cannot of course remain indifferent to the pleas for help of Landsbergis and his team. Especially as this team tirelessly repeats: The "whole civilized world" backs our aspirations and actions to gain independence. It is indeed a sin for Russia's leader to lag behind civilization.

The only trouble is that by no means everything over there in the world of "irreproachable democracy" is as unequivocal. For instance, Helmut Kohl reckons that it would be better for the Lithuanians to take 100 small steps toward independence than 10 large and hasty steps. In his opinion, this would help the republic approach its goal and avoid conflicts. While U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker—who at one time said that America still does not recognize Lithuania's incorporation [interporatsiya] into the USSR in 1940—immediately pointed out that he has no knowledge of Lithuania within its contemporary borders. In short divorce is an extremely complex process for countries even if their marriage was no love match.

Vytautas Landsbergis pays no heed to any reasonable calls from Moscow for restraint. Only secession from the USSR—and only immediately! This ultimatum has resulted in the deadlock which has caused today's tragic and, alas, bloody conflict in Lithuania. Admittedly, Mikhail Gorbachev is still talking about political means of resolving the question, he has sent representatives to the republic, and is "issuing serious warnings" for the umpteenth time, but...the conflict is worsening.

Hundreds of thousands of people of all nationalities in Lithuania—including or primarily Lithuanians—who have openly advocated the republic's staying within the Union have become the hostages of a "flexible policy." They are encountering unprecedented moral terror and are really faced with the threat of physical reprisals. The president has published a decree on disarming and disbanding illegal military formations. But the Lithuanian parliament recently decided to add volunteer detachments to its existing formations. They have been authorized to carry and use weapons. Another analogy. When a dubious threat arose to the lives of dozens of U.S. citizens on the small sovereign island of Grenada, the "irreproachable democrats" immediately landed an assault force on the island and killed hundreds of totally innocent people. Noriega wronged them and Panama came under a military attack with a bombing strike. We are by no means urging the USSR president to employ these barbarous methods. But he should finally realize that democracy and perestroyka need not only words but defense.

The president's decrees on abrogating the discriminatory laws have not been carried out. The situation has worsened. And a "National Salvation Committee" has been set up in Lithuania. All manner of "democrats" claim that no one elected it. The accusations come from people who are either infinitely naive or cynically mendacious. Only a completely deranged demagogue can assume that an election campaign and the "legal" election of a committee of this kind can be conducted in today's situation in Lithuania. But the National Salvation Committee has already said that it will take full responsibility for the citizens' fate, it has resorted to the aid of the military, and... has hitherto remained underground. If it has already "taken responsibility" then it would not be a bad thing for it to make itself known. That would be both honest and understandable. The procrastination is provoking quite well-founded suspicions that far from courageous people, possibly even cowards accustomed to using other people to do their dirty work, have gathered at the National Salvation Committee. My Leningrad colleague Aleksandr Nevzorov, who has told the whole country that political cowardice on the part of high-ranking officials is always fraught with tragedy for the masses, is very right here too.

I am a communist. A communist who considers it "contemptible" to hide his views and convictions. Like my comrades, I recognize peoples' right to self-determination—including secession from the USSR. But only by means of a referendum, only by means of a preliminary honest clarification of all the contentious economic and (in the case of Lithuania—perforce!) territorial issues. In my view, this kind of referendum can only be held in the republic with the introduction of direct presidential rule, the stabilization of society, and by inviting observers from the United Nations and other prestigious international organizations.

Helplessness in analyzing what is going on, the absence of logic in actions and political decisions which are by no means adequate to the events—this is the tragedy of our country.

Lithuania's Supreme Soviet has declared a state of war with the Soviet Union. Day and night Landsbergis urges "the dear people of Lithuania" to defend him against aggression. In practice he is calling for further clashes and casualties. He himself is sitting immobile—as in a bunker—in the Supreme Soviet building surrounded by antitank ditches and traps. In this atmosphere of continuing insanity the republic's former prime minister Kazimiera Prunskiene has demanded a bodyguard due to the threat of reprisals from separatists. They intend to punish the "amber lady" for betraying the nation's interests.

The former premier may be given this guard. But what do you instruct workers, kolkhoz [collective farm] members, members of the intelligentsia, communists, and nonparty people who have overtly advocated the preservation of the USSR to do? Sort out kitchen knives in the hope of using them to defend themselves and their families against extremists?

Democracy with a Nazi bias is still developing in Lithuania. We at the LITVA SOVETSKAYA editorial office are receiving desperate letters and telephone calls from people who are no longer relying on the president's determination even to uphold their interests, who have lost all faith and deem Boris Yeltsin a traitor. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people in the Baltic are hostages to a political game in which there is not a trace of concern for the people. They are forced to become emigres in their native country. What awaits them is the fate of refugees, exiles from a land deeply steeped in the blood and sweat of their forebears and the soldiers who liberated it from Hitler's fascists.

Seeing and being perfectly aware of all this, Russia's so-called democrats have just called for a general political strike and are holding rallies in support of the separatists. They are firebrands and must be stopped.

Blood has already been shed in Lithuania. There will be more bloodshed if legality is not restored in our republic. What must be done to achieve that?

While I was completing these comments of mine USSR President M.S. Gorbachev made a statement on events in the Baltic. The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has called for a quest for ways of securing reconciliation and accord. Since early this morning readers have been calling us to voice their opinion of the president's statement. Of course, both our editorial collective, the readers, and everyone with whom I succeeded in exchanging opinions shares Gorbachev's stance and regards his statement with hope. But I am concerned that it once again contains no concrete measures to restore the operation of the USSR and Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitutions or to defend our civil rights. The press has reported that the laws adopted by the parliament in Estonia will be subjected to expert appraisal. There is not even any talk of this in our republic. It is my profound conviction and the opinion of many many people who do not want to become emigres in their own country that the introduction of presidential rule is still the only surefire guarantee of the restoration of legality in the republic.

Lithuanian Threat to Soviet Democracy Viewed

LD2901023491 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Media are full of indignant response to the Lithuanian bloodshed. Most have seen behind the tragedy a hand of Moscow. Many feel the democratic changes in this country will recede. Realistic judgements are rather an exception to the general rule. Unfortunately there have been so far few attempts to reveal the true causes and get to the roots of the crisis. Larissa Korneyeva has more:

[Begin Korneyeva recording] If law and order are not restored in the Baltic region more blood can be shed. This conclusion has been drawn by the office of prosecutor general. Soviet law enforcing bodies have seen behind the Lithuanian conflict flagrant violations of the national Constitution. The bloody events in Vilnius followed a civil disobedience campaign that was announced by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet headed by Landsbergis.

The Lithuanian authorities called for dodging the armed service draft. No law-ruled state can put up with an encroachment upon law and order. Proof are the realistic positions stated by some British papers one day before the Vilnius events: THE DAILY TELEGRAPH said with good reason the West did not need to panic and it pointed out that President Gorbachev, trying to ensure the draft, acts fully in keeping with the law and displays statesmanship. The paper recalls the British Government had adopted austerity measures in Northern Ireland and the United States too had acted accordingly. When the American authorities claimed that the handful of their citizens were in jeopardy in the small but sovereign Grenada, they immediately ordered a task force to land on the island. The conflict claimed hundreds of lives.

Unlike Grenada, the Lithuanian events are endangering the whole of the democratic changes in the Soviet Union, Panama too came under an armed attack and bombing raids when the United States and Noriega disagreed. There is no justifying what has happened in Lithuania but the democracy and perestroyka in the Soviet Union must be protected.

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, led by Landsbergis, must bear responsibility for the chain of events that resulted in the bloodshed. Staking on the policy of accomplished fact and hoping for Western support, parliament unilaterally proclaimed Lithuanian independence last March. Western nations did not recognize Lithuanian sovereignty even though most of them have never recognized the 1940 Lithuanian incorporation into the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanian parliament members refused a dialogue with Moscow and did not even want to figure out either the mechanism or a calendar of secession from the USSR. Prevalence of the Lithuanian Constitution and own laws was established as a principle.

Obviously no legal order must be introduced without abolishing or changing the existing one first, but Moscow too is paying a great price for having delayed the dialogue with the Baltic republics. It failed to determine on time any reasonable framework of settlement on self-determination and it failed to agree upon the terms of a divorce that must have taken into account the awful interests of the Russian-speaking community in Lithuania and the economic, military, and strategic interests of the USSR.

Significantly, Mr. Landsbergis' irreconcilable attitude towards secession from the Soviet Union drew no support from the American leaders when he recently visited Washington.

The Vatican expressed worries and called upon Lithuania and the Soviet Union to have more dialogue. Chancellor Kohl suggested that Lithuania take small steps to move towards the objectives gradually and without any haste. The French paper LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR remarked that Mr. Landbergis' initiatives seldom won support in his own camp. [words indistinct] Landsbergis had two articles on enemies of the Lithuanian people included in the Lithuanian criminal code. If the two were ever interpreted literally, Lithuania would receive the green light to persecute not only communists, and these are already harassed and threatened with extermination, but all non-Lithuanians in general. Thirty-two Sajudis representatives, writers, members of the republican Academy of Sciences, and even the former Lithuanian Foreign Minister (?Ubschis), protested, but in vain. They warned against listing people as second class. Significantly the notorious law was adopted against this backdrop of a deafening clamor in defense of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom.

Lithuanian democracy was described as spotless, but as we can see, in this world far from everything is equivocal.

Armed units are still coming into being in the republic, which clashes with the Soviet Constitution. After President Gorbachev issued an act to disarm and disband these unlawful units the Lithuanian Parliament recently decided to build up the so-called voluntary units. As a result, thousands of people in the Baltic region have been taken hostage to the Lithuanian authorities' political gamble. Add the economic destabilization and the soar-away prices, the galloping inflation, the government crisis, and the Lithuanian situation that has never before been worse, and you are bound to conclude that if the Lithuanian authorities display neither reason nor readiness for compromise with Moscow. The political confrontation bedeviling the republic will change from bad to worse. [end recording]

MVD Reports Tension in Baltics 'Abating'

LD2801155791 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Despite grim forecasts by some popular television reporters, the past weekend was relatively calm in the Baltic republics. Although the standoff of various political forces there is yet to be overcome, it no longer escalates into open clashes. More than that, as the correspondents staying there report, there have appeared hopeful signs for a stabilization of the situation.

According to the Soviet Home [Internal] Affairs Ministry [MVD], tension has abated in the Baltic area in the past few days. Army units have been withdrawn from Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and only Home Affairs Ministry personnel still remain there to guard various installations. The National Salvation Committee has announced a suspension of its activities.

Lithuania's Prime Minister Gedimanas Vagnorius says his republic is ready to start official talks with the USSR leadership, and he also says that in the opinion of his government there is no reason to speak of any interethnic differences in his republic today. Mr. Vagnarius says, for one, that a treaty is being prepared for signing with the Russian Federation, a treaty that provides, in his opinion, for all the measures to protect the rights and liberties of both the Russians in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Russia. This is a hopeful move that takes into account the wishes of the entire country's democratically minded public.

Let's recall the essence of these wishes. Any even most complex and dramatic political problems must be solved invariably on the basis of legal and general humanitarian standards by realizing and taking into consideration the interests of all, large and small, peoples—indigenous and nonindigenous population—on the basis of law and accord.

By the way, the problems that have accumulated in Lithuania are now being tackled not only at a high government level but more so by the local authorities. For example, in the city of Siauliai negotiations have begun between representatives of the political parties and organizations that exist in the city. They have appealed to all the public movement not to enter into confrontation but help the people to keep their strength of spirit and trust in the future.

Tension is also abating in the neighboring republic of Latvia, and this is indicated by the beginning of the dismantling of barricades in the streets of the republican capital, Riga.

And from Estonia, where some sort of incidents were expected, reports are coming in that normal political life is underway there. In Tallinn a congress has just been held of the republic's independent Communist Party. That congress endorsed party rules, according to which the party is an independent political organization that proceeds in its activities from general, humane principles of Marxism. Its purpose is to create a democratic society in an independent Estonia.

Thus, despite the small incidents now and then, there has obviously shaped a process in the Baltic area for a movement away from tension to stabilization and later to normalization of the situation. Today all the political forces in the Baltic republics must do their utmost so as the standoff still existing there enters a civilized path. That was a review of the developments in the Baltic area.

Citizens Forum Issues Appeal on 'Coup' Attempt

LD2801002991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Report by V. Sukhodumcevas]

[Excerpts] I have here two documents issued by the Citizens' Forum, a new public organization in Snieskus. One of them is an appeal by the Citizens Forum to the residents of Snieckus, the local self-government, and the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania. The second document is an appeal to Sergey Piroshkov, a Supreme Council deputy from Snieckus.

Both documents are interesting, because essential points of view of some residents of Snieckus toward our republic and the path it has chosen is expressed. These points of view do not coincide with the position adopted by the local CPSU in Snieckus, which is the predominant view.

The events of 13 January are assessed by the Citizens Forum in the appeal to the residents of Snieckus as an attempt to carry out a coup d'etat with the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party who are striving for power. Regret is voiced about deputies of the Snieckus town council who are actively supporting reactionary forces that are being urged by some people inside the Ignalina nuclear electric power station to stop the power supply to Lithuania, in an attempt to make the situation even more complicated.

The Citizens Forum declares that such actions do not reflect the opinion of all the residents in Snieckus and that their members give staunch support to the Supreme Council and the government. [passage omitted]

The appeal concludes with the following: It is time people understood that in order to have a good life here in Snieckus we must go together with Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Administrative Reforms Discussed

LD2701235291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2020 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Issues related to the work of the state commission on problems in eastern Lithuania and draft amendments to the law on minority nationalities were discussed at the sitting of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. C. Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council has this to say:

[Begin Stankevicius recording] Rather constructive talks were held by the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Polish faction of deputies who are representing the eastern rayons of Lithuania. [passage omitted]

A draft regulation is being prepared in which general principles and possible solutions are envisaged. This concerns pressing issues for the people living in these areas.

First of all, this is a question of the future territorial and administrative division of the Republic of Lithuania. [passage omitted] In solving this issue, the interests of people who live in these administrative units will be taken into special account. [passage omitted] The use of language will be regulated differently; along with the state language, no doubt, the local language spoken by the majority of people will be applied. [passage omitted] Some amendments will be made concerning the law on the use of native languages of nationality minorities, not only concerning the use of these in primary or secondary schools, but also in the sphere of administrative activities. [end recording]

Gorbachev, Latvia's Rubiks Stress Civic Accord

LD2801174991 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 1605 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Alfreds Rubiks, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, made a statement today for the press on the results of the Moscow meeting of Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Alfreds Rubiks with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov. The statement notes that as a result of the exchange of views it was deemed necessary to seek ways of attaining civic accord by peaceful and democratic methods. The participants in the meeting reached agreement on forming a committee of public conciliation in the republic. Alfreds Rubiks gave an assurance that the Communist Party is ready to play a most active part in the formation and operation of the commission with the aim of promoting stabilization, achieving civil peace, and defending the interests and rights of the working people.

Latvian Leaders Meet Militia Workers 28 Jan

LD2801181191 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1500 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] A meeting of Riga militia workers with the republic's leaders took place today. There were a great many participants, so the venue had to be changed from the Dzerzhinskiy House of Culture to the Large Hall of the Latvian University.

The meeting was chaired by Council of Ministers Chairman Ivars Godmanis. At the meeting he assessed the present situation in the republic as a whole and the activity of the Interior Ministry and spoke of urgent problems of current interest. Riga militia administration chief Viktors Bugajs heads of rayon militia departments, and other spoke about them.

Colonel Nikolay Goncharenko supported the ultimatum-like demands to the republic's parliament and government by the meeting of the group of the ministry's workers held at the Communist Party Sociopolitical Center on 25 January. He announced that he is going to Moscow to report that meeting's resolution to USSR Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo. As a result, he left the hall.

Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Council, spoke at the meeting, analyzing the political situation in the state and in the parliament.

The leaders of the two factions of the Supreme Council, Sergejs Dimans and Janis Dinevics, expressed their stances. Something like a debate outside the walls of the Supreme Soviet resulted.

Interior Minister Aloizs Vaznis reported on the ministry's stance, practical work, and intentions.

It will be possible to listen in subsequent newscasts to excerpts of the speeches at the meeting, which could be of interest to society.

At the conclusion of the meeting Gorbunovs, Godmanis, and Vaznis replied to many questions.

The atmosphere which at first seemed heated became increasingly calm, which raises a hope that conflicts will be avoided peacefully.

Militia Calls for Vaznis Resignation

LD2801173791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1625 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 28 Jan (TASS)—Members of the Riga militia have again demanded the resignation of Aloizs Vaznis, Latvian minister of internal affairs. At a meeting with the republican leadership today, they handed Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis documents adopted on 25 January by a meeting of representatives of the Riga militia, which expressed a lack of confidence in the minister.

In the opinion of those who spoke, the militia is being dragged into political games, distracting its forces from the struggle against crime. "The war of laws"—the actions of the recently formed special detachments of guardians of the law—is intensifyng the state of tension.

The Latvian militia has now been split into two nearly equal parts. Some consider it their duty to implement the Union laws and the USSR Constitution, whereas others, subordinate to instructions of the Latvian minister, stand guard over the laws of Latvia, even if they run counter to Union laws. Approximately two-thirds of the personnel of the Riga militia—and it is in Riga that about 40 percent of the republican militia is concentrated—support Union legislation.

Speaking at the meeting, Vaznis called for only the laws of Latvia to be observed, supporting this with a reminder that the Internal Affairs Ministry is financed from the republican budget. Anatoliy Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, stressed that the situation is also complicated by the confrontation between the main political forces, the People's Front and the Communist Party. He intends to start a dialogue with all the movements in the republic, in the name of civil accord.

Ivans Godmanis said that a report by the Latvian minister of internal affairs will be heard at the government session, but the question of his resignation "must be decided by the Supreme Soviet." He also proposed to nominate candidates for the post of minister.

Soviet Legislators Organize Inter-Latvian Talks

LD2801220791 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Riga January 28 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Rafik Nishanov, deputies to the all-Union parliament Anatoliy Denisov and Nikolay Sychev, who arrived in Riga today to organise meetings between Latvian leaders and representativs of various political and mass movements, began their work.

They today helped organise a meeting at the Latvian parliament between Latvian parliament President Anatoliy Gorbunovs, his deputies and the leaders of the Latvian People's Front group and the Equality Group, representatives of other movements, parties and mass organisations represented at the republican parliament, including Latvian Communist Party leader Alfred Rubiks.

The meeting discussed the situation in the republic and how to defuse tension.

Despie opposite viewpoints and heated discussion, the majority of speakers supported the opinion on the need to remove tension and to settle problems politically.

The sides agreed that they should abandon ultimatums and use all opportunities to stabilise the situation in the republic and preclude the repetition of events of January 20. An agreement was reached to set up a conciliatory commission of the two groups in parliament.

Nishanov, Militia View Developments

LD2801185191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent Inard Skujnis from Riga]

[Text] Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, arrived in Riga today with Professor Denisov, a people's deputy who was in Riga recently with a group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies who came to examine the situation in Latvia. They have already held talks with Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, and with a group of deputies and leaders of public organizations. Among them was Alfred Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

In my view, a second event of importance took place in Riga today. There was a meeting of the Riga militia. Last Friday, representatives of militia subunits adopted a resolution and an open letter to the USSR minister of internal affairs and to the USSR prosecutor general. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, were present at today's meeting. The political situation in the republic and the position of the militia were discussed. The leadership of the Riga militia considers that the battle between Union and republican laws creates additional difficulties in the fight against law-breakers. Measures to disband and disarm the unconstitutional and alternative militia and the formations to defend law and order are not being taken. The militia are worried about the expected laws on citizenship and on the militia. Housing issues are being resolved slowly. There are also quite a number of militiamen expressing distrust of the republic's minister for internal affairs and demanding his resignation.

Of course, the meeting did not resolve these issues. At first there was even a lack of desire to listen to the republic's leaders, but then everyone supported the republic's premier on the point that members of the people's militia should act with, and be subordinate to the militia. There can be no talk of arming them. The public's force is needed to help during mass events. The militia should not take part in the political battle but should only act within the parameters of the law.

After the latest tragic events in Vilnius and Riga, people are afraid of force. I observed those in the hall and sensed the approval for Gorbunov's remarks.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet put forward his position regarding citizenship and the referendum in which, in his words, all permanent residents of Latvia should participate. This dialogue today was very important, and it is to be continued in the days to come.

Nishanov Comments on Riga Talks

LD2801231391 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Remarks by Rafik Nishanov, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities to unidentified correspondents; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Nishanov] First I wish to note that the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation has come to Riga to try to find ways of close cooperation, and to tackle the problems which have arisen by means of dialogue, together with the leadership of Latvia, with the participation of the leaders of various factions in parliament, with the participation of the leaders of various political and public movements. We have had many hours of what I would call extremely sharp discussions. [passage indistinct] We reached accord that we will proceed by the road of political dialogue. When I say we, I am talking of the two factions of the Lativan legislature. We are simply people giving assistance.

Finally, accord was reached among all the participants in the meeting that an interparliamentary conciliation commission will be set up on principles of parity. Representatives of the People's Front and of Equal Rights—the two factions of the Latvian legislature—will work out proposals and recommendations for examination by the Supreme Soviet, which, as the supreme legislative body of power, will then examine these proposals. In the final analysis our aim is to ensure peace and quiet for all inhabitants of Lativa.

[Correspondent] There are no other points of view? [words indistinct] will the Soviet Union start talking about independence for Latvia or not?

[Nishanov] Your question is put in a somewhat incomprehensible way. This conversation is under way, and is continuing, and will be conducted, but if these contacts are raised to a higher level, both sides will be empowered to form a delegation to discuss the whole range of questions.

TASS Correspondents Attacked in Riga 26 Jan

LD2801101391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0935 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Riga, 28 Jan (TASS)—TASS television correspondents Andrey Korotkov and Anatoliy Yershov were attacked on the evening of 26 January as they were taking television pictures in the Latvian capital. They were injured and their film equipment was stolen.

Both journalists are now in the city hospital. One of them has been diagnosed as having a concussion.

Joint Patrol Decision Hailed

LD2801153891 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS international commentator Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—TASS received sad news from Riga today: two TASS journalists—head of the audio-visual studio Andrey Korotkov and cameraman Anatoliy Yershov were attacked when making a video-recording in Riga. Both are now in hospital in a serious condition. One of them, the doctor said, is suffering from concussion. Imported equipment the two journalists used was stolen during the attack.

Last week, two foreigners, Bertil Winberg and Uve Fredriksson, were robbed, battered and left to die in the cold in Tallinn. The two men had arrived in Estonia as representatives of Swedish trade unions.

These two facts are yet another sad confirmation of the official report on the state of criminality in the country published by the USSR Interior Ministry in early January. The report reflects an upswing of crime.

Quite appropriately the USSR interior and defence ministers responded by issuing a joint order to organise street patrols in major cities by militiamen and army servicemen. With the abysmal state of law and order in the country, it should be said that this decision comes, perhaps, with a considerable delay.

It has gone so far that people are afraid to leave houses late in the evening, and fathers and grandfathers have to escort their daughters and granddaughters to and from school for fear of rape.

In Moscow, an average of 3,500 crimes are committed every month, most of them in the streets.

I am sure that the overwhelming majority of Soviet people are regarding the order by two ministers about joint patrols in cities with hope and relief. This measure, already used in the past, will surely normalise the situation and lessen criminality.

Another presidential decree—on measures to ensure suppression of economic sabotage and other crimes in the economic sphere—pursues the same goal. This move, absolutely necessary in the present situation, also comes late. According to specialists, if it had been made early last week, it would have effectively thwarted attempts to launder millions of roubles hoarded by dishonest dealers when 50 and 100 rouble notes were being removed from circulation.

The measures already taken by the government are the first steps in a series necessary to restore full order in the country and make effective the struggle against crime, including organised crime. American ABC television, however, was quick in announcing that combatting crime in the USSR was but a pretext and the measures being taken by the government are a signal of the country's slide towards military dictatorship.

Some Soviet partners, we have to state, are losing the ability to impartially analyse developments. Fortunately, quiet and reasonable attitudes are also voiced amid panicky pronouncements. The West should restrain its excessive reaction to events in the Soviet Union and begin an in-depth study of the situation, the Japanese NIHON KEIDZAI newspaper says. Maximum caution should be displayed at this point not to undercut the stormy will for democratisation and changes, raging in the depths of Soviet society, the newspaper says. I couldn't agree more.

Latvian Council Chairman Reviews Current Issues

LD2801202391 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Speech by Latvian Supreme Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs, addressing Riga militia workers in the Latvian University on 28 January—recorded]

[Excerpts] On the political situation today in the republic: In my view the political situation is defined by a political struggle, the confrontation of two forces—the People's Front of Latvia with all the political forces which have united in it, and second the Latvian Communist Party-CPSU and all who have united in it. Recent events both in Lithuania and here in Latvia show that the political struggle is being conducted not only by political methods, but also by violent means. [passage omitted]

The main question today is, how we shall conduct the political struggle further? Will there be violence hanging over us or will there not? I proposed, and I now propose to all public and political organizations—unfortunately they cannot all sit down at one table—I even propose that in the event they cannot sit down at one table, they adopt either an address or statement or communique in which they would all reject violence, in the form of a statement, communique, or document which would be signed by all public and political (?forces). If we cannot grasp this, and if violence hangs over us, over this or that public organization or group of people, violence will breed violence, and so it is in vain that you react in this way when I wanted to set out this argument. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately Alfreds Petrovich Rubiks in his statement yesterday considered that a commission can be created which will replace the Supreme Council and the government. This is, in my view, a total blind alley. Nevertheless, I do not reject it, and I shall conduct consultations with all political forces so that we can come to a common opinion, primarily on a rejection of violence, and then conduct a dialogue on other questions.

There was a question of dual laws, which has already been mentioned here. I think that for the militia and the law enforcement bodies, this is the question of questions. [passage omitted]

On law and order: Of course, I want to confirm what has already been said here and [word indistinct] questions. The only force which can and must ensure law and order, as far as the militia is concerned, is the militia. And all other public forces can act only under the guidance of the militia, that is the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and only its staff. As I see it, if this does not happen, then there will again be confrontation, some sort of violence, which can lead to nothing good, even in theory. The prime minister spoke about politicization and depoliticization of the militia in the political struggle. I think our task is indeed to do all we can to ensure that the militia can wage a struggle for law and order on a professional basis. So the demands to ministers, the government, and the Supreme Council that the law should facilitate the work of the militia are not political demands, they are truly demands that promote the professional establishment and development of the militia. This also applies to the other social questions which also exist.

Self-Defense Detachments Set up in Latvia

PM2801145691 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Colonel M. Ziyeminsh report: "Is the Self-Defense Detachment Acting Officially?"]

[Text] Riga—In places where crowds of people gather constantly on the streets of Riga, appeal leaflets call on young people to swell the ranks of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. Those who have completed their compulsory military service are held in particular esteem, but the ideal is a young man who has fought in Afghanistan or been to the Airborne Assault Forces school.

Recent events have shown that Latvian MVD personnel do not react uniformly to the events occurring in the republic. And in cities such as Riga and Daugavpils, the militiamen are quite simply split into two camps. On the one hand are those whose position the government newspaper DIENA recently expressed as follows: "Now we, sanctified by the blood of the fallen, are horrified—how can an armed gang (this is what they call the Riga Special Purpose Militia Unit—M.Z.) terrorize Latvia and Riga in the interests of one party with 30,000 members?"

The other camp comprises those who completely reject the idea of an "independent Latvia." They wholly support the actions of the special purpose militia unit, are taking part in the campaign to collect funds for its maintenance, and are ready to swell its ranks.

It was evidently taking into account the existing contradictions, and also the fact that the republic's MVD is today short of somewhere in the region of thousands of workers, that the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a special resolution. It was decided in particular that within the MVD system special self-defense detachments composed of "permanent inhabitants of the republic" would be set up.

A detachment of this sort comprising 20 men, for example, has already been set up in Valka city. And this is how the situation is appraised by Yu. Kubulinsh, section chief at the Valmiyerskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Administration: "At present, when part of our strength is being used to guarantee the safety of Riga, help from the self-defense detachments is needed in the rayon." As he went on to explain, people from the special detachments patrol the city and oversee order and security, and at present, he says, they are unarmed.

It only remains to be said that the republic Council of Ministers has been instructed to put a draft law on the police before the Supreme Soviet by 1 March.

Latvian TV Organizes 'Dialogue' Among Parties

LD2801131691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0551 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent Inards Skujins in Riga]

[Text] A by-election was held in one of the city council wards yesterday. According to the election commission, there were two candidates in the election. The most votes were won by Larisa Yanson, a doctor at city hospital No 7. She was supported by the People's Front. There will now be parity on the Riga city council. Both groups will have the same number of seats, 60 each.

Yesterday was also a day of consultations for us. Yesterday evening I told you that Latvian Television had organized a meeting of representatives of 18 parties and organizations. Latvia's National Independence Movement has held its republican conference. The political situation in the republic and ways of organizing a dialogue were also discussed there. The idea that the Latvian Communist Party should take part in this public dialogue was greeted with disapproval. Janis Dinevics, the leader of the majority group in the legislature, the People's Front, considers that a dialogue is possible. But does the Latvian Communist Party have the right to represent the interests of all Russian speakers, as they are called here, in this dialogue? Zatuliviter, a representative of the Equal Rights group, speaking on Latvian Television yesterday, once again stressed the group's view that it will only resume its seats in the legislature when the People's Front group publicly, through the media, renounces its alliance with the Congress of Citizens.

I have two more reports for you. A delegation of Green MPs in the Swedish legislature is due to arrive in Riga. In Riga today there will be an important meeting between representatives of the city police force, on the one hand, and Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Council, and Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the other. The police representatives will present the government with demands contained in a declaration issued last Friday. These include a demand for Interior Minister Vaznis to resign.

Latvian KGB, People's Front Reject Violence

LD2801210791 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 1605 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] A LETA correspondent reports: It was unprecedented for Kraslava, the KGB chief willingly wrote his signature alongside that of the chairman of the Latvian independence movement. They did this on adopting a statement to residents of the rayon. It states that only by means of compromise must all problems be solved. The Presidium of the rayon soviet, the direction of the People's Front Council, the military commissar, the National Cultural Society, and the local organization of the Latvian Communist Party reject any violent actions.

Latvian-USSR Trade Union Solidarity Sought

91UN0759C Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 2

[Appeal by the Board of the Union of Free Trade Unions of Latvia to the trade union organizations of the USSR: "SSPL Appeal"]

[Text] The Board of the Union of Free Trade Unions of Latvia has appealed to the USSR trade union organizations.

We need your support and a show of trade union solidarity, stresses the appeal. In the opinion of the members of the board, the striving of the Baltic peoples for freedom and independence is in jeopardy. We are against bloodshed and all kinds of dictatorship; we are in favor of upholding human rights, democracy, and humanism, says the appeal. We are aware of the fact that our common preparedness to prevent a victory of reaction is a guarantee of future peaceful coexistence and friendship.

Baltic Party Leaders Meet in Tallinn 28 Jan

LD2801233591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2117 GMT 28 Jan 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A meeting between the leaders of Latvian and Lithuanian Democratic Labor parties and of the Estonia's Communist Party was held in Tallinn today. Correspondent (Vladimir Velmans) reports:

At a news conference for local, Union, and foreign journalists, Ivars Kezbers, Algirdas Brazauskas, and Enn-Arno Sillari spoke in detail, and frankly, about the programmatic aims of the parties they head. This is first and foremost support for the aspirations of the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to independence, and this, as was particularly stressed, in conditions of true plurality of parties. The Democratic Labor parties of Latvia and Lithuania, and of the Communist Party of Estonia—which two days ago became independent of the CPSU—see their position as following left-wing politics, and ensuring a democratic character for changes in the Baltic region by parliamentary methods.

Independent Estonian Communist Party Formed

PM2901094491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent I. Teterin report under the "Party Life: Events, Facts, Commentaries" rubric: "Two Communist Parties in Estonia"]

[Text] Tallinn—The main outcome of the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress which has just finished in Tallinn was the formation of the Independent Communist Party, numbering in its ranks approximately 5,000 members.

At the congress, the new party explained its views on a number of key issues in Estonia's life. The need to fight for equal political and socioeconomic rights for all the republic's inhabitants, irrespective of nationality, was proclaimed. The need to carry out a reform helping to establish state control of prices for essential items and perfect the system for compensating the least well-off for losses was declared.

Communists from the new party promised to fight to restore state independence for the Estonian Republic. In their opinion, this could be achieved only through talks with the USSR's highest organs of power.

The congress elected the leading organs of the Estonian Communist Party. V. Valjas became chairman, and E.-A. Sillari, who is, as is well known, a CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, was elected first secretary.

Tallinn Commandant Plans No Conscript 'Roundup'

LD2801125391 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] On the subject of conscripts and their parents, Yuriy (Sinin), commandant of Tallinn Garrison, announced that on 26 and 27 January visits were paid to the homes of the young men who are considered to have arbitrarily left the Army. There are over 60 such boys in Tallinn. The parents of these young men were addressed and aspects of the boys' return to the Army were explained. No one was detained. Yuriy (Sinin) said that there is no plan to conduct a forced roundup. He claims that the military has no orders to harass the young men doing alternative service.

Narva Enterprises Call Strike 28 Jan

LD2801164891 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1500 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] As we have announced, a large section of major enterprises in Narva have called a strike today. They say the reason is that during the meeting on 24 January with Arnold Ruutel [chairman of Estonian Supreme Soviet] and government representatives the people of Narva did not get any satisfactory answers. The local radio station broadcast on several occasions an appeal to strike today from the town council deputies, from the so-called coordination committee and from Interfront representatives.

At the moment it is not known how many enterprises in the town are on strike. Strong pressure is being felt from the Narva town party committee. Nevertheless, Oleg Klushin, general director of the Kreenholmi Manufaktuur textile factory appealed to the residents not to go on strike. He explained what economic damage a strike would bring. Today the aktiv of the Narva cultural trade union met and decided not to join the strike.

Tomorrow a government commission will go to Narva to examine the situation.

Estonia Offers Reward for 'Terrorists' Capture

PM2801092791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 6

[Correspondent I. Teterin report: "20,000 for Terrorists"]

[Text] The amounted cited in the headline is the sum that the Estonian Government has set as a bounty for anyone who helps to locate the criminals who organized nighttime explosions in Tallinn a few days ago. PRAVDA reported that explosives were placed under the windows of the United Council of Labor Collectives' Strike Committee and Executive Committee—the two organizations, incidentally, which have been most sharply opposed to the position of the republic's current government and its sociopolitical course. So far the terrorists have not been found, so the bounty awaits volunteer helpers.

Meanwhile strikes are continuing in Estonia. Currently work has been stopped at 24 enterprises. On 23 January Tallinn Airport joined in the strikes, and all domestic flights were cancelled. It was only at 0600 on 24 January that aircraft started taking off and landing at Tallinn once again.

'600 Seconds' Reportage on Estonia Criticized

PM2801143191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Union Edition p 8

[A. Plutnik article: "What Nevzorov Saw in Estonia"]

[Text] During the latest edition of "600 Seconds," which went out on Leningrad Television, as usual, we were presented with current events in Estonia, once again as interpreted by the "rabid" reporter. The program was entitled "The Day Before." This time everything indicates that a real Estonian grave digger, who digs graves just in case, so to speak, was the symbol. Since, like the author, he is confident that there will be people to bury here any day now.

A premonition of tragedy? This time the journalist did not arrive late at the scene, as was the case in Lithuania, but somewhat ahead of schedule, however, once again there was evidence of "enemy encirclement," the eve of a fatal skirmish. Nothing happened before our eyes in either case.

Throughout the 600 seconds, while tackling political astrology "with a lethal subtext," Nevzorov had absolutely no sense of the highly profound danger inherent in his position. That is why, accordingly, he did not even notice that the absence of "relevant" footage or any trustworthy facts to confirm in any way his conviction that the Estonians have an almost physiological hatred of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Poles living together with them and this forces him to use conjecture as arguments and resort to rhetoric like the kind of conclusions of an investigation.

One should not, of course, draw attention again to what this Leningrad television reporter says and does, he seems to have achieved his goal—he is now written about far more than anyone has ever been written about or discussed in recent times. Besides, people who have brought eternal fame to our time and our country have entered and left this world. Clearly this popularity is of a different order.

A journalist ultimately says what he considers necessary. He has a goal and the means of securing it—television. He has a chance to directly address millions of people and expresses his attitude to many many things. In particular, he addresses journalist colleagues, some of whom he dares to insult for abusing their official position. But you cannot be silent when seeds of interethnic dissension are being spread throughout the country from the television screen, when the dignity of a sovereign people is overtly humiliated, and when personal conjecture is virtually presented as the voice of providence.

It is dangerous connivance to overlook this kind of thing.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Condemns Gorbachev 'Ultimatum'

LD2801183491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1628 GMT on 28 January carries a 13-minute "Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Diary" program presented by correspondent Andrey Nikiforov. The program begins with a three-minute recorded interview with Anatoliy Mostovoy, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Human Rights Committee, about the exchange of banknotes. To the suggestion that the approach that has been adopted presupposes guilt until proven innocent, Mostovoy says that the presidential decree is popular among those who were envious of others and of their better life. But the decree does violate our elementary rights. Nowhere was it written that one must save only in the Savings Bank, so the decree is robbery. Apart from that, the economic effect of this decree is zero, says Mostovoy, adding that the Russian legislature regards this action as harsh, going hand in hand with the increased patrolling of cities.

Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, is then shown replying to questions from members of the Social Policy Commission on 28 January, criticizing what is taking place, especially the increased patrolling.

Yeltsin is heard saying: "Our declared sovereignty notwithstanding, we are completely unprotected in Russia. So, from 1 February, joint Ministry of Internal Affairs and Defense Ministry patrols are being introduced—that is to say, in practice a state of emergency regime is being introduced. No one has consulted or is consulting us. More than that, this is being done on the strength of orders from two ministers, something that runs counter to the Constitution and to human rights. We have sensed a very serious shift to the right on the part of the leadership. Here we have Lithuania, tanks, servicemen, bloodshed; there we have the money exchange—and all this without anyone having been consulted at all.

"All this, as it were, happens by way of an ultimatum. Naturally, we could not but be alarmed that this is a rather serious step in the direction of, well, dictatorship; maybe because during the most decisive moment Russia stood shoulder to shoulder with the Baltic republics, lending them its support, backing them up, and indeed preventing the further onward march of—I will not say the conservative forces, I can now simply say the reactionary forces. When I speak with the president and ask who issued the orders the answer is: I do not know. When I speak with a minister and ask who issued the orders, the answer is: I do not know. So, then, on Sunday we went there with a delegation, I mean, in order to be on the spot, to be familiar with the situation and to make our influence felt and to subsequently say to the president: Russia will not remain on the sidelines as far as these events are concerned. Russia will not merely give its own appraisal; it will also undertake such actions to make sure that this aggression does not get off the ground.

"One must bear in mind that consolidation is underway among a very conservative group, a very conservative group, you know. Precise commands are being issued along the party line and other lines—everything that needs to be done, how it needs to be done. It is, as it were, a whole program of an entire struggle. There is, again, an information blocade; the offensive against Yeltsin has begun again, and against the Supreme Soviet. All this is, of course, preplanned and none of this is a coincidence. It is coordinated, because in various papers and on television and radio alike you get practically identical material. It is possible to lose everything, you know, if we become idle, if we fail to come out against things, if we fail to express our viewpoint.

"Incidentally, I am not stirring things up. The situation is there for all to see and we now wish to express our protest, including against this joint patrolling. Our committee on legislation has examined everything and this runs counter to several points in the constitution.

"Incidentally, if such a state of emergency is to be introduced, the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the republic in which it is being introduced is obligatory. Have we given our consent? No. I telephoned the Ukraine, Belorussia—no, no, no. This disdain is pronounced. Moreover, it is, you know, offhand. Things have gone too far. It is understandable that the ground is slipping from under their feet, the system is ablaze in places. The system is gradually disintegrating. Any conflagration is dangerous, you know."

Then deputy Zakharov is interviewed on pension fund legislation in the pipeline.

Abdulatipov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, then outlines the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's strategy: The federative treaty must be elaborated and signed. There must be a clear demarcation of powers. The RSFSR's integrity and the introduction of presidential rule or otherwise could be put to a referendum.

Work in the committees and commissions will continue tomorrow, Nikiforov says. Subsequently, until the end of the week, there will be separate and joint sittings of the chambers.

Moscow Soviet Asks Yeltsin To Outlaw Joint Patrols

LD2901122691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] The leaders of the Moscow City Soviet have sent a letter to Boris Yeltsin requesting that he acknowledge as illegal the recent decree on joint patrolling of the streets of major towns by the forces of the militia and the Army, and that he also abrogate its force in Moscow. The Moscow City Soviet and its executive committee consider the joint patrols a measure that is inappropriate to the operational situation in the city.

Presidium Rejects Joint Patrol Order

LD2901133591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1230 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] We have a very important and substantive document of the Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. It is a statement expressing serious concern over the actions of Union-level bodies relating to the use of the Armed Forces to carry out nontraditional functions. In this context, the Presidium statement says, the order of the USSR Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defense No. 493/513 of 29 December last year, which was kept secret from the public and from the Union republics for a long time, causes particular concern.

According to the appraisal of the Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the measures announced by the order on the joint patrolling of the streets of major cities is an inappropriate reaction to conditions of a state of emergency.

At the same time, the statement draws attention to the fact that the Union law on the legal procedure for states of emergency has established that they are declared only during natural disasters, major accidents and catastrophes, epidemics, and during mass disturbances in individual localities, by the top bodies of state authority of the republic or by the USSR president at the request of these bodies.

On the territory of the Russian Federation such grounds do not exist at present. The Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers voices a firm protest against such actions and demands that the USSR's Cabinet of Ministers take the necessary measures to halt the anticonstitutional actions of Union-level ministries. For its part, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Russia stresses its determination to undertake all measures envisaged by the law to strengthen law and order and stabilize the sociopolitical situation in society.

Stankevich Criticizes Joint Patrols, Money Decree

LD2801203191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1138 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Bersenev]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jan (TASS)—"A situation of alarmed expectation" is how Sergey Stankevich, first deputy chairman of the Moscow Soviet, speaking today at a news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents, described the situation in Moscow.

Such a situation, in his words, has been caused primarily by the further deepening of the economic crisis, especially in the financial sphere. He noted that the capital's enterprises are in a fever; many of them are on the verge of financial failure or need to raise the price of their goods. Even the insignificant profit which they gain is—in accordance with the new law—subject to additional taxation. The overall level of deductions is approximately 80 percent.

Another destabilizing factor, in the deputy mayor's opinion, is "the unpredictability of the central government's actions." By this he means the USSR president's decree on the exchange of 50- and 100-ruble banknotes and the decision on involving the Army in patrolling in cities. Stankevich noted that the financial operation is especially painful for the capital where there are many pensioners and passengers in transit.

As far as the joint order of the USSR ministers of internal affairs and of defense are concerned, providing for bringing armed army patrols into major cities as of 1 February, the deputy mayor believes that the situation in Moscow "is being monitored [kontrolirovatsya]. There was no need for this measure." He maintains that "the most serious doubts are being raised about the legal basis of the document since, essentially, the political regime in the city and the country is being changed, and elements of a state of emergency are being introduced, although partially." He reported that the leadership of the Moscow Soviet has appealed to the Russian legislature to examine this order from a legal point of view.

The first deputy chairman said that reassuring signs have appeared in the approach by the leading bodies to Moscow's problems. The question of the reform of the system of governing Moscow was placed on the agenda, and after that the decree of the USSR president "on perfecting the government of Moscow" was issued.

In reply to a question by a TASS correspondent, he noted that changes in the system of governing the capital will make it possible, in the first instance, to reduce the contradictions which have arisen between the authorities of the city and the rayons, between the soviets and executive committees, and to put an end to the endless dispute over the limits of their powers, to a kind of city-level "parade of sovereignty." There are imperfections in the existing system of local power; urgent changes are necessary.

Moscow's Prokofyev on Lithuania, Army Role

PM2801134191 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, by correspondent V. Yevseyev; place and date of interview not given: "Prudence—That Is What We Need"]

[Text] [Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, the tragic events in Lithuania have shaken the entire country...

[Prokofyev] Yes, today we are mourning the dead in Vilnius and are expressing condolences to their families and dear ones.

But while paying tribute to the memory of the dead, we must seek the reasons that led to this tragedy.

[Yevseyev] Practically all the media are currently engaged in identifying these reasons. However, reports on the situation in Lithuania are sometimes totally contradictory. I would like to know where you stand on this question.

[Prokofyev] It is natural that the assessments being made by the press, television, and radio should be contradictory, reflecting, as this does, the general situation in our society. Indeed, one can look at any phenomenon from various angles, reflecting the attitudes of various groups and various approaches. Everyone is free to express his own opinion. As long as he does not forget to give a conscientious account of the facts, does not forget that they must not be juggled to fit a particular political concept.

But there is probably one thing everyone agrees upon at the moment. What happened in Vilnius was a tragedy. Loss of life is unforgivable in any circumstances. And it is greatly to be regretted that the events in Lithuania developed in that way.

But I would like to point out that events do not occur of their own accord. The tension in Lithuania has been growing for many months. It was the escalation of this tension—which, unfortunately, people both in the center and in the republic itself were unable to halt—that led to the loss of life.

If we are talking about building a rule-of-law state, then the law, and the law alone, must be the commander in chief in that state. But it is this that the current Lithuanian leadership has long been flouting and is still flouting. This leadership, which calls itself democratic, is operating outside the framework of the USSR Constitution and outside its own republic's Constitution, which no one has revoked. Ignoring existing laws, the Lithuanian leadership has blatantly infringed the rights of part—and a considerable part!—of the population and has effectively suppressed all dissent. This policy was bound to lead to overt confrontation in the republic.

[Yevseyev] In what terms would you describe the conflicting sides in Lithuania—ethnic, political, or what?

[Prokofyev] I believe it is a mistake to divide them up along ethnic lines. Perhaps the confrontation in Lithuania initially arose on the basis of ethnic contradictions. But I am now convinced that what is happening there is a purely political struggle. To keep the republic in the Union, to keep the socialist system. Or to establish capitalism and take Lithuania out of the Union. It is this rather than ethnicity that is the watershed.

[Yevseyev] B.N. Yeltsin has declared support for the democratically minded Russian-speaking population in Lithuania. In your view, who would fall into this category?

[Prokofyev] One should really put this question to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin himself. But since he has signed the statement that was also signed by V. Landsbergis, it is clear that Yeltsin regards those who support Landsbergis' policy as the "democratically minded" section of the population. The policy is geared to separating Lithuania from the Union, establishing a totalitarian regime, and flouting the rights of all dissidents. So those who advocate transformations in the republic in the interests of the entire population, those who regard secession from the USSR as wrong are not democrats, in Yeltsin's view. To all appearances, they cannot count on the support of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] in the shape of its chairman.

[Yevseyev] As is known, a National Salvation Committee has been set up in Lithuania. What is the legal basis for its emergence?

[Prokofyev] I think this could be described as an act of desperation. When honor, dignity, and even people's lives are in jeopardy, when existing laws are being ignored and new ones that violate human rights are being created, then, as a rule, organs heading a movement for the restoration of constitutional norms will spontaneously appear. It is a normal worldwide phenomenon. As I said before, there is an overt political struggle going on in Lithuania at the moment.

[Yevseyev] Does the Army have a role to play in this struggle?

[Prokofyev] Unfortunately, our Army is often engaged in things that it is not supposed to be doing. Remember the 20,000 soldiers who brought in the harvest in Moscow Oblast. Is it their job? And the thousands of military vehicles currently carrying national economic freight. Is that their job?

It is exactly the same with the matters we are discussing. Bringing in the Army to maintain order plugs the holes caused by political mismanagement. But it puts the Army in a position where whatever it does is bad. But just imagine what would have happened at the Vilnius television center had the Army not been there. I think there might well have been more deaths in that incandescent atmosphere. I believe that if the Army had "interfered" earlier in Sumgait, in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Baku it might have saved many lives. It is unfortunate, of course, that the Army has to be brought in to perform functions that are not its own, but if it is going to do it, it should be when it is still able to prevent the fire from breaking out, not when it is already a hard job to put it out. And, of course, all this has to be done strictly in accordance with the law.

[Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, many Muscovites anxiously awaited 16 January since, in a television relay of B.N. Yeltsin's news conference, one journalist had supplied information to the effect that on that day, according to two KGB officers, the same thing would happen in Moscow as had happened in Lithuania. But, according to our editorial office's information, 16 January was a normal day. What information do you have on this score?

[Prokofyev] Indeed, Moscow was perfectly quiet on 16 January. There were no indications of the promised "horror"—no troop movements, no reinforced militia details, no mass political strikes, no withdrawal of labor... Need one say more. But I would like to address the representatives of the media once again. Weigh your words, think what reaction they might provoke. For example, the newspaper KURANTY, under the eye-catching headline "Chronicle of a Political Strike," writes that enterprises in Sovetskiy Rayon stopped work at 1200. In fact, approximately 200 people held a rally at the entrance to one enterprise, employing 5,000 people. This kind of disinformation merely adds fuel to the fire. Who needs it?

I will tackle this opportunity of expressing in the newspaper's pages words of gratitude to Muscovites who are not responding to these provocations. Prudence—that is what we need above all, to prevent something irreparable from happening.

[Yevseyev] What is the solution to the present political crisis, in your view?

[Prokofyev] There is only one way out—by tackling all the questions by constitutional, parliamentary means.

Remember Kipling's story "Mowgli"? In the story, during a drought, all the wild animals—carnivores and herbivores alike—go and drink water together from the same spring. We are all in this situation today. If we do not realize this we will destroy the country. We need civic accord and actions that are in strict accordance with the law. This applies to all political parties and movements.

[Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, a final question. Again not a pleasant one, alas. The war in the Persian Gulf zone. What is your assessment of the development of events?

[Prokofyev] I do not believe that one should turn the other cheek. But in this situation, it seems to me that the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the conflict were not completely exhausted. Even to ensure the triumph of the principles that are currently being established in the world, one must not use armed force on such a scale. Indeed, it is not Husayn and his retinue, organizers of the aggression against Kuwait, who will suffer. The blood of totally innocent people will be shed.

Now that it is too late to talk about a peaceful solution of the conflict, one can only hope that it will be resolved at the cost of as few human lives as possible and as swiftly as possible. And another thing. Once, when addressing the congress of Russian Communists, I urged that not one of our country's soldiers should go to the Persian Gulf zone. Now I fully support our leadership's policy, which is geared to noninvolvement in this military conflict.

RSFSR Deputies Questioned on Baltics

91UN0774A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 2

[V. Raskin report on news conference by RSFSR People's Deputies I.P. Rybkin, second secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Oblast Committee; V.N. Stepanov, chairman of the Karelian SSR Supreme Soviet; and Captain 1st Rank A.F. Chaykovskiy; held in the CPSU Central Committee Press Center in Moscow on 23 January: "From Confrontation—To Accord"]

[Text] Yesterday participants of the third session of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet came to a meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists in the "Oktyabrskaya" hotel. This was how they defined the subject of their discussion: "From what reality to what future?" In other words, they talked about the political meaning of decisions on government structures which the Russian parliament is supposed to pass at its current session. Among the participants of the meeting were RSFSR People's Deputies I.P. Rybkin, second secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Oblast Committee; V.N. Stepanov, chairman of the Karelian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; and A.F. Chaykovskiy, a serviceman—captain 1st rank (city of Kaliningrad). In their introductory statement the Russian parliamentarians presented in brief their opinions on issues that will be considered at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

Our readers know also that the current session has started a week ahead of schedule. This was due to the worsening situation in the Baltics. For the same reason, questions asked by the journalists were primarily related to the current events in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. For instance, they asked a question about the parliamentarians' attitude toward the national salvation committees. In response to this question Viktor Nikolayevich Stepanov referred to the statement by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. He said that he agreed with the country's leader, who emphasized: "Any public organization, committee, or front, whatever its program may be, may try to claim power by constitutional means alone, without violence. No attempt to appeal to the Armed Forces in a political struggle can be condoned."

When asked about his evaluation of the situation in the Baltic area, Andrey Fedorovich Chaykovskiy answered that he did not want, and nothing would induce him, to interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It is no secret to anyone that these republics violate the rights of their minorities, particularly of the Russian-speaking part of the population. "I can cite facts of a student not being allowed to attend school," said Chaykovskiy, "of a woman being insulted merely because she is a serviceman's wife, of an old man being insulted because he is a veteran of the Great Patriotic war. Such a state of affairs is unacceptable. But we must find some way out of the situation on a constitutional basis."

Further, the deputy pondered what the results might be if the republics rashly created their own armies. He underscored that this was a concept disastrous for the whole of mankind and recommended heeding the opinion of professionals. Not a single world civilization, not a single world community would support the idea of creating republic armies. Why not? Because then a threat would arise to the international agreements on nonaggression and nonproliferation of nuclear arms as well as to arms reduction agreements. Armies need weapons, and that means that military-industrial complexes will start working at full capacity again.

A considerable part of the conversation in the press center was given to the issues of sovereignization and confrontation between Union laws and those adopted in the republics. Quoting his lawmaking experience, Viktor Nikolayevich Stepanov, chairman of the Karelian SSR Supreme Soviet, talked about ways to achieve accord instead of confrontation. He cited the following examples. The situation stops being normal when, on the one hand we are talking about republic participation in foreign economic relations but, on the other, they have to go to Moscow to get a license for the right to barter cranberries with neighboring Finland. This is a very complicated way of gaining independence and making decisions! Some people are ready to accuse the autonomous republics for the collapse of the Russian Federation. We have to define, with great precision, the functions and the powers delegated by the republics to Russia and to the Union on a voluntary basis.

In answering journalists' questions, the participants in the news conference tried to describe the ways they envisage for reaching accord in our country.

Latvian Envoy to RSFSR Presents Credentials

LD2501140291 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 25 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—Latvia's charge d'affaires Janis Lovniks presented his credentials at the Russian Foreign Ministry today.

After the ceremony, Lovniks had a brief conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev to discuss bilateral cooperation. The two also signed a protocol of cooperation and agreed to coordinate their policies.

Janis Lovniks was born on March 14, 1954, in Riga, is an ethnic Latvian, is married and has a daughter.

He graduated from the lawyers' department of the Latvian State University. He worked at Riga's Kirov District Prosecutor's Office and from 1980 to 1990 worked as investigator and senior investigator for special cases at the Latvian Prosecutor's Office.

Lovniks speaks Latvian, Russian and English.

He has no previous experience of diplomatic work.

New Moscow Militia Chief Appointed

PM2501142391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Militia Chief in Moscow"]

[Text] On 23 January the Moscow City Soviet appointed Major General of Militia V. Komissarov to the position of chief of the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration. The editorial office received notification of this from V. Maksimov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Law and Order Subcommission.

Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Sergeyevich Komissarov's career has taken him from ordinary militiaman to minister of internal affairs in the North Ossetian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], deputy chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Administration for Criminal Investigations, and a faculty chief at the USSR MVD Academy.

North Ossetia Sets Up Committee on Referendum

LD2501211791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] A central commission to hold a referendum on 17 March on preserving the USSR has been set up in the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet considered immediate measures in connection with conducting the referendum.

Leningraders Mark 'Nazi Siege' Anniversary

LD2701203391 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 27 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Anna Scherbakova]

[Text] Leningrad January 27 TASS—The measured beat of the metronome heard over the Piskarevskoye Memorial Cemetery at noon on Sunday, echoed in the hearts of Leningraders who came here to pay their tribute to people who died during the Nazi siege in World War II.

The blockade, which lasted 900 tragic days and nights and claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians, was liquidated on this date 47 years ago.

This, the city's largest cemetery, became the last refuge for those who fell then.

Flowers were laid on common graves and at the monument to motherland, the focal point of the memorial complex.

Flowers and wreaths were also laid at the monument to the city's heroic defenders in victory square at the beginning of the city's main thoroughfare, and other monuments commemorating the feat of valour performed at Leningrad.

Memorial services were held in all churches and later in the day fireworks were displayed to commemorate those who did not live to see the liberation of the city.

Nearly 600,000 elderly people have joined the recently established society of those who survived the siege. Today, many of them attended meetings, festive performances and shows.

Chita To Sell Land at R1.5 Million Per Hectare

PM2501142591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Hectares—1.5 Million Rubles Each"]

[Text] The Chita City Soviet has examined the question of land reform. Factories, plants, and institutes within the city limits will have to buy their land from the local authorities and use it for legitimate purposes. For the time being enterprises will be able to pay rent to the city coffers. According to provisional figures, a single hectare of Chita land will be priced at 1.5 million rubles.

Russian City Reverts to Traditional Name

LD2901093191 Moscow TASS in English 0919 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—Samara became the latest Russian city to reclaim its historic name after the Presidium of the Russian parliament today scrapped the name of Bolshevik leader Valerian Kuybyshev from the books.

In line with the decision, Kuibyshev region was renamed Samara region.

Samara, one of the oldest Russian cities on the Volga river, was renamed Kuybyshev in 1935 as part of a massive campaign in which thousands of cities lost their historic names.

Other cities to get back their names recently include Tver (Kalinin) and Nizhny Novgorod (Gorkiy).

New Legal Newspaper Published in Moscow

LD2701101691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Summary] A newspaper called YURIDICHESKIY VESTNIK [LEGAL HERALD] is on sale in Moscow, intended for all the people of Russia. The first issue carries an interview with Nikolay Fedorov, Russian minister of justice, the draft law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on state service, and provisions on joint stock societies.

New Leningrad Sunday Paper Appears

LD2701130191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Summary] Yet another newspaper has appeared in Leningrad: SEVERNYY VESTNIK, a Sunday newspaper for family reading. Evidently the Leningrad postal service operates on Sunday, unlike Moscow's. The newspaper's motto is "spirituality, morality and culture".

Western Republics

CPM Secretary on Moldovan Party Conference

LD2801232991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1811 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By MOLDOVA-PRES correspondent Anatoliy Golya]

[Text] Kishinev, 28 Jan (TASS)—Petr Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPM (Communist Party of Moldova), has told the MOLDOVA-PRES agency correspondent in an interview: "The republican party conference has unequivocally expressed itself in favor of preserving the integrity of the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM), and this means that it has justified our expectations."

A section of the communists of the Dnestr region, he noted, maintains the view that it is not worth their belonging to a single Communist Party of Moldova while the so-called Dnestr region Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [MSSR] is not recognized. This point of view, however, did not find support among the remaining delegates at the conference. They considered that "at the present stage the preservation of the integrity of the republic's Communist Party is the most important condition for its existence as a political force." There was also condemnation of the actions of separatist elements, which aim at the break-up of Moldova.

"It is also important in principle that, in spite of the objections of the deputies from the Dnestr region, we have succeeded in adopting the rules of the Communist Party of Moldova," Petr Luchinskiy emphasized. "The adoption of the rules is a necessary condition for registering the Communist Party of Moldova as an independent party. It will really become just this after the adoption of its program, which is already being prepared," the first secretary noted.

Ukrainian Government, Miners Hold Talks

LD2801222591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Talks have been held between miners and the Government of the Ukraine. Henceforth, every tonne of coal extracted by miners of the Ukraine will cost 90 rubles and 93 kopeks, or 2.4 times dearer than last year. The new calculated price for the output of the Ukrainian pitmen is stipulated in a protocol signed by participants in the talks in Donetsk between the republican government and representatives of miners' strike committees.

Apart from this, the protocol stipulates the sum of the subsidies allocated by the government for the sector. This year it will come to 12 billion rubles. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers has also agreed to the level of the state order proposed by the colliers. It will now be 95 percent of the planned extraction volume for coking coal, and 90 percent for power generating coal.

It proved impossible to reach agreement on only one very important point—on pay. It is impossible today to satisfy the miners's demands to ensure a pay rise of two to two-and-a-half times, especially since a certain increase has already been built into the retail price, and also into the new material incentives fund. A path of compromise is necessary—to continue the talks.

Premier Meets Miners

PM2901120991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by B. Glotov: "Claims Are Multiplying"]

[Text] Donetsk—V. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, has met with representatives of miners collectives in Donetsk. Yu. Boldyrev, plenipotentiary representative of the executive committee of the regional union of Donbass strike committees, described this event as negotiations with all the consequences ensuing from this term. V. Fokin proposed moving away from confrontation, and viewing it as a business meeting.

What is at stake here? At the end of last year the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a decision on the republican status of the coal and metallurgical sectors. The metallurgical workers reacted to this more or less calmly. The miners' reaction was different: No, they are not opposed to a change of "boss," but they want him to be considerate and attentive to their needs. The republican committee for coal has yet to become a proper working body. Its functions have not yet been conclusively defined, it has no permanent premises, and it is not yet fully staffed. Meanwhile, the situation in Donbass mines is extremely complex. Back in the second half of last year coal enterprise collectives began to feel the "cold breath" of the market. The prices for materials, equipment, and services rose sharply while the price for coal remained unchanged.

These and other incongruities forced Donbass [production] association leaders to announce at the beginning of January that the mines would suspend the dispatch of coal unless the miners' problems were resolved without delay. The Ukrainian Government managed to defuse the conflict in time. V. Fokin arrived in the Donbass precisely to resolve the problems that had arisen. The meeting took place in a complex, fraught atmosphere. Nonetheless, after protracted debate, a protocol was signed in accordance with which the Ukrainian Government, which has taken over the management of the coal sector, assumes responsibility for the implementation of the USSR Council of Ministers resolutions aimed at resolving a series of key production, social, and consumer issues affecting Donbass coal enterprises. A new price per tonne of coal has been fixed. It will now cost 90 rubles [R] and 93 kopeks, or 2.4 times more than last year.

In order to implement the Union decisions R12 billion will be needed, which will now have to come from the republic budget. This budget, V. Fokin said, carries a huge deficit totalling some R15 billion. During the conference it emerged that supplies of timber and other materials to miners also remain a most difficult question. These materials are being supplied by Russian enterprises. Contracts have been concluded with these enterprises, but they have failed to dispatch the ordered goods. Why? Apparently in retaliation for the Ukraine's failure to meet deliveries of meat, sugar, and other foodstuffs to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in January. This is a strange situation. There is a treaty between the sovereign republics, yet problems and claims and counterclaims are on the increase.

Caucasus

Situation in South Ossetia 'Stabilized'

LD2801181991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Unattributed report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs press center in Tskhinvali]

[Text] The situation in South Ossetia has stabilized. It has been relatively calm there for the last two days, although sporadic gunfire can be heard in the town, and there are cases of arson attacks on houses. Republican militia workers together with detachments of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs ensure that the curfew is observed. There are more people on the streets, which until recently were barricaded. Workers of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs continue to leave the town. There are still about 250 Georgian militiamen in Tskhinvali. The Georgian National Guards detachments have been withdrawn from Tskhinvali.

Georgian Railroad Blockaded in Protest

LD2901120991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1137 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—A TASS correspondent has been informed by phone from Tbilisi that the movement of trains in the town of Samtredia—a major junction in Georgia—has been stopped. The representatives of a number of public organizations and parties have closed the rail lines. The action is directed against the decree of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding the joint patrolling the streets of major towns by militiamen and servicemen.

Those taking part in the action are also opposed to the proposed introduction of prefectures in Georgia which is envisaged by the draft law on the election of local bodies of self-government. Those taking part in the blockade of the railroad consider that the establishment of the structure of prefectures in the republic is an antidemocratic step.

Azerbaijan Central Committee Discusses Crisis

LD2801205791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] The difficult period that Azerbaijan is experiencing is caused mainly by the crisis in the country and by the negative consequences of republican events. Party organizations, lost at times and showing no initiatives, are also to blame for this. This was noted in Baku today at a joint plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the Control and Auditing Commission.

Mutalibov, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party

Central Committee, and president of the republic, delivered a report at the plenum. Speaking about the ways to resolve the crisis, many speakers came to the conclusion that if civic accord is not reached and the economy is not stabilized then the situation could get out of control. The conclusion of a new Union treaty and the formation of a common all-Union market may help to find the way out of the established situation, plenum participants believe. An indispensable condition of this is that republican sovereignty should not be affected.

The plenum approved the composition of the Azerbaijan Central Committee commission.

Commodity Exchange To Be Established in Baku

LD2601143391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0635 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Text] Baku, 26 Jan (TASS)—The government of Azerbaijan has adopted a decision to set up a commodity exchange in the republic's capittal, Baku. Its founders are the republic's Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], the city's executive committee, major production associations, and specialized and commercial banks.

As a TASS correspondent was told by Ragim Guseynov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] of Azerbaijan, the need to set up the exchange has been dictated by the switch to new economic relations.

The exchange, he said, will be combining classical exchange operations with barter deals, auctions, and fair-based trade.

Later on, as the volume of the market increases and trade expands, Ragim Guseynov announced, it is intended to create a number of specialized exchanges—for trade in petroleum products, cotton, tobacco, wine, and other goods that the Republic produces in large quantities.